India and Pakistan have been engaged in military-level Track 2 talks for the past 12 months, with the delegates of the two sides meeting in Dubai, Bangkok and finally in Lahore in September this year. Smaller “sub-group” meetings in Chiang Mai (Thailand) and Palo Alto (California) have also featured in the Track 2 process. A number of issues — among them Siachen, Sir Creek, confidence-building measures — were discussed at these meetings, where my participation as part of the Indian delegation brings me to share here my take on the issue of demilitarisation of Siachen.
There are three aspects to the Siachen issue. The first, listed below, in my opinion, needs transparent action at the government level, especially to sensitise public opinion on the Siachen issue.
The first aspect is why should India, in the first place, agree to any demilitarisation of Siachen when it holds the dominating high ground on Saltoro Ridge and can command the strategic region, thus preventing a China-Pakistan link up in the region? Why should India vacate Siachen when the Indian Parliament has passed a resolution that the entire Jammu & Kashmir (including Pakistan-occupied Kashmir) is Indian territory? Why should India repeat the case of returning Haji Pir Pass (captured by the Indian Army in the 1965 War, and vacated by India after the Tashkent Agreement and subsequently reoccupied by the Pakistan Army, and taking it back is almost impossible) when there is a strong possibility that the Pakistan Army will reoccupy the Saltoro Ridge and we will never be able to take it back again? India has lost a total of 814 soldiers in Siachen since 1984, but now due to superior facilities and a better economy, we can remain there indefinitely, (while Pakistan’s economic constraints make it difficult for it to maintain troops even at lower heights). So why should the sacrifices of our soldiers be forgotten, and why should we vacate Saltoro Ridge when we hold all the cards? Why should India not link Siachen to other issues like Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, ISI-sponsored counterfeit currency and normalisation of trade ties? Why is Pakistan unwilling to resolve the Sir Creek issue though it is doable? Given its sensitive and emotive nature, I feel that the Indian government would need to answer the question why. And this question would perhaps need to be debated in Parliament.
The second aspect is when should India agree to demilitarisation of Siachen? Here also the Track 2 discussed the political instability and the possibility of early elections looming in India and Pakistan. In my opinion, this question of when can only be dealt with by the next government at the Centre (assuming it has a comfortable majority), which would perhaps also need to debate this in Parliament.
The third aspect, which Track 2 discussed and finally agreed to a proposal, is how to demilitarise Siachen? The official Indian stand on delineation and authentication is well known, and the Track 2 proposal has covered these aspects. I may mention here that the Pakistani team were worried that if they agreed to authentication of the AGPL (Actual Ground Position Line), India may stop further discussions on Siachen, once the authentication had been carried out. Hence, an “integrated” approach was agreed to. The question of how is answered below.
The Track 2 proposals for “how to demilitarise Siachen” (assuming that answers to the questions of why and when can be found) are “part of the comprehensive resolution of the Siachen dispute, and notwithstanding the claims of each country, both sides should agree to withdraw from the conflict area while retaining the option of punitive action should the other side renege on the commitments”. The Track 2, Lahore “Siachen Proposal” of September 25, 2012 says “the following clear package of integrated and interlinked stipulations were laid down for the demilitarisation of the area and delineation of the line”:
w Setting up a joint commission to delineate the line beyond NJ 9842, consistent with existing arrangements
w The present ground positions would be jointly recorded and the records exchanged (this should meet the “authentication” requirement)
w The determination of the places to which redeployment would be affected would be jointly agreed
w Disengagement and demilitarisation would occur in accordance with a mutually acceptable timeframe. (The establishment of a joint working group has been proposed, in a separate annexure, to suggest detailed phase-by-phase redeployment of forces and oversee implementation of this complicated process.)
w Prior to withdrawal, each side will undertake to remove munitions and other military equipment and waste from its area of control
w Ongoing cooperative monitoring of these activities and the resulting demilitarised zone would be agreed to for ensuring transparency. (In a separate annexure the Track 2 has proposed a method of monitoring, initially by national technical means and subsequently by visual means, joint aerial reconnaissance and onsite inspections etc.)
The concluding paragraph of the Track 2 proposal reads: “In keeping with the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration, both sides should undertake that resolution of this issue is a bilateral matter and that there will be no change in the status of the area, and also that no personnel of any third country will be permitted within it, unless cleared by the two countries jointly.”
I have written earlier that Track 2 is not a magic wand, which can solve complicated problems between India and Pakistan. It can only provide some possible solutions for the consideration of Track 1 discussions. The proposals on how to demilitarise Siachen are doable, provided the Indian government answers the questions of why and when.
A final observation after my third visit to Pakistan (the first two were official visits in 2005) is that while the Pakistan Army still calls the shots, it is unlikely to directly take over the reins of power again. And more importantly, Gen. Parvez Kayani appears to support the move for good relations with India. Whether this is a short-term tactical move, due to the Afghanistan situation, or a long-term strategic move to give economic issues priority over ideological issues is still not clear. The Track 2 teams of both countries have done their job, and now it is up to the two governments to make the next move.

The writer, a former vice-admiral, retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam