The Supreme Court quite rightly declared illegal and unconstitutional the deployment of tribal youth to take on Maoists under the “salwa judum” programme in Chhattisgarh. Under this project, ongoing since 2005, some 6,000 poor young tribals have been made special police officers, or Koya Commandos, and given weapons to fight the

Maoists. In denouncing the idea, through a ruling on Tuesday, the country’s highest court appears to have accorded centrality to the human rights of those roped in under the salwa judum initiative, correctly maintaining that these are young people — sometimes well below 18 — who have barely attended primary school and are simply not equipped to take on the responsibility of SPOs. The judges cited Article 14 of the Constitution (equality before the law and equal protection of the law) as well as Article 21 (no one can be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedures established by law). In other words, tribal youth must be nourished through education and not sent up as cannon fodder. These are useful points to enumerate.
However, the court could also have emphasised another signal aspect of the Constitution in declaring that salwa judum was undesirable, unworthy and unconstitutional. Quite simply, setting up a vigilante force of citizens — which is what salwa judum has done — runs contrary to the understanding that the state alone in democratic societies must be empowered to use violence in the manner sanctioned by the duly constituted authority and within the bounds of law. If this were not so, armed gangs of one or another persuasion would roam the land, in some cases enjoy official patronage, and justify their goals and motives in terms of righteousness, morality, culture, nationalism and revolutionary impulses of one or another kind. What salwa judum does is to arm one set of citizens against another in a calculated and programmed manner in the belief that a national cause is being served, and criminals are being paid back in their own coin. However, our notion of democratic justice demands that those who envisage or commit serious crimes for personal or political reasons must be made to confront the full majesty of the law at the hands of duly constituted authority, and not sought to be subdued by state-sponsored vigilante groups. Next-door Pakistan (there are other examples) offers an objective lesson. Here the pernicious use of armed terrorists to secure official objectives has brought the society to its knees, and the state gives every appearance of degenerating into helplessness in the face of assault by such elements.
No Indian would want to go there, and yet the authorities in Chhattisgarh offer the limp explanation that their fight against Maoists would be enfeebled if salwa judum is off the table. In this view, the forces mobilised under salwa judum know the jungles well and can checkmate the Maoists. This is surprising in view of the fact that the state’s fight against Maoists in Chhattisgarh has produced no better results than those elsewhere in the country where there is no salwa judum. It should be noted that the salwa judum idea differs in principle and in spirit from that of village defence units (comprising mostly retired Armymen) in Jammu and Kashmir some years ago to meet the onslaught by terrorists launched into Indian territory by Pakistan. The key difference is that VDUs, unlike salwa judum, were set up to challenge foreign mercenaries. It is to be hoped that after being disbanded, the salwa judum personnel would be removed to safety (as otherwise they would be sitting ducks for the Maoists), and given a start in another kind of life with the help of the Centre.