In Pakistan, the Army runs the country. The Inter-Services Intelligence directorate - a wing of the military - is its preferred instrument for maintaining contact with terrorist outfits which are used to further the country's foreign policy objectives. The Pakistan Army's undeniable terror link is thus not merely a general proposition.

From time to time, specific instances of its personnel being cited in operations linked to terrorism come to light. Unless a catalogue is maintained, many may be misled into the naïve belief that each revelation is a one-off, and that the Pakistan Army exists as a pristine force in a sea of trouble. On paper, this is the line taken by most nations that routinely deal with Pakistan — such as the United States, or even India. Unfortunately for the Pakistan Army (and the ISI), the lid is once again off, and its association with the netherworld exposed.
In the second superseding indictment filed by US federal prosecutors in a Chicago court earlier this week, four Pakistani conspirators were charged with carrying out the 2008 terror attack in Mumbai, in which the victims included Americans. One of those indicted is a “Major Iqbal”, a serving officer. This name emerged in the FBI’s interrogation of terror suspect David Coleman Headley, a Pakistani who became an American citizen. A dossier that India handed over to Pakistan in February 2010 had also mentioned “Major Iqbal”, besides a “Major Samir Ali”. Islamabad did not even bother to respond. It is hard to say if things will be any different now that the matter is before a US court. In any case, it is unlikely the Army officer in question will be asked any questions. Islamabad will probably flatly deny such a person exists. It is unlikely the Americans will press the matter. Far too much is at stake. In spite of the current strain in relations between Washington and Islamabad over continuing US drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas targeting Al Qaeda and the Taliban, both sides know only too well that the US believes it cannot do without the Pakistan Army in the Afghan theatre and beyond.
Only recently, Tahhawur Hussain Rana, Headley’s accomplice, had informed a Chicago court in an affidavit that he had taken part in planning and reconnaissance for the Mumbai 26/11 attacks under the ISI’s guidance. We thus have two instances in a few weeks when the US judicial system has received information from indicted individuals about the part played by Pakistan Army and ISI personnel in a major terrorist strike against India. There is also the treasure trove of leaked Guantanamo documents, which became public on Sunday. One of them — dating to 2007 — unflinchingly associates the ISI with international terrorism (it is not known if the Obama administration sustains this position). It informs the prison supervisors that detainees associated with the ISI “may have provided support to Al Qaeda or the Taliban, or engaged in hostilities against US or coalition forces (in Afghanistan)”. It may be recalled that Ajmal Kasab, the lone gunman caught after the 26/11 assault on Mumbai, had noted in his testimony that “a Major General Saheb” had visited him and fellow attackers while they were undergoing training. The officer came accompanied by Hafiz Saeed, the ideological leader of the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba which associates flagrantly with the ISI. Innumerable former Kashmiri terrorists recall dealing with a “Brigadier Saheb” or a “Colonel Saheb” in Pakistan-run training camps. The story is not new.
Not challenging this state of affairs in our diplomatic dealings with Islamabad, whose pace has once again picked up, does not do us justice. Our interlocutors must not be shy to tell the country what the Pakistani response is.