The nationwide uproar created by chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Omar Abdullah, demanding withdrawal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) from “certain areas” in his state has to be seen in its broader implications in an overall national context, rather than either as a narrowly military issue, or a political one concerning Jammu and Kashmir alone.
Mr Abdullah is under political siege by his opponents on issues of domestic governance. He is desperately seeking a diversionary measure to relieve the pressures on him and his party, in this case by raising the issue of AFSPA and its application in Jammu and Kashmir.

By extension, his comments on AFSPA lend themselves to interpretation as implied criticism of the heavy presence of the Indian Army and other security forces in the state.
Jammu and Kashmir is a vital issue of national security and not a theme for agitational rhetoric by the leader of the political party in government at state level. Mr Abdullah’s strident posturing on AFSPA is therefore primarily aimed at his own political constituency in the Kashmir Valley in an attempt to strengthen his acceptability.
Some reckonable separatist elements in the Valley have come out in support of his comments on AFSPA, and want him to translate speech into action unilaterally if necessary.
There is, of course, no corresponding echo of support in the Jammu region where there is tremendous support for the presence of the Indian Army in the state.
The AFSPA was passed by both Houses of the Indian Parliament on September 11, 1958, and initially made applicable only in the troubled “Seven Sisters” north-eastern states of the country.
In 1990, it was extended to Jammu and Kashmir as well. These states had all been targeted by an active campaign of low-intensity proxy war supported by Pakistan through their local adherents, primarily in the Kashmir Valley who were provided with cross-border support. None of these regions can even today be described as complete havens of peace and tranquillity.
In fact, their continued existence within the Union of India is itself due in no small measure to the extensive counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations carried out by the Indian military and paramilitary forces during the early years of our republic.
It is nobody’s case that these methods were not sometimes heavy handed and misdirected or that injustices did not occur on occasions. But the context of the turbulent challenges during the early years of our existence as a republic, when the survival of the nation itself was often at stake, is also often forgotten or deliberately ignored in historical hindsight.
The Indian Army regards counterinsurgency as an unpleasant and thankless necessity required to be undertaken in the murky environment of a “dirty war”.
Unlike in a high-intensity conventional war where fullest use of maximum force and firepower is acceptable and mandatory, in low-intensity operations like the counterinsurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, the soldier has to walk a delicate tightrope between eliminating well-armed militants with “minimum force” to avoid collateral casualties amongst the local civil population and maintaining exemplary behaviour towards the civil population in the area of operations even in the face of the gravest provocation.
It is only the Indian Army who can handle the conflicting requirements of high- and low-intensity environments.
This is the operational background within which AFSPA has to be applied, something which is often forgotten or deliberately ignored by the ostensibly “liberal” sections of civil society, during outpourings of criticism against AFSPA.
These critics may be either genuinely idealistic and well meaning but naive and ill-informed, or overground supporters of militant organisations seeking to cynically exploit the democratic process itself to speak against AFSPA and the Army from public platforms, the latter often as a ploy to inhibit or slow down military operations to relieve pressure against militant groups in the area.
The Army is the last resort of the government, when all else has failed, and AFSPA constitutes an essential military prerequisite before deploying armed forces (including paramilitary and Central police forces) in aid to civil authority. Repeal of AFSPA or dilution of its provisions would certainly be detrimental to their operational functions and it would be preferable to withdraw the military completely from operations rather than leave troops to function without the necessary legal protection for actions during a proxy war against a ruthless and well-armed enemy.
Mr Abdullah is an individual of presentable personality and distinguished political lineage, though of comparatively limited experience in administration or the devious ways of practical politics. The political party to which he belongs represents, to some extent, an acceptable middle path in the devious and tangled politics of Jammu and Kashmir.
But Mr Abdullah seems to have overestimated his own capabilities for controlling his political followers and workers and underestimated the dangers of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds.
Because sooner or later, the hounds, in this case ruthless extremist jihadi organisations like the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba or the Hizbul Mujahideen are likely to turn and devour him. Such a fate would indeed be a tragedy for one who is so young and promising.

The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former member of Parliament