Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s ongoing visit to Moscow comes at an important juncture in India’s relationship with Russia. Interestingly, the trip coincides with the 40th anniversary of the India-Pakistan war of 1971 — the crisis that forged the strategic relationship between India and the erstwhile Soviet Union. Dr Singh’s meetings with the Russian leadership will be important not only to buttress the existing ties but also to explore new areas of cooperation and
convergence.

In the four decades since the Indo-Soviet treaty the global political, strategic and economic landscapes have changed dramatically, but the core of the bilateral relationship was (and remains) cooperation in defence supplies and technology. In the years following the treaty, Moscow became a very dependable source of defence sales and technology transfer. To be sure, there was uncertainty and disruption of supplies and spares after the implosion of the Soviet Union. But these proved manageable. Following India’s nuclear tests of 1998 and the ensuing international censure and sanctions, New Delhi and Moscow began moving closer. After Vladimir Putin became President in 2000, Russia and India concluded a fresh strategic partnership agreement.
The new strategic partnership has enabled India to acquire weapon systems from Russia that are crucial both for military modernisation and for acquiring the capability to project power. These acquisitions span the spectrum of war fighting, ranging from fighter aircraft to cruise missiles, from frigates to tanks. Perhaps the best known, and certainly the most important, of the recent defence deals is the pending transfer of the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov. This deal underlines both the importance of the Russian relationship to India and the problems that have cropped up in recent years. The latter includes troubling issues such as delay in delivery, cost escalation, incomplete technology transfers and product support.
Unsurprisingly India has, over the past decade or so, sought to diversify its sources of defence procurement. Over this period, Israel and the US have emerged as important alternatives. Moscow has been particularly apprehensive about the implications of the strategic transformation in US-India relations. But the recent decision on the 126 multi-role combat aircraft suggests that India is unlikely to put too many eggs in the American basket. Russia is likely to remain the largest defence partner for India, but it will have to operate in an increasingly diverse and competitive marketplace.
The strategic partnership agreement has also facilitated cooperation in the energy sector. As a net importer of energy, India has increasingly turned to Russia as a major source of oil and natural gas. ONGC Videsh has a 20 per cent stake in the Sakhalin-I oil and gas fields. New Delhi has also been keen on acquiring a comparable stake in the Sakhalin-III projects. India has been pursuing this for nearly six years now, but Russia is yet to respond favourably. Another major area of cooperation and commerce has been nuclear energy. This, too, has lately been plagued by problems — not least the delay in commissioning the Koodankulam reactors. New Delhi should at once convey credible assurances to Moscow and begin a process of public consultation to ensure that the project is not stalled.
Defence and nuclear energy will figure prominently in the Prime Minister’s discussions in Moscow. Yet it is equally important that both sides resolve at the highest levels to upgrade their economic relations. Bilateral trade has risen from a mere $1.67 billion in 2003-04 to $8.75 billion last year. But this fell short of even the modest projection of $10 billion. An inter-governmental commission has been considering a range of measures to redress this state of affairs, including a comprehensive economic cooperation agreement and revival of the north-south transport corridor through Iran. Unless the two countries are able to add a solid economic layer to their relationship, its strategic dimension cannot be fully leveraged.
Bilateral issues apart, the two countries are also faced with the challenge of evolving complimentary responses to a host of international challenges. The most pressing of these stems from Afghanistan. Even as the US and its allies prepare to drawdown their military presence in Afghanistan, the insurgency remains strong. Both India and Russia are concerned about continuing instability, but their emphases are somewhat different. Whilst India is keen to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a haven for terrorists, Russia is more concerned about the problem of drugs flowing from that country. Moscow’s somewhat narrow approach is understandable in the light of its troubled history of involvement in Afghanistan. But it will be interesting to see how Russia’s policy shapes up in the aftermath of the American drawdown. The endgame in Afghanistan will unfold at a time when Russia’s relations with the US are dipping. The Obama administration’s much-vaunted “reset” with Russia has evidently been abandoned. Recent American criticism of elections in Russia, especially of Mr Putin’s role, is likely to sharpen the divide.
India and Russia will also need to watch the developments at the other end of Asia. Chinese assertiveness over regional disputes coupled with America’s desire to reinforce its presence has injected strategic uncertainty in East Asia. Russia was once a great Eurasian power. Its strategic ambitions have considerably contracted over the past two decades. But its ability to play a role in East Asia should not be underestimated. The challenge for Moscow and New Delhi is to find ways of working together towards a regional security architecture that promotes stability and precludes the dominance of any great power.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi