The high court in Denmark has upheld the verdict of a domestic trial court to not allow the extradition to India of Kim Davy to stand trial in this country in the Purulia arms drop case of 1995. The high court’s judgment is to be deplored. The extradition had been sought by the CBI and the Danish government had raised no objections. But the country’s judicial system intervened following an appeal by the accused, a Danish national.

Mr Davy is the key accused in the stealth-drop of a large consignment of arms and ammunition that included hundreds of AK-47 rifles, pistols, anti-tank grenades, rocket launchers and thousands of rounds of ammunition — in short, equipment that would typically be used by terrorist or extremist elements to wage war against the state, a crime of extraordinary seriousness in any country, not least one such as India, which is acknowledged worldwide to be run on democratic principles. The crime for which Mr Davy is charged would also typically fall in the category of a transnational crime in which international cooperation would be expected to be rendered, especially between democratic states, even if an extradition treaty or bilateral mutual legal assistance arrangements did not exist. The Danish national committed the crime along with those of other nationalities. This further underlines its transnational character.
The Danish high court’s stand is the more regrettable considering that the practice followed internationally in determining jurisdiction — nourished by well-established principles — is fairly straightforward in an instance such as this: the territory on which the crime has occurred has a straightforward case in seeking to hold trial within its own territory. The case is bolstered when evidence and witnesses are also to be found within the same territory, in this case India. Under a certain principle, Denmark too could have sought to try its national within its own jurisdiction in order to uphold a certain morality in law — namely, that it would look upon with disfavour even in the case of its own citizens if there are good reasons to believe that they have taken part in actions that constitute a crime. For their part, the Danish authorities appear not to have considered this and agreed to comply with the CBI request to extradite Mr Davy. Thus, cooperation at the level of governments was indeed forthcoming, and but for the Denmark judiciary stepping in, Mr Davy should have been on his way to India to stand trial. It is pertinent that Denmark agreed to India’s extradition request after obtaining sovereign assurances from this country that the death penalty would not be imposed on Mr Davy (Denmark, like several other states, has banned the death sentence) if he was found guilty, and that he would be permitted to serve the jail term — if one was ordered by the Indian courts — in prisons in his own country.
Even so, the Danish judicial system has prevented extradition on the grounds that Mr Davy would risk “torture or other inhuman treatment” in India, and that conditions in Indian jails are not satisfactory. The points raised regarding relatively poor jail conditions and the practice of torture by India’s police, although this is outlawed and is known to have attracted punishment for offending police personnel, are valid and are well taken. However, they do not really apply in this high-profile case involving an international cast, especially when India has already made certain assurances to Denmark in pursuit of its extradition request, including transfer of the prisoner to Denmark for serving out a sentence, if there is one. Nevertheless, especially in the light of this case, India does need to work even harder to end the practice of torture by police. But it was expected that the Danish judiciary would keep the larger picture in view of pursuing criminals to the ground, even if they are Danish nationals.