The election of a moderate cleric, Hassan Rowhani, as Iranian President should have caused quiet optimism, particularly in the United States.

His inauguration on August 4, in the Iranian Majlis, with Indian vice-president Hamid Ansari watching from the front row, however occurred amidst mounting gloom in the Islamic world. On July 31, US House of Representatives passed a bill that not only tightens sanctions but removes President Barack Obama’s ability to waive them if a deal is reached with Iran. Fortunately, it does not become law unless the US Senate clears it in September. In effect, this holds a gun to Iran’s head as the new President settles down, getting his Cabinet approved by the Majlis.
In the Islamic world, Al Qaeda and its associates are making a dramatic comeback as evidenced by daring jail-breaks in Dera Ismail Khan in Pakistan, Abu Ghareb in Iraq, besides jails in Benghazi, Libya and Afghanistan.
Over 2,000 militants were freed, boosting the morale of a purportedly beleaguered Al Qaeda, reeling under years of relentless drone attacks. US shutting its missions in 19 countries in the Gulf and West Asia, based on an electronic communication intercept between Al Qaeda’s head Ayman al-Zawahiri and their Yemen branch chief, Nasser al-Wuhayshi, merely confirmed the re-generated threat.
The spillover effected India too as a suicide attempt on its consulate in Jalalabad on August 3, fortunately unsuccessful, was followed by a daring raid across the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir on August 6 when five Indian soldiers lost their lives. Reports indicated the raiding party was over 20-member strong, with some donning Pakistani Army uniforms. It is not possible for such a large group to have crossed the fortified line, past a Pakistani picket, and then retreat post-mayhem without assistance from Pakistan’s Army. This happened as India and Pakistan had activated back-channel links to repair the damage to bilateral relations by the January beheading of an Indian soldier in the same sector.
The Rowhani presidency, symbolising the Iranian peoples’ hopes for a way out of their isolation and economic distress, thus commences during troubled times. President Rowhani said after taking over that he was “seriously determined” to resolve the nuclear dispute. He added that his government had the political will and the ability to take the concerns of the other side into account. However, he concluded, Iran’s “peaceful nuclear programme is a national issue.”
If there is a causal relationship between the deteriorating security situation and the planned US withdrawal from the region, then it revives the significance of Iran as a regional swing power that can either help stabilise the region or exacerbate its vulnerability by shifting its support.
Ironically, the US’ induction into the region post 9/11 knocked out two of Iran’s principal foes — Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and the Afghan Taliban.
With Iraq under a Shia regime, the Iranian influence now runs through a Shia corridor seamlessly, to the Mediterranean. With the Taliban Iran has a modus vivendi that may last even if the Taliban overrun south Afghanistan. It is because of this that India is belatedly trying to put its relations with Iran on an even keel, having its own concerns about the Afghanistan end-game of Pakistani Army, their friends in the Taliban and amongst groups like the Haqqanis.
US foreign policy flows from its strategic assessment of another nation’s usefulness for their long-term interests. A reassessment of a deal with Iran would at least be getting examined in Washington. If the US, for economic reasons and because of public opinion, has to lower its presence in the region and Al Qaeda and its affiliates have re-generated then what instruments/allies does the US have today that can hold the barricades against this resurging radical Islam? Pakistan’s new government has won power by aligning with some jihadi groups and is yet to demonstrate that it can control them. Pakistani Army has battled jihadi groups but selectively, giving immunity to perceived allies, for current or later use.
Thus, unlike 1980-88 when Pakistan controlled the religious indoctrination and infrastructure of anti-Soviet jihad, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan today harbours ambitions to control the Pakistani state through incremental penetration of its institutions and higher echelons of power.
Egypt’s democratic path, though leading to the gradual takeover of its institutions by the Muslim Brotherhood, is hazy. Whether the Army can contain the Islamic upsurge by selective detentions and periodic brute force is still uncertain. At any rate, Al Qaeda is happy that the failure of the democratic experiment is pushing even moderate Islamists into its fold. Turkey is also teetering uncertainly between its secular past and an indeterminate Islamic future, exacerbated by the authoritarian streak of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
For normalisation of US-Iran relations, the US needs to determine whether Iran can be allowed to retain its nuclear fuel cycle, but with adequate safeguards to ensure it does not weaponise. President Rowhani has the requisite diplomatic experience and a Cabinet that balances reformists, traditionalists and technocrats to be a worthy interlocutor.
Can the two nations, estranged since 1979, agree on a new vision for the region that accommodates US interests, addresses Iranian fears and builds a bulwark against the revived forces of radical Islam?
As the US’ shale gas production peaks and its dependence on Gulf oil and gas reduce drastically over the next decade, the possibility of a grand bargain between the US, its Sunni allies and Iran and its Shia brothers will increase. But history is replete with opportunities missed that then caused great tragedies.

The writer is a former secretary in the external affairs ministry. He tweets at @ambkcsingh