Feb 06 : When to talk to Pakistan, and the conversation menu, have been problematic in recent years. The issue is once again with us. It has never been the case that India has shied away from discussing Kashmir with Islamabad, as Pakistan frequently asserts.

After the 1971 war, it was New Delhi that took the initiative for the Shimla talks and Kashmir had an important place in that discussion. Indeed, it is with the emergence of the use of carefully-nurtured terrorist groups by Pakistan as an instrument of state policy towards this country that conducting a meaningful dialogue with Islamabad began to pose a problem. Terrorist strikes were routinely and glibly denied. In 1998, a structured format of discussions emerged that went under the rubric of "composite dialogue". As the name suggests, areas of differences were covered for discussion under eight categories. Since clear-cut solutions to the outstanding problems were hard to prise out, the two countries sought to find a way out through the expedient of "confidence-building measures", picking on the Cold War vocabulary employed by the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union. These weren’t consistently a help, although from time to time CBMs did serve a useful purpose. But the composite dialogue was repeatedly jolted on account of the Kargil war, the terrorist attack on the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly and the Indian Parliament, and the attack on Mumbai’s rail network in 2006. The composite dialogue could be resurrected after each such episode, although with long lapses of time. We are now revisiting the familiar diplomatic site of making some effort to recommence talks that broke down on account of 26/11.

Both India and Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons about the time that the composite dialogue framework was devised. This brought outside powers, notably the US and its European allies, directly into the equation. They professed to be apprehensive that the two nuclear-armed nations would start fighting if they weren’t talking. Therefore, informally, they tend to nudge both sides not to decline the opportunity to converse, although conversations are continually punctured by terrorist strikes. This works well at the theoretical level. But Indian public opinion appears quite fed up with being obliged to grasp the slimmest assurance offered by Islamabad to prevent its terrorist groups from operating against this country as these promises are not kept. Since the US and Nato involvement in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s neighbour on its western side, the Western powers have only grown more keen that India and Pakistan do not stop talking, no matter how bad the provocation. This is because Islamabad frequently threatens the US that it can’t do its best to tackle anti-Afghan terrorism because it must station large contingents of forces on its India border. This is a ploy not to fight the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda as the Indian threat is contrived. Nevertheless, the Westerners constantly seek to persuade New Delhi not to give up dialogue with Pakistan, if only to avoid giving Islamabad the alibi to stop being active against terrorists in Waziristan. The circumstances thrown up by the nuclear issue and Afghanistan have narrowed India’s diplomatic options over the years. The government is obliged to strike a tradeoff between this unenviable position and public opinion that is tired of Islamabad-induced terrorism. The dilemma is a real one for New Delhi. In the present instance, India will have to take on board the fact that at least pro forma legal action has been initiated against some Lashkar-e-Tayyaba elements who plotted the Mumbai attacks. Not doing so could make it appear unreasonable in the world of diplomacy. However, it is best for India to go into a tango with Pakistan with its eyes open, and not without preparing fallback positions.