The abduction by Naxalites last week of Orissa’s Malkangiri collector R. Vineel Kumar, along with junior engineer Pabitra Majhi, underlines the complexity of dealing effectively with the Maoist problem. There are some crucial lessons here too. Since the Naxalite issue affects about 60 districts across seven states, what we are witnessing in Orissa has wider implications.

The initial focus was on whether or not to engage in talks with the Maoists who demanded the release of arrested colleagues in return for the captured officials. It is just as well that the Orissa government chose to agree to such a swap. It has been a ready prescription for some years that there should be no negotiations with terrorists. It is thought that such a course of action is pusillanimous, that it emboldens terrorists, and that it is a relatively painless way of getting freed desperadoes captured with some difficulty. In India we have almost always chosen the path of dialogue, but the no-negotiations stance is especially strong among Western nations. The Rubaiya Sayeed case in Kashmir and the Kandahar hijack case highlight the unspoken Indian approach. Possibly what explains the Western view is that usually these countries deal with terrorists who are not their own citizens, and those abducted are usually ordinary individuals (not large groups) — often in non-Western locations (such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan) — and not senior officials or their families. Should the worst happen and a hostage is killed by the kidnappers, the domestic political fallout is expected to be relatively small. A genuine test of the no-negotiations-with-terrorists approach is yet to come. Only if a senior official or a large group of their own nationals is taken captive home soil will we get a real idea of how firmly committed Western democracies are to the principle they espouse. Most hostage situations which have played out on Indian soil involve our own citizens — those captured as well as the outlaws — or, as in the Kandahar case, a very large group of our citizens are affected. This brings an altogether different perspective into play. It should also be kept in mind that if an official as senior as a district collector is allowed to be tortured or killed by outlawed bodies, the faith of the populace in the administration is likely to be badly shaken, not to mention that government officials would hesitate to serve in such areas. There is another consideration as well. Vile as the operating techniques of the Naxalites are, should they be deemed to be terrorists in the ordinary sense of the term? The answer is not easy or uncomplicated, for the stated aim of Naxal violence is succour for the poorest sections and this brings in a degree of sympathy for them among the intelligentsia. Another issue in the debate, of course, is that Naxalites are not external elements but our own citizens. The rules of engagement may have been different if their gangs included foreigners.
There are two key lessons in the Malkangiri affair. The collector seems to have been an extremely popular figure in the district on account of his concern for the poor and the steps he took to improve their condition. Even so, he was foolhardy to move about without security. Quite simply, that is inviting trouble in the Naxal belt. It is to be hoped that all state governments which face the Maoist problem have strict instructions for officials not to move about in the field without adequate precautions. Two, conspicuously pro-poor district officials leave a mark. This is why — before the negotiations began — poor villagers tried on their own to confront the Maoists to release Mr Kumar unharmed. The extension of this is that genuinely welfare-minded officials can help challenge the Maoist phenomenon through their actions.