Among the various internal security problems this country is besieged with, the Naxal/Maoist issue is one which is difficult to attribute to foreign inspiration, unlike, say, the dodgy situation in Kashmir or the Northeast, or lately even communal violence, which is sometimes linked to the action-reaction syndrome driven by terrorist attacks. And yet it is plain that success in dealing with this homegrown malady appears to be minimal. Union home minister P. Chidambaram acknowledged as much when he told the chief ministers’ conference on internal security this week: “Looking back at 2010, my assessment is that there is a kind of stalemate.” The home minister’s observation is noteworthy for its frankness. Usually not one to beat about the bush, Mr Chidambaram has offered a clearcut appraisal. Perhaps its public articulation will goad the Centre and state governments to be both more analytical and purposeful in meeting a challenge which, at its root, emanates from two sources — the stark poverty in the countryside in large parts of the country, and the deficit of governance which drives people, particularly the poor, to despair that can become a stepping-stone to violence.
Mr Chidambaram took charge of the home ministry a little over two years ago. Right from the beginning he set about revamping, innovating and establishing institutions to deal with terror-related crimes since he came to the job in the immediate the aftermath of the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai. It was only a little later that he turned his attention to Naxalism, which was then being officially described as the country’s primary internal security problem. (Under the pressure of political to-and-fro, not least within the ruling Congress itself, such a cavalier categorisation has been modified imperceptibly as it appeared to be casting blame on the poorest sections of our people, particularly tribals. Now the marker of hierarchy has been abandoned and the Maoist question only ranks as one among the country’s key internal security challenges.) Even so, the government’s success in dealing with Maoism has been conspicuously limited. This is not surprising. So long as the Indian State cannot take effective steps to raise people from grinding poverty, it cannot turn the tide against Naxalism, especially in regions where the terrain is forested and inaccessible for the most part. Merely deploying the police, paramilitary forces or even the military means will not do, important and inescapable as these may be. As Mr Chidambaram admitted at the internal security conference, there has been a “perceptible lull” in anti-Naxalite operations since the massacre of 76 CRPF personnel in Dantewada in April 2010 — in effect, for the past one year. This is clear recognition that even the police and military end of the solution has not crystallised. There aren’t enough police personnel, and those that are available lack the right training and equipment, and possibly also suffer from an absence of leadership and morale. Not so the Naxalites. The home minister called the CPI (Maoist) a “powerful and determined adversary”, and noted it had added “at least four companies to the People’s Liberation Guerilla Army”.
India’s home minister clearly has his task cut out. He must not only inspire the state governments to raise the right type of uniformed forces, he needs to engage in serious dialogue with them to do the needful and promise them all the support he can. But there is a key acknowledgement to be made. At bottom, the Naxalite menace can be traced to ungoverned spaces — not unlike the Taliban problem which Afghanistan faces. The State must govern effectively. In order to fight poverty, it has to go out and build roads, set up schools, welfare centres, post offices, and not just police stations. Besides, these nodes and communication lines must function. Local livelihood opportunities must be created, keeping in mind local resources as well as sensitivities. Only then can Maoist battalions be driven back.