Quick, hard strikes must follow data from UAVs
New Delhi , April 9: The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the battle against the Naxalites, which the government had proposed after the recent Dantewada attack, isn’t likely to prove successful unless it is accompanied with force multipliers like helicopter-borne attack teams and proper logistical backup.
Security sources stated that it is not the first time that UAVs are being deployed against Maoist extremists. UAVs were first deployed in Chhattisgarh in 2007 after a spate of extremist attacks in the region.
However, the deployment of UAVs proved unsuccessful the first time round as the real-time surveillance data retrieved from the UAVs wasn’t used effectively, which means the receipt of real-time intelligence was not followed by prompt, surgical attacks on Maoist targets.
Sources in the security agencies stated that the UAVs used by India were unlike the Predator drones (currently in use in Afghanistan and Pakistan by US forces) that first identify the foe through visual or thermal surveillance and then shoot them, either by directing an aircraft or missile, or fire a missile themselves. “The Searcher MK-II UAV used in Maoist operations by the Indian agencies gets aerial shots of their camps and gives a general idea of their location. Once the recce has been completed, they are withdrawn from operations,” the sources added.
This essentially means that the images sent by these UAVs have to be acted upon quickly because the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (the fighting wing of the CPI-Maoist) is a highly mobile force. “Unless we keep quick reaction teams of highly trained anti-Maoist forces at strategic locations on alert for immediate attack through the aerial route, the deployment of these UAVs will not help,” the sources said.
In 2007, using UAV surveillance data, the government was able to establish that the CPI-Maoists were operating at least four camps to train PLGA cadres in the Dandakaranya forests (the forest tract in India’s central-southern region covering parts of Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, the Bastar region of Chhattisgarh, and Maharashtra).
However, sources stated that the lack of clarity on the deployment of helicopters for attacks on Maoists proved costly as the CPI-Maoist continued to hold sway in the self-proclaimed liberated zone comprising the Dandakaranya forests.
Nitin Mahajan