With the treaty with Afghanistan signed in New Delhi on October 4, India has introduced itself as a member of the top table, regardless of disapproving sniffs from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, or active (and often violent) opposition from Pakistan). The United States, the main player in Afghanistan, must have directly or indirectly indicated its acquiescence, without which this would not have been feasible.

For the first time, India and Afghanistan have moved out of the realms of “soft power” and directly entered into the hitherto forbidden hard power space of mutual security. Under this pact, India is to train Afghan security forces in counterterrorism, which has expanded into fairly intense counterinsurgency and conventional operations as well. This was an area hitherto reserved for the efforts of the polygot Nato forces, each with their own uneven national standards of efficiency and effectiveness.
The Nato troops, except its American component, have always been reluctant warriors in Afghanistan, operating under individual national approvals regarding location and choice of mission. Their troops have been almost invariably been assigned to the “quieter” spots of the conflict like the territory of the Northern Alliance in upper Afghanistan, where the Taliban have expanded into. Some like Spain succumbed to pressure and pulled out their forces. Others, like the United Kingdom, have decided that they have done their bit, and it was advisable to terminate their fruitless involvement in a frustrating war, with no tangible benefits but only casualties. Of course, Britain waited till the end of its Afghan commitments, before withdrawing completely from its thankless task. To give the British forces their due, they have done their share of duty in the high-intensity Helmand area (of south western Afghanistan), where other European contingents have shown reluctance to become engaged in.
Afghanistan has proved that Nato remains an organisation essentially designed for “homeland defence” of Western Europe against a Soviet threat during the Cold War and is out of place in a non-European environment. Indeed, it would not be incorrect to question the present raison d’être for Nato itself in the post-Cold War environment even in Europe. Perhaps a European Union force would be more appropriate with, of course, its inevitable doubts on American linkages.
How should India go about implementing the proposed security component of its agreement with Afghanistan? There are too many unknowns in Afghanistan, including the long-term prospects of the Karzai government itself. The recent assassination of former Afghanistan President Burhanuddin Rabbani on September 20 demonstrates that even though goodwill for India may (and does) exist among all sections of the Afghan population, including Pashtuns, any public expression of it will draw the wrath of Pakistan-sponsored elements proliferating in Afghanistan.
As the final dates of drawdown in 2014 get closer, Nato appears increasingly anxious to leave with as few casualties as possible. The Taliban is scenting victory and quite content to bide its time with occasional high-profile targeted attacks like the Rabbani assassination, or the attack on the US embassy and Nato headquarters in Kabul in July, designed to remind the world about its presence.

Under such circumstances India must clearly understand all aspects and dimensions of the situation it seeks to enter into. The aim must be clear — to deny Pakistan the strategic space of an Afghanistan controlled by a power structure hostile to India.
The Afghan National Army has commenced taking over responsibility for the security situation in Afghanistan. It has not yet been fully successful, but is not an abject failure either. Gradually, almost imperceptibly, a spirit of Afghan national unity is coming about, especially in the urban areas and amongst the student population. India must sense this carefully and try to move with as much caution as possible. It is unlikely of course that any large-scale movement of Afghan troops to India for training will take place. Pakistan will not allow it.
The only alternative is to emplace Indian Military Training and Advisory Teams (IMTRAT) in Afghanistan where they will impart training to Afghan Army troops in whatever branches of service are required. Chief amongst these will be training the fighting arms — armour, artillery, combat engineers, and infantry. It is no small task, but one in which the Indian Army is well versed, having carried these out in diverse locations earlier. Indian instructors get along well with foreign nationalities, particularly those from allied regions like Burma, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal or Bhutan, besides African and Arab countries.
Professionally, training the Afghan National Army should not be a problem for India. The problem lies in the intense politics associated with Afghanistan and its internal issues. This has already commenced, with President Hamid Karzai’s statement about India being a close friend, but Pakistan a “twin brother”. IMTRAT Afghanistan will be intensely targeted by Pakistan’s Afghan auxiliaries and will require strong self-protection measures. There may even be casualties, like the two Indian medical officers assassinated in Kabul by Pakistan-sponsored groups. Pakistan will also do its best to make transit connectivity between India and Afghanistan as insecure as possible. Under these circumstances, the greater danger is loss of resolution by the Indian government and abandonment of its resolutions to help Afghanistan to arm and defend itself.
Afghanistan has historically been the graveyard of empires. India is not an imperialist in the traditional politico-military sense but its failure to help Karzai’s Afghanistan would be a tragedy.

The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former member of Parliament