India’s security perceptions have traditionally focused on terrorism by Pakistan-based jihadi agencies like Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and its other franchisees. “Murder with a borrowed sword” or Third Party terrorism is still comparatively novel in an Indian setting. The attempted assassination of an Israeli diplomat in New Delhi on February 13 by a car bomb placed by alleged Iranian surrogates with Indian connections would fall in this category, posing a type of security-cum-diplomatic challenge whose ramifications Indian security and counter-intelligence agencies may still not be fully conversant with. Indian security perceptions have traditionally focused on terrorism by Pakistan-based groups of Sunni jihadis whose virulently anti-Indian philosophy is anti-Shia and anti-Israel.

In the present incident, the Indian capital does not appear to be the intended target but merely a preferred location for a clash between third party agencies, in this case of Israel and Iran. India too can become a battleground where such conflicts can be played out with scant regard for national boundaries. It is a phenomenon which is likely to recur with increasing frequency and may get totally out of hand unless India’s traditional image of a soft open target acquires a firm no-nonsense makeover of preventive action, to root out “the New Delhi bombers” and send out an unequivocal message that the sanctity of Indian territory cannot be trifled with under any circumstances by foreign intelligence services.
Given Iran’s hardline image of Shia radicalism and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s harsh rhetoric denouncing Israel and the West at every opportunity, Israel for its part justifiably perceives Iran’s nuclear programme as an existentialist threat to itself, one about which it cannot afford to be at all complacent. The New Delhi car bomb was a manifestation of this conflict between Israel and Iran, conducted through their respective covert agencies.
Two similar incidents also occurred almost simultaneously the same day near the Israeli embassies in places as widely separated as Bangkok in Thailand and Tbilisi in Georgia, making it obvious that there is a common thread linking the three. Investigations in India by the Delhi Police have thrown up an Iranian connection at the very outset, with their very first arrest, that of a freelance Indian journalist working for an Iranian radio station. The motorcycle reportedly used by the bomber has also been recovered.
The arrested journalist is suspected to be member of a local group that provided backup and support for the alleged hitman, who left the country immediately after the incident. Comparisons with Mumbai 26/11 and the confessions of Daood Gilani alias
David Coleman Headley are inevitable.
The Israeli embassy in New Delhi has been quick (some would say too quick) to announce an Iranian connection to the episode and demand that those involved in the attempt be traced and brought to justice. Iran for its part has, naturally, denied any involvement in the terrorist attack while public opinion in India seems to be divided between pro- and anti-Israeli points of view. New Delhi attaches considerable importance to maintaining friendly relations with both Iran and Israel, who however are sworn enemies to each other. This three-way relationship carries a significant potential of acute embarrassment for their common host.
India is squirming uneasily at the thought of a private Iran-Israel war on Indian soil, a political and diplomatic hot potato which has dropped abruptly in India’s lap, leaving New Delhi scrambling to contain the possible fallout.
India has also to keep a wary ear open to the escalating war of words between the US and Iran over the latter’s ongoing nuclear programme, which is gradually raising geopolitical temperatures within and around South Asia. India must also never forget its own proximity to the possible scene of a potential
catastrophe should a US-Iran nuclear cauldron ever boil
over.
Israel is determined to exploit every available means to derail the Iranian programme at all costs. Iran’s nuclear and scientific infrastructure is under attack, by means ranging from physical sabotage to cyber attacks on critical software programmes. The reported use of computer viruses like Stuxnet to disable the Iranian centrifuge system used for enrichment of uranium is a case in point. Other reports, some backed by hard evidence, indicate that Iranian scientists participating in that country’s nuclear programme have been targeted for assassination.
Four prominent Iranian nuclear scientists have been killed or incapacitated since 2010, a typical case being the double assassination attempt in Teheran on November 29, 2010, in which one Iranian scientist was killed and another, Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, a high-ranking official of the Iranian defence ministry, who was reportedly heading one of Iran’s largest nuclear projects, was severely injured, and possibly incapacitated. The modus operandi of these assassinations was similar to the one recently witnessed in New Delhi, of magnetic car-bombs clamped on the targeted vehicle by a motorcyclist, who then disappeared in rush hour traffic.
The involvement of other covert agencies in this conflict cannot be discounted, notably those of Saudi Arabia, and the ubiquitous CIA of the United States, both united in their opposition to the Shia fundamentalism of the Ayatollahs and President Ahmadinejad. Dissident Kurds inside Iran are yet another group violently opposed to the Ahmadinejad regime, and could offer “volunteers” for such activities. Of course, all the suspect organisations have strenuously denied involvement in any type of terrorist activity in India, but this too is entirely as expected and in accordance with the rules of a very devious game.
India’s own national security is at stake, and the country obviously cannot be permitted to become a happy hunting ground for such activities by external agencies.
The New Delhi bomb episode has tested the efficiency and professional performance of India’s own security and counter-intelligence services once again. Their performance will remain under scrutiny.

The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former member of Parliament