As the curtains fall on 2010, our foreign policy establishment can look back with some satisfaction. The succession of visits by leaders of the major powers and our own participation in a string of multilateral summits has underscored India’s rising profile on the international stage. The scripted performances of summitry are particularly alluring in the age of 24-hour news coverage. But international politics continues to turn on seemingly mundane diplomatic activities. Further, despite all the attention to India’s increasing global importance, challenges within the region remain at once immediate and intractable. It is appropriate, therefore, that external affairs minister S.M. Krishna is beginning the new year with a visit to Afghanistan.
Although purpose of the trip is described as routine bilateral consultations, it comes on the heels of important developments. For a start, the Obama administration recently concluded its annual review of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This partly public exercise in stock-taking concluded that the military surge had “arrested” the momentum of the Taliban insurgency, but cautioned that “these gains remain fragile and reversible”. Although the review talked up Pakistan’s contributions to the fight against Al Qaeda and Taliban, the Obama administration’s unease was palpable. Pakistan’s reluctance to move against insurgent safe havens along its borders with Afghanistan was emphasised more than once. Internal intelligence assessments — leaked to the press around the same time as the review — were more forthright. National Intelligence Estimates, which represent the consensus of view of all intelligence agencies, have warned that Pakistan’s unwillingness to clean out insurgents’ sanctuaries in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas remains a serious obstacle to progress in the war.
But the Obama administration appears to be resigning itself to Pakistan’s intransigence. To be sure, drone attacks are on the rise, but no one seriously believes that these can drain the swamp. The current policy of continuing “engagement” with the Pakistan Army is presented as the only realistic course. As in the past, the US is under-estimating its leverage. And this is because the Obama administration doesn’t take any interest in the one issue that is of greatest interest to the Pakistan Army: how it secures and wields influence in the polity. Unless the US demonstrates its willingness to undercut the Army’s standing within Pakistan, there is no way that Pakistan Army chief General Pervez Kayani & Co will begin to oblige. New Delhi needs to begin a frank conversation with Washington on these lines. The American assumption that Pakistan Army’s stance is some uncontrollable force of nature is the surest recipe for continued regional instability.
The Af-Pak review also took a cautious optimistic view of the improvements to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The targets set for the expansion of ANSF had been exceeded. The review also noted the “sharply improved… training effectiveness” of these forces. Clearly, their operational effectiveness is not even worth discussing — at least not yet. Indeed, the levels of desertion and attrition in ANSF remain very high. Unsurprisingly, the ANSF is not in charge anywhere except Kabul. And yet, the review speaks about sticking to the plan for transitioning to Afghan-led operations starting July 2011 and to be completed by 2014. Of course, the administration has made it clear that there will be an American military presence thereafter too. But American combat units are likely to be phased out before the ANSF becomes capable of holding its own against the insurgency. The training of ANSF is another area where India can contribute, if Rawalpindi was not handed a veto by Washington.
The issues of more immediate concern to India are Kabul’s efforts towards reconciliation with the Taliban and New Delhi’s role in the unfolding end game. Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s desire to reach out to the Taliban leadership appears to be strengthening with each passing month. Here the US’ inability to tackle the Pakistan end of the insurgency and the increasing civilian toll in operations inside Afghanistan appear to be the key drivers. Most recently, he has responded positively to suggestions from former senior Taliban leaders like Mullah Zaeef for formal negotiations in Turkey. So far, the Americans have sought to avoid being drawn into these efforts directly. But at some point in the near future they are likely to take control of this process.
New Delhi’s position on this issue is clear. It supports Mr Karzai’s efforts so long as it remains within the bounds articulated by him. The insurgents would have to give up violence, adhere to the Afghan Constitution, and sever ties with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. In his meetings in Kabul, Mr Krishna should reiterate India’s stance, not least because Pakistan is urging a dilution of these criteria. India has also made it clear that it is not in favour of reaching out to the top leadership of the Taliban and other major insurgent groups. The joint statement issued during the Russian President’s recent visit pointedly noted the need to uphold the sanctions against individuals listed by the UN Security Council Resolution 1267 Sanctions Committee. Unless top Taliban leaders are removed from this list, serious formal negotiations are unlikely to take off. Evidently, India intends to use its temporary seat in the Security Council to shape deliberations on this issue.
Nevertheless, New Delhi has to recognise the limits of its influence in the Afghanistan end game. It is quite possible that Kabul (and Washington) might align itself with Islamabad’s position on reconciliation. The process could then move in a direction that is inimical to our interest.
So far, we have done well to focus on acquiring a strong developmental footprint in Afghanistan, and to build equities with a wide section of Afghan society. We have also sought to work with the Karzai government. These efforts could still pay off. But it may also be time start thinking of taking out some insurance policies.

Srinath Raghavan is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi