The recent policy announcements — after a two-year policy drought — concerning foreign direct investments (FDI) and the unpopular but unavoidable decision to raise the price of diesel to signal the government’s intent to curb subsidies to attract much-needed domestic and global investments, are as much a political statement as an economic strategy to save a government in difficulty.
The consequences have been several, including the departure of Congress’ nettlesome ally Mamata Banerjee from the governing coalition. Some results following from the policy pronouncements, including those of a political nature, lie in the future, such as the effect of the recent steps on the mind of the voter in the next Parliament election.
But with this one act the Sonia-Manmohan regime has given notice that it has the will to last its full term. The flurry of government actions makes it plain that it seeks to do so not at the mercy of others, or in a lacklustre way, which is bound to make it an object of further ridicule and periodic harangues from the Opposition, not to say swipes of merciless allies who take sly delight in its agonies because some among them might just be campaigning against the Congress in the next general election (even if they were to return as Congress allies later).
Earlier, the Congress Party used to repeat, mantra fashion, that it would last the distance. But there were sceptics in its own ranks. It was hard to judge when leading supporters might pull the rug because the ruling dispensation was nationally perceived as weak — something of a joke really — and was surviving on the basis of whimsical support of partners prone to privilege expediency over even the most basic principle, such has been the cut-throat nature of India’s fragmented politics in recent years.
But the moment for doubt can now be said to have passed. Mamata’s irrevocable action has caused no tremors. Despite the hike in diesel rates, the government appears to have won back the support of some segments — chiefly urban — which had backed it in the last two elections but were dismayed with governmental inaction and were politically returning to the NDA fold.
These classes are pro-market but not comprador, and sections of them could even be inclined towards a hazy Hindu nationalism — in short, BJP’s constituency ordinarily, which had deserted the NDA in 2004 and looked like returning to it, fed up with both policy and leadership vacuum on the UPA side in the second edition of the coalition.
By standing out in conspicuous opposition to the announced measures, the BJP has unwittingly checked the momentum of this incipient process which was working in its favour, and has hurt itself. The saffron party’s positioning has been seen as negatively opportunistic — standing in opposition to policies that it had supported when in power — in the same way as its stance on the India-US civil nuclear agreement.
The BJP was also viewed as irresponsible by many when it not only blocked the recent Monsoon Session of Parliament, not allowing a discussion on the coal allocation process and the corruption it spawned across parties and across state governments and the Centre, but sought to make a hallowed principle of its wilful disregard of the process of parliamentary democracy.
If BJP, the principal Opposition party, is seen as earning negative points (some of its NDA allies were not enthusiastic about its unseemly attitude towards Parliament) in spite of its shrill anti-government campaign on coal allocations and demand for the Prime Minister’s head, it appears unlikely that any troubled members of the governing combine would put themselves out in a way that might give comfort to the saffron formation. Earlier, such elements found traction in the perceived weaknesses of the government.
Despite Mamata Banerjee sacrificing considered judgment for hasty action, this state of affairs — for a change — strengthens Congress’ hand in its dealings with partners and supporters. After unfurling a wide set of pro-investment measures, the government would want to benefit from their political fruits before it goes to the country. That should take UPA-2 to 2014.
The Congress has chosen market appeasement to change the optics in its favour. But this has limitations. If the party seeks to emerge as a serious contender in 2014, it also needs to appeal to the personality and psychology of the country — which essentially means intervening, if need be brazenly, on the side of the poor and the small and medium landowning peasantry. In the absence of this the social contract that has kept the government in place for nearly two terms — it is widely recognised that pro-poor measures which were criticised by not a few brought in the votes — risks dissolution.
Political theorist Rajni Kothari, who drew our attention to the Congress “system” and its decline about the mid-70s, perceptively observed that the win of that party in 2004, and it forming the government in conjunction with others, was in a sense more significant a phenomenon than its assuming office in 1947 (when it had stepped into the government with an air of naturalness). This was because the Congress — after a prolonged period of effacement — had returned to displace the “sangh parivar” outfit (the BJP), which had earlier stolen its élan, as the central focus in national politics.
The “sangh parivar” may therefore be expected to do whatever it takes to try and storm back as the centrepiece in the national political grid. Staying out of the power paradigm for the third consecutive term in Parliament can cause it long-term damage. To finesse any prospect of this happening, the Congress would need conspicuous leadership, not just the right mix of policies and alliances.
In the interregnum we are passing through, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has given evidence of front-rank leadership, but in recent times the leadership poverty in the Congress has appeared no less striking than in the BJP, if Sonia Gandhi is not to be the cynosure. Covering the deficiency means strategising for elections and summoning the right ideology-politics framework, but the kind of party the Congress is it also means getting Rahul Gandhi to play the part of a more enthusiastic field general.