If China remains an enigma for India, it is for good reasons. Even as Beijing’s profile in the world grows bigger each day and its trade with New Delhi is rising, the political picture is murky at best with both sides sedulously play down the border dispute and Beijing saying little about its continuing love affair with Pakistan.

Whatever his motives, Ratan Tata has now added a new controversial dimension to the debate by suggesting that New Delhi should treat China as an ally, rather than an adversary.
In any assessment of Sino-Indian relations, it is accepted by policymakers that China will remain a vital and difficult neighbour of India. For one thing, it is asserting its regional and world role and its assertiveness has disturbed its neighbours in Southeast and East Asia. Much to the relief of the latter countries, the American announcement of a shift in military direction to the Pacific has put a marker on the ground. New Delhi has also drawn comfort from this new US focus without broadcasting its feelings around the world. It is equally clear that India will not agree to be a military ally of the US even as most nations of Southeast Asia will be loath to be proclaimed allies in the American containment of Beijing, should it want to. For most of them, China is too close and powerful for broadcasting their predicament.
In any event, American policy towards China will combine components of containment and engagement because Beijing has now assumed properties of a major nation state, if not an emerging superpower, and must be kept in the loop for tackling important world problems. The United States still remains far superior to China and the rest of the world in its economic and military might, but the rise of China and other nations after the demise of the Soviet Union and the diminution of its successor state signifies that it can no longer go it alone in pursuing its policies around the world.
India’s problems in the context of China are manifold. It must keep a wary eye and its powder dry along the long shared border. Whatever Beijing’s motives, which are not above suspicion, its ties with Pakistan cannot but affect its relations with India. Second, the burgeoning trade between the two countries, mostly in Beijing’s factor is a relatively new factor in the equation. Even if one does not believe in China’s string of pearls theory, suggesting a containment of New Delhi through the pursuit of close relations with its neighbours, one conclusion that seems inescapable is Beijing’s inclination to keep New Delhi preoccupied with it neighbours to prevent it from playing a meaningful role on the world stage.
Without proclaiming it in so many words, India has essentially adopted the American approach of engagement and containment even though New Delhi is unhappy with the word containment because it smacks of Cold War ideology. On the other hand, there is consensus in the country over declining the status of a non-Nato ally (as and when it might be made) because it would obviously be detrimental to New Delhi’s interests to be classed as an American camp follower. Mercifully, there is political space for India to benefit from a revived US interest in the Asia-Pacific while retaining its freedom of action. The future in Sino-Indian relations is not sealed, dependent as it will be on India’s future economic and military strength as it will be on China’s own internal developments highlighted by a more literate and demanding population.
We are, in any case, a long way away from finding a modus vivendi in Sino-Indian relations. Sometimes, Chinese arrogance towards India comes through in its official and semi-official media and it is often implied that New Delhi is being delusional in viewing itself as being in the same league as China. Partly, the remedy lies in India’s hands in demonstrating its ability to surmount its domestic problems and achieve new benchmarks; partly, in India’s diplomatic prowess in coming closer to the nations of Southeast and East Asia. China’s smaller neighbours are pining for a greater Indian role in their region and both Japan and South Korea have spread the welcome mat for India for years.
India’s look east policy has been pursued in fits and starts although there seems to be some indication that the mandarins in the South Block and their political masters are taking more interest in giving sinews to an approach that is as obvious as it is logical. Indeed, Chinese hubris plays to India’s strength because when the mask is off, Beijing’s attitude towards the smaller countries of Southeast Asia is that they are flies to be swotted. China has many disputes with its neighbours over the South China Sea but has had lately to bow to them to an extent because the Asean countries understandably prefer jointly talking to Beijing rather than risk being overawed one at a time.
Washington is still feeling its way to fleshing out its new policy towards China. US secretary of state Hillary Clinton raised a stir by describing the South China Sea as a matter of American interest. While the US would be loath to come to the military aid of countries in trouble with Beijing, it would have to negotiate delicately, where it is treaty-bound to assist, as in the case of the Philippines. Neither Beijing nor Washington would want to be eyeball to eyeball in the Indo-Pacific area, but the hazards of overshooting the mark are very much there.
For India, the options are to build closer relations in the region, to benefit from the new American accent on the Indo-Pacific and announce to China that it is willing to play ball if it takes New Delhi’s legitimate interests into account. Despite Mr Tata, there is little to suggest that Beijing has turned over a new leaf before New Delhi can view it as a friend, rather than an adversary.