In 2010, India had a string of VIP visitors from the “big five” countries. First to arrive was British Prime Minister David Cameron in July. Then followed US President Barack Obama’s successful India visit in November 2010, though it was somewhat dampened by the WikiLeaks disclosures. Next was France President Nicolas Sarkozy who turned on the charm offensive with sufficient help from his glamorous wife. This was followed by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India from December 15 to 17 and then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s two-day trip beginning on December 21. The reason for these visits is the fact that a “rising” India is expected to play an increasingly important role in the two most “dangerous regions on earth”, i.e. the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The latter, dominated by peninsular India, is crucial to global sea trade and energy flow since it connects the Pacific and Atlantic oceans.
Significantly, the Chinese Premier’s visit was uninspiring despite contracts worth $16 billion being signed and bilateral trade expected to cross $120 billion by 2014 (Mr Wen signed $35 billion worth of deals with Pakistan a few days later).
Given the border dispute and China’s new assertiveness on its territorial claims in South Asia and the APR, where it is trying to “shape the geostrategic arena”, can growing trade (with India’s share at 33 per cent deficit) alone stabilise the region?
On November 21, 2010, China commenced work in Tibet on the first of the planned 28 dams on the river Brahmaputra for hydropower generation. Though China’s latest move will further aggravate tensions, the era of “water wars” will really begin in a few years when China decides to divert Brahmaputra into its own territory (to irrigate its arid regions and replenish the water levels in the depleting Yellow river), thus converting India’s Northeast into a desert.
In addition to neutralising Pakistan and China’s designs in South Asia, India must oppose any Chinese attempts to convert the South China Sea (SCS) into China’s territorial waters as then free flow of Indian and global sea-borne commerce from the IOR to the APR and vice-versa would be at China’s mercy. Sixty per cent of India’s sea-borne trade moves westwards, across the IOR to Europe and beyond, while 40 per cent moves eastward, to the APR and beyond. Given China’s latest mischief of not recognising the 1,500 kms of its boundary with Kashmir as part of the disputed Sino-Indian border, India needs to declare a new policy stating that Tibet is not a part of China. Also, it needs to increase trade with Taiwan, from the present $5 million, annual level.
Mr Medvedev’s visit served to consolidate Indo-Russian ties. There is no doubt that India needs to continue its traditional time-tested relations with Russia for meeting its vital defence needs (stealth fighter aircraft, nuclear submarines), civilian nuclear reactors and some crude oil from the Sakhalin oil fields. However, the United States with a global naval presence is also important to India, as it is the only military power capable of countering China.
On October 27, 2010, the US announced the construction of a $12 billion naval base on Guam Island, which along with the Pearl Harbour (Hawaii) forms the “third and last island chain” blocking China’s cherished eastwards push across the Pacific Ocean. In anticipation of Chinese weaponisation of space by 2020, the US plans to launch a series of lethal robotic aerospace systems. By 2020, China aims to be capable of launching missile and cyberspace strikes on every part of the globe.
North Korea — China’s proxy in APR — continues to raise tensions with the November 23, 2010, shelling of South Korea’s Yeonpyeondo Island and then threatening nuclear strikes, bringing Japan and South Korea closer to the US.
In my opinion, the incident like the March 26, 2010, sinking of South Korean warship Cheonan by a North Korean submarine, had the blessings of China. China provides North Korea 79 per cent of its foreign investments, 90 per cent of its crude oil, 84 per cent of its consumer goods and most of its military equipment. This scenario is almost identical to China’s other proxy, Pakistan, which hopes to use US aid worth billions of dollars to buy three dozen J10 fighter aircraft, four Yuan class conventional submarines (with Air Independent Propulsion System), four Type 054 Frigates and also possibly acquire a Han-class nuclear attack submarine on a 10-year lease from China at “friendship prices”.
India should brace itself to counter a Cheonan-type incident at sea or a 26/11-type of attack. While South Korea has recently “remodeled” its future military response, Japan has recently decided to increase its submarine force from 16 to 22. The Indian Navy, which is now reduced to 14 aging conventional submarines, instead of 24 that are needed, should urgently emulate the Japanese example.
The China-Pak anti-India nexus will remain unchanged for decades while China will simultaneously head for a collision course against the US as it is a stumbling block to China’s territorial claims in the APR.
The world, including India, relies on sea-borne trade and oil moving safely through the IOR to various global destinations. Hence, India and the US do have mutual interests.
For the safety of sea-borne commerce, India needs “friends” to counter Chinese moves in the APR, while the US, along with the global maritime community, needs “friends” to counter the piracy and maritime terror in the IOR.
Indeed, China’s expected prolonged naval deployments in the IOR by about 2030 will further aggravate the situation.
To conclude, Indo-US relations (specially in the fields of maritime, aerospace, defence and cyber security) have a bright future but they can never be “strategic” like the present asymmetrical US-Britain or China-Pakistan ties because of America’s fixation with its “geostrategic ally” Pakistan.
The only way for India to avoid an inevitable war with China is to deter China with a combination of conventional and nuclear weapons capability along with diplomacy and close cooperation with other maritime nations, including the US.
For a start, India needs to increase its annual defence budget by 50 per cent and ensure that the money is actually spent and not allowed to lapse.

Vice-Admiral Arun Kumar Singh retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam