Pakistan and the United States may appear to be on the same side in the “war on terror” in Afghanistan but they are by no means “natural allies”. Pakistan was never really serious about the alliance except for whatever it could extract in terms of military and economic aid from the US, even as it provided the Taliban a trans-border safe haven in its Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) region.

The serious incident of fratricide on November 27, 2011, between Pakistani and American forces on the AfPak border in the Mohmand tribal agency in Fata has to be viewed in this context. Twenty-eight soldiers of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps, manning two border outposts (“Boulder” and “Volcano”), were killed by misdirected American attack helicopters and gunship aircraft. The US helicopters were responding to an urgent call for close air support from an American-Afghan patrol ambushed in the same area. Militarily, the incident appeared to be an all too familiar case of mistaken identity and garbled communication between allied forces. Such problems are often encountered in air-land warfare, particularly when there are language barriers.
But in the larger context, since war is sometimes defined as politics by other means, the political fallout from the Mohmand incident on US-Pak relations was tectonic. It triggered a wave of public fury in Pakistan and further inflamed anti-US sentiment in Pakistan. Also, it put the Zardari government under immense pressure as vociferous political opponents like Imran Khan and his Tehreek-e-Insaf Party as well as other more fundamentalist outfits were critical of the fratricide.
Pakistan signalled its severe displeasure with the US by adopting a series of measures, most significant of which was the blockade of the logistic jugular for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces in Afghanistan by immediate closure of the Khyber and Bolan passes.
In many senses, however, the Mohmand incident was an action replay of the earlier Afghan War of 1979-89. The protagonists at that time were different, but the stage setting and the storyline remain the same.
The Afghan War was a “war of liberation” against military intervention in Afghanistan by a European power and the counter-mobilisation of fundamentalist Islamic forces opposed to the invaders. The foreign intervention then was by Soviet Russia in support of its ally, President Mohammad Najibullah.
Similarly, in 2001, the US invaded Afghanistan which was ruled by the Taliban. The US aimed to arrest and punish those deemed responsible for the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre. In both the wars, Afghanistan was the battleground and its inhabitants the principal sufferers, with the entire country transformed into a free fire zone by both sides.
In the Mohmand incident, Pakistan sought to project itself as an innocent injured party and its troops the victims of a deliberate American attack. But the US refused to buy the story and maintained that the airstrike was to help extricate an American patrol under hostile fire emanating from a Pakistani border post.
Indian commanders and troops deployed under similar conditions of “no war, no peace” opposite Pakistani troops along the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir, would accord more credibility to the American account than the Pakistani one, because it rings more true. It matches their experience in Jammu and Kashmir.
Pakistan has all along been an untrustworthy opponent quick to irritate and provoke, initiating incidents of firing at the Indian troops from across the Line of Control. Usually, in all such cases, India has followed a policy of “restraint”. It refrained from counteraction as any Indian response would be picked up and reported by Pakistani forces as a breach of peace. And soon a complaint will be lodged with the United Nations Observers monitoring that particular sector. The first priority of the Indian government was to maintain peace at all costs, even at times when India was clearly the aggrieved party.
As the US prepares to withdraw from Afghanistan by 2014, Pakistan is jockeying for a dominant place in the post-withdrawal scenario. During the Afghan War of 1979-89, the asymmetry between the opposing forces, acting as proxies for opposing superpowers, was sought to be evened out by their respective principals.
Russia (at that time the USSR) provided helicopter gunships with Russian pilots to the forces of the Afghan government engaged in fighting the Mujahideen supported by the CIA and the ISI. The ISI was initially handicapped by lack of effective air defence measures against the Russian helicopters. This was a shortcoming that the US sought to rectify by providing them with Stinger shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, through ISI.
The Stingers caused substantial losses to the Soviet helicopter forces and redressed the balance somewhat. However, the story carries a sting in the tail. When hostilities ended and the US wanted to recover the Stingers it had so freely handed out, there was no response from the Mujahideen even when substantive bonuses were offered.
It was widely held that some or all of the “missing” missiles were retained with an eye to the future. The present generation of Mujahideen are suspected to hold an unknown number of these weapons, though there are no reports so far that these have ever been encountered.
But what of the future? Food for thought indeed!

The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former Member of Parliament