IF INDIA has been jubilant over US President Barack Obama’s visit, an important reason is his virtually unqualified endorsement of Indian quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council that is a departure from the previous American position. A typical reaction to it in the world media was that the US president had given a “push” to India’s “ambition”. How long will it take for the ambition to be fulfilled is the question, and on this opinions vary widely.

Many in India’s foreign policy establishment think that this could take as long as a decade. Some others have gone so far as to declare that Mr Obama’s promise of a permanent seat was a “pie in the sky”. Most American sources also believe that it would take quite some time before the package of the Security Council reform and the composition of its enlarged membership can be wrapped up. Of some interest is the estimate of a distinguished Chinese academic, Shen Dingli of the Fudan University. Unlike the government of his country that continues to be ambiguous, he supports India’s claim to a seat around the horseshoe table at Turtle Bay in New York categorically. Yet he believes that it has taken 15 years to reach so far, and that another 15 years might be needed before the exercise of reforming global governance could be completed.
In view of all this it is all the more remarkable that the mood about the expansion of the Security Council at the most important venue, the UN itself, is vastly more upbeat, as I witnessed during three working days there last week. One telling phrase I heard at almost every step was: “This is an idea whose time has come and there is overwhelming support for the expansion of both the permanent and non-permanent membership of the Council”. Some sources said that in December 2009, ambassadors (technically, they are called Permanent Representatives) of 144 countries had signed a letter demanding that the facilitator should prepare a text for inter-governmental negotiations instead of spending time in informal “discussions” in an open-ended working group. The number 144 far exceeds the two-thirds majority of the General Assembly which is needed to amend the UN Charter.
The Security Council per se has no say in this matter though by virtue of their clout the five permanent members can and will influence the voting pattern. Even today the clout of the US remains unmatched, as became evident last week. America succeeded in blocking the election of Iran to the executive of the women’s committee of Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc). Iran got only 19 of 54 votes, while East Timor, a last-minute US-backed candidate, secured 36. India was elected by 52 votes.
To be sure, even the optimists about an early reform and expansion of the Security Council readily admit that a great many rival, sometimes overlapping, sometimes clashing claims of different groups have to be reconciled before an agreed resolution can be tabled and passed. For, different groups and countries have different demands of their own. For instance, the Africa Group, consisting of 53 member states from that continent wants two permanent and two non-permanent seats on the expanded council. This is a legitimate aspiration though the North African states do not want to be left out. The so-called “L-69” Group, so named after the number of a relevant resolution, with 44 members, is broadly in favour of early reforms subject to its interests being protected. Similar is the stand of small island states. The Coffee Club, claiming a maximum membership of 10 but never able to mobilise that number, consists of those who want to keep some other country out, such as Pakistan that constantly trains its guns on India, Argentina that wants Brazil out, South Korea strongly opposed to Japan and so on. The main motive behind the campaign for early reforms is G4, comprising India, Brazil, Japan and Germany.
Despite the enormity of the task, the predominant view among the movers and shakers at the UN headquarters is that the necessary consensus need not take one or two years because everyone is slowly realising what is possible and what is not. For instance, an unwieldy council would not be acceptable. Therefore, the optimum size could be in the mid-20s, in place of 15 at present. Non-permanent new members would have to exceed new permanent ones. The red-herrings across the trail suggesting undefined “interim” or “intermediate” models of change make no sense.
The other issues on which a consensus has yet to be evolved can be summed up briefly even though these cover 80 pages compiled by the facilitator, Ambassador Tanin. Veto is at the top of them. The Africa group persists in its demand that all new permanent members should have the veto exactly as the present P-5 do. But opinion seems to be veering round the G4 view that all permanent members should indeed have the veto right but in their case it should be put into operation after 15 years when the whole issue is reviewed.
Even today veto is used rarely; by then it might become irrelevant. Moreover, the working methods of the Security Council would have to be improved so that it does not encroach on the functions of the General Assembly. Finally, there should be regional balance but permanent members from each region should be selected on the basis of the criterion already mentioned in the UN Charter.
As for India’s permanent membership, it has full support of four of the P-5. The only exception, China, “understands” but does not yet support India’s interest in a more active role at the UN. But indications in both Delhi and New York are that Beijing would not oppose India’s presence at the UN top table. Japan’s entry into the fray could be a problem because the US would back it to the hilt while China would do all it can to exclude Japan. However, there is no need for India to get involved in this conflict. Finally, the US support is accompanied by the demand that India must act on Burma and Iran according to America’s wishes. New Delhi’s inability to do so must be conveyed courteously to Washington.