In September-October 2000, as the Eastern Fleet Commander, I led a task force of warships on a 45-day overseas deployment to what is now a hotly disputed region, namely the South China Sea and the East China Sea.

We made port calls to show indigenously-built Indian warships and also exercised with warships of Singapore, Vietnam, China, South Korea, Japan and Indonesia. After this path-breaking deployment, the Indian Navy has carried out 60-day deployments every year to the Asia Pacific Region, which is of vital interest to India. In addition, our warships and submarines deploy on similar flag showing missions in the Indian Ocean Region, as also in the Mediterranean, Europe and, occasionally, the American continent. These periodic deployments show that India is aware that over 90 per cent of India’s trade is by sea, 50 per cent of India’s sea-borne trade (including energy imports) is to and from the West and 50 per cent is eastwards. The impressive growth and deployment of the Indian Navy is recognised globally, but organisational issues of higher defence management remain, which need to be resolved so that our national interests may always be fully protected by a Navy on which billions of dollars are spent.
It is a matter of time before the Indian Navy begins operating ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of the INS Arihant and the follow-on types. In the strategic field of nuclear deterrence, the Indian Navy will deploy the SSBNs as mandated, but the question is: what will the government do in case of a doomsday scenario, wherein India or its military is attacked by an enemy nuclear “first strike”?
In 2008, it took massive public outcry for the government to permit Indian naval ships to commence anti-piracy patrols off Somalia. Subsequently, 26/11 forced the government to beef up coastal security, which had been neglected despite the Mumbai bomb blasts of 1993. By early 2011, the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) neutralised the threat of piracy within 600 nautical miles off India’s west coast (numerous pirate boats were sunk and over 120 pirates arrested), and have also deterred repetition of 26/11. Indian Navy warships off Somalia have co-operated with the international community in counter-piracy operations ensuring, for the first time in over five years, a decline in the number of Somali piracy-related seizure of merchant ships.
Impressed by the growth of the professional Indian Navy, Vietnam, in 2011, offered India a naval base in the South China Sea. The government is yet to take a decision, despite the fact that such a facility is essential if the Indian Navy is to protect Indian sea-borne trade and ONGC oil exploration in South China Sea. The only alternative is induction of 6 to 12 tactical nuclear submarines (SSNs) of the INS Chakra type, for prolonged deployment in distant waters without any base support.
Recently China has upped the ante by declaring that Tibet (including “lower Tibet” i.e. Arunachal Pradesh), South China Sea, East China Sea and the Yellow Sea as areas of its “core interests”, and that it would not tolerate any foreign interference in these areas. India has yet to spell out its core national interests in the region.
The year 2012 marks the 400th anniversary of the Indian Navy, which traces its origin to 1612, when a squadron of the East India Company warships defeated the Portuguese in a sea battle off Surat. On December 4, 2012, Indian Navy Chief, Adm. D.K. Joshi, speaking to the media on the occasion of Navy Day, said that the Indian Navy would be ready to sail anywhere (including the South China Sea), to protect India’s national interests. Unfortunately, India’s national security adviser, Shiv Shankar Menon, who was in Beijing for talks, issued a statement to appease the Chinese. Around the same time, the Maldives government asked the Indian infrastructure firm GMR to get out of its project on the Male airport. Shortly after, a Maldivian government delegation went to Beijing for “defence and military co-operation” and returned on December 13, 2012, with a $500 million military aid package.
The Indian Navy (along with the Indian Army and Air Force) assisted the Maldives government in 1988 coup attempt, and again in 2004 after the December 26 tsunami. The ICG and the Indian Navy have been training Maldives Coast Guard personnel for over two decades. Has all the goodwill built up by Indian sea power been squandered in a few days because of inept Indian diplomacy? The Chinese, who set up an embassy in Male a year ago, are now entrenched in India’s backyard (China also built the Gwadar Port in Pakistan and Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, in addition to ports in Bangladesh and Burma). The Gwadar Port, located 360 nautical miles off the strategic Gulf of Oman, is expected to become a Chinese naval base in a few years. The threats to India’s oil imports from West Asia are obvious.
In India, naval diplomacy is something that is still frowned upon. In February 2008, the Indian Navy organised a meeting of the heads of Indian Ocean navies and coast guards in New Delhi under the name Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. This two-day symposium was inaugurated by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and attended by Navy and Coast Guard chiefs of 30-odd Indian Ocean nations, along with numerous foreign ambassadors. Conspicuous by its absence were officials from our external affairs ministry; apparently, the Indian Foreign Service was peeved at the Indian Navy stepping on its turf.
Our defence and foreign ministries need to be reminded of what Fredrick the Great of Prussia said over a century ago, “Diplomacy without military power is like music without instruments.”
The latest American National Intelligence Council report of 2012 lists India as one of the top three economies, along with the US and China, by 2030. Clearly, if India has to emerge as a great power, it must closely co-ordinate its diplomatic and naval efforts. This is vital since the only place where the Chinese military machine and economy are vulnerable is in its extended sea trade routes in the Indian Ocean, which can be interdicted by the Indian Navy. China’s proxy Pakistan too is extremely vulnerable to a naval blockade by India.
The higher defence management in India needs a drastic change with the Indian armed forces being integrated with the government (ministry of defence) as is the case in most nations of the world.

The writer, a former vice-admiral, retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam