After a long interregnum, Jhalanath Khanal, leader of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), was elected Prime Minister in the Constituent Assembly (which now doubles as Nepal’s Parliament) on Sunday, but is not hard to see that Mr Khanal will live on borrowed time. He will also not be in much of a position to offer

his country much-needed stability and a policy framework geared at coping with problems that have been piling up for the past three years. Given the parliamentary arithmetic and the political equation between the key players — the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), far and away the largest party in the House although way short of a majority, the Nepali Congress (NC), and CPN (UML) — Parliament had not been able to elect a Prime Minister since June last year although a number of farcical attempts were made.
On being elected, Mr Khanal claimed that his election was the product of consensus and that his government would seek consensus on key issues. Neither proposition derives from reality. Maoist leader Prachanda, who has been keen to become Prime Minister ever since the position fell vacant, struck a last-minute arrangement with the CPN(UML) to elevate Mr Khanal. The NC, the third leading player in Nepal which has held power countless times, was cut out of the deal. Also, some 50 Maoist MPs guided by Baburam Bhattarai, Mr Prachanda’s number two, voted for Mr Khanal under protest, as they wanted the Prime Minister’s position held by their own party, given its overwhelming superiority in the House. In the circumstances it is evident that Mr Prachanda is the king behind the throne and the elected Prime Minister will have little latitude, given the Maoist chief’s propensities and his track record of functioning. It is also to be kept in view that the CPN(UML) and NC had together offered to make Mr Prachanda Prime Minister provided he agreed in advance on only a certain number of Maoist guerrilla fighters to be integrated into the Nepalese Army, but the Maoist supremo reportedly declined to accept such terms. In effect, the integration of all the erstwhile Maoist guerrillas into the country’s Army is, for the Maoist leader, the base negotiating point and no consensus politics in the country is possible unless the democratic parties accept this. Indeed, it is this factor which has been the elephant in the room in Nepal’s politics since the last election in April 2008.
That election had brought the Constituent Assembly into being. By May 2009, this body was to have drafted the Constitution of post-royal Nepal. Last year it missed an extended deadline of one year and is on course to miss the second one-year deadline in May 2011. With no agreement in sight among key political players on the nature of the Nepali state after the end of the monarchy, it is hardly feasible to be sanguine about the future. Indeed, little can be taken for granted. Will the Maoists go back to being countryside guerrillas seeking to take power by force of arms? Will the Army revolt in the hope of seizing power or bringing back the King in a bid to thwart the Maoists with whom it has an uneasy relationship? Or even if all sides will agree to a fresh election (although this looks highly civilised, politically, in the circumstances)? There are just too many open questions.
Nepal is important to India’s security to the north, and this country would desire a republican solution to Nepal’s political problems. Nevertheless, it will also be ready to live with any other solution the Nepali people themselves find acceptable. Prolonged uncertainty in the Himalayan nation is not only bad from the security perspective. A stalemate, which can potentially lead to anarchy, also thwarts meaningful partnership between the two close neighbours.