The Musharraf-Manmohan Singh “Open Borders” solution to the Jammu and Kashmir imbroglio reached its zenith in 2006-2007. It was a product, as in history, of personality and events. Pakistan was cornered by the US after the 9/11 attack to turn on the Taliban, Pervez Musharraf the military dictator was desiring to be statesman and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s peace vision was in sync with his party’s desire to woo the Muslim vote. The July 2006 train bombings in Mumbai retarded the pace of the parleys. Mr Musharraf’s exit, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the ascent of her husband Asif Ali Zardari were all pointers to a game change in Pakistan.
However, even after the 26/11 at­tack in Mumbai in 2008, we co­ntinued to believe that the parleys had been interrupted and not derailed. This make-believe bonhomie has invited Pakistani sn­u­bs. Firstly their silence over $5 million Indian humanitarian a­ss­istance after the Pakistani floods. When upped to $20 million, Pakistan specified its manner of giving i.e. the UN ambassadors of both countries in New York in the beatific presence of Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General. This was followed by exchange of barbs at the UN. From the UN General Assembly (UNGA) po­d­ium, and elsewhere in New York, Pakistani foreign minister S.M. Qureshi chided India for ducking the civil unrest in Kashmir. It is not Pakistan raising the issue, he alleged, it is the people of the Valley. His coup de grace was in his UNGA address that the Kashmir issue was “about the exercise of the right of self-de­t­e­r­mination by the Kashmiri people through a free, fair and im­partial plebiscite under the UN auspices”. The “P” word se­nt the Indians epileptic, Indian ex­ternal affairs minister S.M. Kr­ishna dubbing it “unsolicited and unt­e­nable”. India called off a bilateral meeting with Mr Qure­s­hi, the latter then retorting it was India avoiding contact, which he was ready for “anytime, anywhere”.
Why has Pakistan relapsed into anachronistic formulations, long discarded and at variance with bilateral accords like the Shimla Agreement? Perhaps Pakistan is reverting to its default position, in which is anchored the core belief system of the Army and the Islamists. Mr Musharraf was making a foray to test the waters, the Army silently acquiesced, while the Islamists undermined it through periodic attacks on India. More importantly the context in which Mr Musharraf op­erated has changed i.e. the Kashmir Valley is undergoing civil unrest unseen for decades, Pakistani leverage vis-a-vis US has increased with the US President Barack Obama’s imperative for an honourable withdrawal from Afghanistan and the rise of Pakistan’s all-weather friend China.
The situation in the Valley merits closer scrutiny. The calls for “azadi” are not new, their vigour is. In December 1963, reported loss of Prophet’s relic had unleashed a similar unrest. It is perhaps not a coincidence that this happened after India’s embarrassing thrashing at the hands of China in 1962. Contrariwise, Sheikh Abdullah the family’s paterfamilias finally settled with the Nehru-Gandhi family only in 1974, after the break-up of Pakistan in 1971 and the emergence of India as the dominant South Asian power. Peace and harmony prevailed till Sh­eikh Sahib’s demise in 1982. The incompetence of his son and successor Farooq, the electoral fra­ud in 1987 and finally Pakistani victory in Afghanistan and Soviet withdrawal in 1989 rel­easing jihad blooded hordes all encouraged Pakistan to now turn its terror machine towards the Valley. Today Omar, a third generation Abdullah, lacking the charisma and guile of his grandfather, or his father’s charm and grace has only his pal Rahul Ga­ndhi’s goodwill to sustain him in a task to which he is clearly unequal.
The all-party delegation’s visit, followed by an eight-point initiative and the promise of special interlocutors are a good opening gambit. The weakness is the unavailability of a political figure who can translate all this into a cogent political strategy and a narrative that undercuts the leaders who are fuelling the unrest.
Bob Woodward’s book Obama’s Wars depicts growing US wariness with Pakistani duplicity. The US is also reacting to emerging Chinese assertiveness in East Asia. With Mr Obama due in New Delhi next month India needs to enlarge its options and its Kashmir narrative. The April 1948 UN Security Council plebiscite resolution needs revisiting, which India of the 1950s and 60s spent time ducking. India of 1971 felt it had overcome it with the Shimla Agreement. A rising India, today needs to debate it with Pakistan and with its people in Kashmir. Is Pakistan ready to let its Shia minority in Gilgit and Baltistan even consider the option of escaping their prison for freedom in India? Valley needs to be told by us and by the P-5 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council) that none of them wants an independent Kashmir — a potentially Islamised Swat Valley. Are the four million people of the Valley wanting to be swallowed up by a Pakistan at war with itself? Why are no politicians espousing such a narrative in the Valley? Exchanging a part of the Valley for Gilgit and Baltistan makes greater strategic sense as it would sever overland links between Pakistan and China.
Kashmir is the door through which Pakistan is allowing the Chinese power to percolate into South Asia. Is Pakistan willing to forsake its special relations with China for a deal on Kashmir? If not, any concession to Pakistan will be one to China. The US needs to reassess its interests in the context of this great game and, for perhaps the first time, have a frank discussion with India on a common malaise — a headache called Pakistan.

The author is a former secretary in the external affairs ministry