India’s successful launch of Agni-V, Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), with a stated range of 5,000 kms, was a truly euphoric occasion for the nation. The spectacle of the lift-off from Wheeler Island signalled that India had gatecrashed into the strategic missile community whether it was welcome there or not, and the world must learn to live with it. To Indian public opinion, the saga of Agni-V came as a refreshing and welcome relief from the otherwise unending soap opera of political sleaze which has now become an almost permanent feature on the national scene.

Agni-V also demonstrated that not withstanding the general concern about flight of high-end human talent to perceived greener pastures abroad, a substantial and solid base of home-grown science and technology still remains available within the country.
But India cannot afford a state of extended euphoria for too long. South Asia is a harsh environment and much hard work still remains to be done in terms of technical refinement and organisational structuring. It is imperative that Agni-V is put on the production line and inducted into service at the earliest as an integrated and fully engineered component of the Indian strategic missile system.
India’s strategic weapons assets are held by the respective services but their operational employment is controlled and conducted by the Strategic Forces Command. It functions under the Integrated Defence Staff, which, in India’s case, functions under the Chiefs of Staff Committee and not under a Chief of Defence Staff as in other countries for reasons which are peculiarly Indian.
Thus, Agni-V is also an appropriate occasion to point yet again to the many shortcomings in India’s system of the higher management of national security. The Integrated Defence Staff should have been the key control element for strategic forces but it remains a badly wounded lame duck even several decades after its establishment.
The Integrated Defence Staff was established as the chief authority for tri-service coordination at the national levels of strategic and operational planning. Whatever the public face put on it by the defence services, it is no secret that due to short-sightedness and narrow-minded service rivalries, the Integrated Defence Staff exists as a more or less ornamental organisation, almost completely sidetracked out of the mainline decision-making process.
Going by logic and precedent, Agni-V would be allotted to the strategic missile units of the Indian Army for operational employment. Some may also go to the Air Force as a strategic strike element replacing manned aircraft in this role, possibly reflecting the shape of things to come. Published reports indicate that Agni-V, when fully developed, will be deployed in both silo-based as well as road-mobile configurations. India may also take comfort and justifiable pride that other complex supporting equipment for Agni-V are also being produced in the country, many of them by the Indian private sector. Significant among them are the mobile missile platforms for Agni missiles, designed around the transportererector-launcher vehicles which are on public display during the Republic Day and Army Day parades in New Delhi. They are by no means small achievements either. In the same category come the intelligence and surveillance satellites for reconnaissance, target acquisition and missile guidance, along with the other communications and support systems, all made in India.
In accordance with India’s long-standing nuclear policy of “no first use” followed by “massive retaliation” in case of a nuclear attack, Agni-V can be launched in a nuclear or conventional second-strike mode, depending on the nature of the initial first strike by the opponent. For this, Agni-V and its associated infrastructure will have to remain capable of surviving a hostile first strike and remain functional in the aftermath to carry out retaliatory second-strike missions as a punitive response directed against “value targets”, like cities and population centres in preference to “counter-force” targets of a strategic nature, like troop concentrations or critical infrastructure. How massive is India’s “massive” retaliation required to be? These and other related questions will relate to the number of counter-value or counter-force targets selected for retaliation and the resources remaining to do so.
The advent of Agni-V provoked a quick response from Pakistan, which launched a Hatf-VII missile, with a stated range of 3,000-3,500 kms, and the capability to reach targets throughout the subcontinent. Earlier, Indian ballistic missiles could easily cover even the most distant regions in Pakistan, while peninsular and eastern India remained outside Pakistani missile range. Hatf-VII has altered that equation and introduced a new element into the India-Pakistan balance, including the China factor of the strategic joint-venture relationship with Pakistan.
China’s Dong Feng (East Wind) series of IRBM/Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, with a claimed operational reach of 8,000 kms, is basically oriented towards the western coasts of mainland US, and as “ship busters” for engaging American carrier task forces standing off in the East/South China Sea. Based in Tibet and western China, the Dong Feng missile can easily reach targets throughout the Indian subcontinent as well, hitherto without fear of Indian retaliation against the heartland of China around Beijing or Shanghai. Agni-V with its enhanced range has now removed this immunity and has somewhat evened out the imbalance.
The Dong Feng series is a fully matured weapons system, whereas Agni-V is still a prototype technology demonstrator. Agni-V will require further development including additional test-firings before it can be cleared for induction and series production. The so-called “international community” led by China and its surrogates, like Pakistan, will attempt to pressure India against these additional tests. India will require to hold firm on this issue, including against some countries otherwise considered friendly. The wavering displayed during the run-up to the second series of nuclear tests in Pokhran must not recur in respect of Agni-V.
A very senior national leader recently referred in Parliament to Agni-V as a “weapon of peace”. He may have confused his metaphors somewhat because Agni-V is undoubtedly a weapon of war, which is also India’s powerful “peacekeeper”.

The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former member of Parliament