Pak disinterest in talks evident
March.16 : Pakistan’s approach to discussions with India has changed in fundamental ways since the time of Gen. Pervez Musharraf, and this shows up in the context of both Kashmir and Afghanistan, and in the broad thrust of Islamabad’s diplomatic efforts against this country. It is not clear to what extent this shift had been factored into India’s decision to talk to Pakistan at the level of foreign secretaries last month, which carried the imprimatur of the Prime Minister. Dr Manmohan Singh apparently shares the view that for the sake of appearances Islamabad has taken a few perfunctory steps to book some Pakistani conspirators behind the 26/11 Mumbai attacks,
but is essentially dragging its feet. Nonetheless, the PM’s keenness to resume contacts — although not yet in the form of a return to the composite dialogue process disrupted after 26/11 — after the failure of his move at Sharm el-Sheikh is rooted in his high-minded view that there can never be an alternative to dialogue, and that apparently the time for it is always right.
Many might differ with the latter part of this proposition, but that has not deterred the government from going ahead with the opening round of the foreign secretaries’ dialogue in New Delhi last month. Such an approach can yield dividends if the interlocutor is amenable, but there has so far been little evidence of this. Home minister P. Chidambaram was constrained to note at a recent public forum that the Inter-Services Intelligence was supporting all Pakistani terrorist outfits acting against this country. When Pakistan’s high commissioner Shahid Malik sought to rebut this, Mr Chidambaram urged him to offer India the voice samples of some of the 26/11 suspects so that these could be matched against electronic transcripts in this country’s possession. On hearing this, Mr Malik withdrew from the impromptu debate. It transpires that the February 25 discussion between the two foreign secretaries was anything but smooth. The Pakistani side was eager to quickly escalate talks to the political level while India desired proof of positive Pakistani intentions on the 26/11 investigation before this could be contemplated. That looks like a logjam. It is far from clear when Islamabad will invite the Indian foreign secretary to continue the dialogue at that level. It would appear that it is in no hurry to do so. Pakistani analysts have observed that Islamabad holds all the aces at the current juncture, in that the United States has now come to rely on it completely to end the war in Afghanistan with the help of the Taliban who have been sheltered by Pakistan all these years.
For Islamabad, being the bad boy has produced results. Thus — the thinking goes — it can sit tight about dialogue with India unless this is to take place on its own terms. For decades India has accused Pakistan of using terrorists to mould the political discussion on Kashmir. Pakistan has lately begun to throw a counter-charge: that India is using Afghan territory to launch terrorists against Pakistan in Balochistan (and now even in Lahore). This is wholly contrived, but technically a tit for tat has become available to use at diplomatic forums. The issue of waters of the Indus river system has been brought into the discussion as the other new element. Terrorist outfits like Lashkar-e-Tayyaba have been wheeled out to raise temperatures on the river waters issue and their slogan is “water or war”, although it is well known that even India’s share of the Indus system waters flows into Pakistan which is unable to exploit it, letting it run into the sea. In Kashmir, a violent militant line has been renewed after several years, and in Afghanistan Pakistan’s proxies have begun to attack Indian civilians and diplomats. India is deeply concerned, but it is not clear if it has put together the appropriate political or diplomatic response.
but is essentially dragging its feet. Nonetheless, the PM’s keenness to resume contacts — although not yet in the form of a return to the composite dialogue process disrupted after 26/11 — after the failure of his move at Sharm el-Sheikh is rooted in his high-minded view that there can never be an alternative to dialogue, and that apparently the time for it is always right.
Many might differ with the latter part of this proposition, but that has not deterred the government from going ahead with the opening round of the foreign secretaries’ dialogue in New Delhi last month. Such an approach can yield dividends if the interlocutor is amenable, but there has so far been little evidence of this. Home minister P. Chidambaram was constrained to note at a recent public forum that the Inter-Services Intelligence was supporting all Pakistani terrorist outfits acting against this country. When Pakistan’s high commissioner Shahid Malik sought to rebut this, Mr Chidambaram urged him to offer India the voice samples of some of the 26/11 suspects so that these could be matched against electronic transcripts in this country’s possession. On hearing this, Mr Malik withdrew from the impromptu debate. It transpires that the February 25 discussion between the two foreign secretaries was anything but smooth. The Pakistani side was eager to quickly escalate talks to the political level while India desired proof of positive Pakistani intentions on the 26/11 investigation before this could be contemplated. That looks like a logjam. It is far from clear when Islamabad will invite the Indian foreign secretary to continue the dialogue at that level. It would appear that it is in no hurry to do so. Pakistani analysts have observed that Islamabad holds all the aces at the current juncture, in that the United States has now come to rely on it completely to end the war in Afghanistan with the help of the Taliban who have been sheltered by Pakistan all these years.
For Islamabad, being the bad boy has produced results. Thus — the thinking goes — it can sit tight about dialogue with India unless this is to take place on its own terms. For decades India has accused Pakistan of using terrorists to mould the political discussion on Kashmir. Pakistan has lately begun to throw a counter-charge: that India is using Afghan territory to launch terrorists against Pakistan in Balochistan (and now even in Lahore). This is wholly contrived, but technically a tit for tat has become available to use at diplomatic forums. The issue of waters of the Indus river system has been brought into the discussion as the other new element. Terrorist outfits like Lashkar-e-Tayyaba have been wheeled out to raise temperatures on the river waters issue and their slogan is “water or war”, although it is well known that even India’s share of the Indus system waters flows into Pakistan which is unable to exploit it, letting it run into the sea. In Kashmir, a violent militant line has been renewed after several years, and in Afghanistan Pakistan’s proxies have begun to attack Indian civilians and diplomats. India is deeply concerned, but it is not clear if it has put together the appropriate political or diplomatic response.
