Ten years after the US’ intervention in Afghanistan, the international community will reconvene in Bonn on December 5 to consider the next steps. The conference is expected to focus on the modalities of handing over responsibility for security to Afghan forces and the political process of reconciliation with the Taliban. These will have to be worked out keeping in mind the deadline of mid-2014. The conference will also lay out the international community’s commitment to Afghanistan thereafter.

The much-awaited event is already under a cloud following Pakistan’s decision not to participate. But it was unlikely to be anything more than a stock-taking exercise.
The US and its allies have already been working towards these objectives, albeit with rather limited success. On the security side, the effort has been to beef up the size and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The first Bonn conference, held in 2001, envisaged a standing Army of 60,000 troops. The number has since been revised steadily upwards. Currently the Afghan Army has almost 171,600 troops, and this number is likely to increase. Then again, the quantitative growth in the Army’s size has not translated into a commensurate qualitative improvement in its operational capabilities. There has been a persistent short-fall in the number of trainers.
Be that as it may, the coalition is now turning over provinces to the ANSF where the insurgents remain active. This may work well as far as the timeline for withdrawal is concerned, but it does not augur well from the standpoint of security. It remains to be seen whether the conference will squarely face this problem.
If progress on security matters has been halting, the situation on the political front is gloomier still. Over the past year and a half, multiple channels of communication have been opened to reach out to the insurgents. But the results have been, to put it mildly, underwhelming, owing to two factors. First, the Taliban have fragmented considerably in the past few years. The assumption that a grand reconciliation can be effected is simply implausible. What the coalition needs is a patchwork quilt of agreements. But stitching these together will take more time and effort than currently appears to be available. The second, and related, problem is that bigger outfits like the Quetta Shura and the Haqqanis are operating under the shelter of Pakistan. Unless operational pressure is drastically increased on them, there is no reason why these groups will come to the negotiating table. It is commonplace to assert that insurgencies can only be ended by a political settlement. But it is equally obvious that insurgents will not come to the negotiating table when they hope to win on the battlefield. Pakistan, of course, refuses to move against them.
In the current state of US-Pakistan relations, it is not difficult to see why Pakistan has opted out of the conference. Throughout this year, the relationship has been on a roller-coaster ride. The arrest of a CIA officer in Pakistan, the killing of Osama bin Laden, the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani and, most recently, the death of two dozen Pakistani soldiers in a Nato airstrike: all have imposed considerable strain on US’ ties with Pakistan. Yet, too much should not be read into Pakistan’s decision to skip the Bonn conference. Both sides realise that a total break would be deeply problematic. The challenge for Washington is to find effective ways of changing the behaviour of its recalcitrant ally.
Part of the reason for the US’ dependence on Pakistan is geographic. Pakistan’s long and permeable border with Afghanistan gives it certain advantages that cannot be wished away. But it also stems from Washington’s reluctance to take any serious steps towards involving the other major regional actors in its attempt to stabilise Afghanistan. Periodic noises have been made about a “regional solution”, but these have either been vacuous statements of intent or inane efforts to link the problem in Afghanistan to the resolution of India-Pakistan disputes. The Bonn conference could have been an opportunity to reconsider the regional dimension. The timing, alas, is unpropitious. And this is not only because of the slump in US-Pakistan relations.
US relations with Iran are heading southward. The Obama administration has not only failed to shore up ties with Tehran, but has taken steps that will worsen the relationship. The allegation about an Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the US and, more importantly, the recent push to further isolate Iran on the nuclear issue will have implications for the international community’s efforts to secure Iranian cooperation on Afghanistan. US relations with Russia are not in a promising state either. Sharp differences over US missile defences and the Arab Spring suggest that Washington’s effort to “reset” relations with Russia has been put on the backburner. It is not surprising that the Russians have come out in opposition to America’s quest for long-term military bases in Afghanistan.
The forthcoming conference, then, is unlikely to result in any serious outcome. Nevertheless, India will be keen to see the commitments accepted by the international community for the post-2014 period. The recent India-Afghanistan strategic partnership agreement is a good platform to prepare for the US drawdown and beyond. The winning of an important iron ore concession at Hajigak in central Afghanistan indicates the direction in which India wants to proceed. Even as India moves to increase its economic presence in Afghanistan, it should keep a weather-eye on the evolving security situation.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi