Feb.01 : Afghanistan has been a theatre of war and foreign involvement in its internal affairs for three decades. A stable equilibrium is far from being reached. Kabul is as yet a long way from generating its own resources to run a modern state system, including its security vector, to fend off threats from historically meddlesome neighbours,

the most pernicious of which has been Pakistan, seeking from the time of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to gain a foothold in Afghanistan. On account of the military conflict imposed on Afghanistan by the Taliban and Al Qaeda, which receive Pakistani state support, Kabul continues to be badly in need of international assistance of a non-threatening variety.

India was absent from the scene for most of the time Afghanistan was in turmoil in the past three decades, and returned to its historically friendly engagement with Kabul only after the end of Taliban rule in 2001, following which the international community entered the picture in a big way. India enjoys enormous goodwill of the people of all regions of that country. The nature of its involvement is viewed positively across ethnic divides, including very much the Pashtuns among whom the Taliban are mainly to be found. However, India is one among several foreign actors in Afghanistan. Different players approach key issues differently, depending on how their long-term interests are impacted. Many twists and turns of international, regional and Afghan domestic policy may therefore be expected to be encountered in the course of Afghanistan’s reconstruction and emergence as a self-sustaining society and state. Vital questions of policy, politics, ideology and the path to be pursued will be debated. Last week’s London conference on Afghanistan, which became the occasion for discussing primarily British and European concerns, marks but an early stage of that debate.It is necessary to view the outcome of London as a part of an ongoing discussion involving Afghans and the internationals, and not some final formula which all concerned must accept or be turned away from the table. US secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s non-endorsement of the basic British idea of seeking to win over elements of the Taliban leadership with Pakistan’s help is an indication that discussions on Afghanistan’s long-term stability are at an incipient stage. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh showed the way when in Washington last November he forthrightly stated that India shall remain engaged with Afghanistan, and advised the US to do the same. This country has reason to be concerned that Afghanistan’s stability is not rocked by policy blasts — orchestrated by a regional entity, Pakistan or any other, or an international player — that pave the way for the return of the same forces which were ousted from Kabul in 2001. India’s security stands to be greatly prejudiced if such forces regroup and are victorious. India, after all, lies in Afghanistan’s immediate neighbourhood, unlike the US or Europe. It cannot but view the good Taliban-bad Taliban categorisation as being both sterile and artificial. The Taliban are an ideological tendency — nurtured by Pakistan for its own long-term ends — that espouses a literalist interpretation of Islam and threatens democracy and what we stand for. True, many who are with the Taliban fighting units were coerced into joining or are mercenaries; some are plain anti-government rebels, but not ideological foes of Kabul. Afghanistan has long sought to reintegrate this variety but lacked the resources to make its plan work. New Delhi should be only too happy if the Afghan government and people succeed in their effort. However, it must continue to resist moves to refashion Afghanistan’s power matrix through a Pakistan-led regional initiative that privileges the cult of extremist Islam.