The main thrust of President Dmitry Medvedev’s India visit was to revive something of the warmth of old Indo-Soviet ties in a world that has changed beyond recognition since the two countries were virtual allies in the Cold War. The first term of Boris Yeltsin and his foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev on the break-up of the Soviet Union was nothing short of disastrous for the Moscow-New Delhi relationship because they had great delusions about Washington’s interest in helping their country.
The new Russian Federation had dismissed the old Soviet relationships as passé and burdensome without realising that Moscow could not equate India with the client states that were heavily dependent upon Soviet largesse. The Indian-Soviet relationship was more equal. While New Delhi was grateful for the arms it received from Moscow the West refused to sell and the transfer of technology no other country was then willing to give, India exported products that were not then available in the Soviet Union.
The mistake of the Yeltsin regime was that it tarred all countries with the same brush and was so enamoured of the American relationship that it gave the impression that its foreign policy was made in Washington. It was only after Yeltsin’s painful realisation that America pursued policies in its own national interest that he brought in Yevgeny Primakov as Prime Minister.
It was Vladimir Putin who made a significant effort to renew, in a measure, the old relationship of trust with India. And President Medvedev has tried to remove some of the cobwebs that have gathered thick and fast over a stunted equation. The agreements signed on the advanced aircraft, a collaborative effort and other projects are impressive, but the problem with Indo-Russian trade in the post-Soviet era has been a paltry two-way commerce outside the defence field and government contracts.
There are many reasons for this anomaly: the richer Russians’ lure for Western products, easier two-way traffic of people and goods with the West and Russian businessmen’s aversion to cultivating Indian trade, associated in their minds with cheap and shoddy goods. Above all, it has been Indian businessmen’s inability to obtain visas quickly and the difficulty of doing business with Russia. Perhaps the most significant agreement this time around is on simplifying the visa regime because it could vastly improve the trading relationship if it is properly implemented. There is in the Russian psyche a phobia about hordes of Indians overrunning the vast Russian spaces.
One other factor has a bearing on the future Moscow-New Delhi relationship is the evolving new world order. It is clear that India has now a new equation with the United States symbolised above all by the nuclear agreement that gave New Delhi the passport to nuclear commerce with the world. At the same time, Russia is in the midst of a “re-set” in its relations with America even while hedging its bets by building a close equation with Beijing. In a sense, China seems to the more dominant of the two, given its economic performance and the spare cash it has to tempt Moscow. We have thus arrived at a point when there is a quadrilateral formulation that impinges on relations between any two of the countries.
Some Russian commentaries give the suggestion of a sense of unease at the growing closeness of the Indo-American equation even as New Delhi has noted how Moscow sometimes behaves as the junior partner of China – a telling indication was its decision to shun the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony for a Chinese dissident simply because that was the preposterous Beijing demand.
Within this quadrilateral, there is vast opportunity in advancing the Indo-Russian relationship provided Moscow permits the burgeoning of business and other private interactions unhindered. It is surely telling that despite the testiness of the Beijing-New Delhi ties, the two countries have set the goal of $100 billion trade while the future target for Moscow and Delhi is $20 billion.
Both Russia and India have left behind the more sentimental aspects of the old relationship. Moscow has lost its ideology and much of its territory while New Delhi has lost some of its innocence. In fact, this could be a blessing in disguise because a relationship build on hardheaded pragmatism is lasting. There are very good reasons why the two countries should be supportive of each other and expand a lop-sided relationship for their mutual benefit and for the betterment of the region and the world.
A debate has begun in Russia over the prospect of Mr Putin returning to the presidency. Even if that were to happen, there would be no change in how Moscow perceives its interest in India. And even as the Manmohan Singh government is in the early days of its second term, it is facing much turbulence. Here again, the basis of the India-Russia equation is accepted across the political spectrum.
The need of the hour is to nurture the tender shoots of business-to-business relations, a task more for the Russian than the Indian side; Russian bureaucracy is more than a match for the Indian variant. Indian business and industry will sprint to grasp an opportunity. In the past, it has often had to give up in the face of visa and other restrictions. Expanding trade is indeed in the hands of Russian leaders of the ilk of President Medvedev.
President Medvedev pressed all the right buttons during his Indian safari. He now has the task of perking up his administration to act on what he and many of his countrymen desire: two-way trade commensurate with the nature of the military relationship and easier access to each other’s country.

S. Nihal Singh is the author of The Yogi and the Bear: A Study of Indo-Soviet Relations.