Matt Waldman, a fellow at the Carr Centre for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University, caused alarm in Western nations and a huge controversy in Pakistan with his academic paper on the relationship between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence and insurgents in Afghanistan.
The report, The Sun in the Sky, reveals that the ISI exerts, directly and indirectly, significant influence on the strategic decision-making and field operations of the Taliban. Waldman interviewed nine insurgent commanders between February and May this year and also 10 former senior Taliban officials, 22 Afghan elders, tribal leaders, analysts and politicians and 13 foreign diplomats experts and security officials. Here, he talks about his interest in Afghanistan, his recent research and his belief that fundamental issues driving Pakistan’s insecurity, especially the Kashmir issue, needs to be addressed in order to stabilise South Asia.

Q: What triggered off your interest in the links between the Taliban and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence?
A: The truth is I wasn’t very interested until I started to conduct interviews with insurgents and with individuals connected with insurgents. When they started to talk about how much influence the ISI had, I thought this was an issue which I cannot just pass by. I really have to raise this in the course of my interviews which are in fact about other issues like reconciliation, reintegration, negotiations and so on. I felt very obliged to undertake this research given the significance, or what appears to be the significance, of the ISI there.

Q: The role of ISI in Afghanistan has always been talked about, especially since the rise of the Taliban in the country. What made you think that you would be able to provide new insight into the link between the ISI and the Taliban?
A: I have been working in Afghanistan and on Afghanistan for years now and I always believe that Pakistan’s role was significant, but I noticed that there has been not a great deal of research on this relationship between the ISI and Afghan insurgents. So I thought that it would be worthwhile undertaking some rigorous and fairly methodical research on this issue and sure enough it has produced some very interesting results.

Q: The Pakistan government has vehemently denied the links uncovered in your research. What was your reaction to denials and clarifications issued by Pakistan? What about personal attacks on your credibility as a researcher?
A: My duty is to my research. It is my job as a researcher to conduct interviews, to ensure that they are done in the most independent and impartial way possible and I had seek to verify the claims made by any interviewee, to seek to corroborate anything what they are saying to use not only other sources to corroborate, but also look at analysis conducted by other researchers and to as well to confer with and discuss these issues with officials in international organisations and Western countries. That’s of course, exactly what I did.
As I say in the report that I cannot conclusively verify all of these assertions because we are taking about activities that are inherently covert and in very dangerous part of the world. What I can do, is to faithfully reproduce for people the assertions, the views, the beliefs of people who are at the heart of this conflict. That is what I am doing. So, I am sure always debate about this issue as a lot of people are passionate about this issue and understandably so. But my duty was to present the findings of my research and that is what I did.
My report is there, people can read the report and judge it as they will. I have concluded in that report, the findings of this research, which as I say was conducted independently. I contacted the interviewees separately and conducted the interviews separately as a way of trying to ensure that the findings were verifiable and corresponded to reality. There was a lot of corroboration, a lot of verification work. Now, we will never know the exact truth of what is going on. But all we can try to do is to get closer to it and I think one way of going about that is to talk to people who are at the heart of what is going on.
I have reflected their views faithfully in my report. Now people may disagree with what those people have to say, or they may agree with it. My job as a researcher is to reflect the views faithfully if I believe they are honestly held and reflect genuine beliefs. And indeed I do.

Q: Will you go back to Afghanistan and is your safety an issue now especially as you have not revealed the names of your interviewees? Will the report cause any problems for you?
A: I will go back to Afghanistan. There is always a risk for anyone travelling in this region, but my job as a researcher is to try to establish the truth and then to reflect that in my reporting. And, of course, it’s also my duty to disclose their identities if they believe that would put them at risk. That is a case of research ethics and I wouldn’t violate that trust.

Q: Your report has quoted a former Taliban minister as saying that basically the root problem in Afghanistan is the competition between Pakistan and India. Is that a popular belief held by the Taliban and other insurgents in Afghanistan?
A: I think that individual believes that to be the case, but personally don’t believe that to be the case. I believe that fundamentally there are four major drivers of the conflict in Afghanistan:
One is the predatory and exclusionary politics we have seen in Kabul. Certain groups, certain factions feel excluded from power and that has led them to join the Taliban, join the insurgency to seek to obtain power.
Secondly, the abuse of power right which we have seen at many levels, right at the lowest level with the police or at the top where we see perhaps judges or ministers who are clearly engaged in corrupt or criminal practices and I think that has driven a lot of people into joining or supporting the insurgents.
Thirdly, there is a perception that foreign military forces are not there in Afghanistan to benefit Afghans, but they are aggressive and somehow they are invaders and that they are seeking to occupy the country. Although that is not a majority view in Afghanistan, I do believe a minority believes that and those individuals do join insurgency and of course we know that many of the night raids which killed innocent Afghan civilians have driven people into supporting the insurgency. One Taliban figure was interviewed by my assistant and it was very clear that the interviewee joined the Taliban because of a particular raid on his home in which two of his sons, two of his uncles and his father had been killed. He had not joined the Taliban before and he never would have joined the Taliban but for that incident.
Finally, the fourth factor is Pakistan. The activities of the ISI have contributed to this conflict in the sense that insurgents always need a sanctuary in order to be able to recuperate, in order to be rehabilitated, to prepare for future activities. Of course, it does seem, as the interviewees claim, that significant support is being provided by the ISI. So, that, of course, is another factor that has helped the insurgents in their campaign.

Q: You have talked about Quetta Shura (the main governing council of the Taliban) and how ISI has representatives on that. Could you corroborate the presence of ISI operatives on the Taliban governing council from any of the sources? Would the ISI be able to plant someone of the Taliban council?
A: This is one of the findings that came out in the research. This is something that the interviewees told me and not all of them, of course, but many of them. These are people who are at the heart of the insurgency. These are the people who are doing the fighting by the leading men to fight foreign forces and the Afghan government and their views are that the ISI have some sort of presence, although there are different views in what way that is.
Indeed many others who know the insurgency and who know the region very well also believe that to be the case. I also spoke to diplomats who did not dispute it, so I think it does seem to be the case that there is this presence somehow on the Quetta Shura.
It’s not necessarily the case that it is an individual who is specifically an ISI officer. People believe that perhaps there might be observers or an individual or individuals on the Shura who actually would report back to ISI what was happening.
It’s not clear and there are different interpretations of exactly how the ISI presence on the supreme council was manifested. There is a large body of opinion that believes that somehow or other the ISI has a presence on that Shura and they are aware of its activities.

Q: The report also highlights the mistrust and fear of the ISI amongst the Taliban and insurgents in Afghanistan. How long will the ISI be able to lead the strategic policies of the Taliban in spite of this growing mistrust?
A: This is a very interesting dynamic. It did seem that the insurgents were very uncomfortable with their relationship with the ISI. They felt they were forced to work with them because they needed the sanctuary, they needed the support (provided by the ISI) and indeed, they were very fearful that if they did not conduct their activities in accordance with the ISI directives they would somehow suffer.
They seem to have been pressured into this kind of relationship, they didn’t like it but they felt that they had to live with it. The ISI also feel that, I mean I do not know, but perhaps they feel there is no alternative and in order to secure Pakistan’s interests they need to work with insurgents. Maybe that is how they perceive this relationship with the Taliban.

Q: One aspect you have not touched in your report is the huge amount of aid and reconstruction money that pours into Afghanistan and Pakistan. Is that huge amount of aid money an issue that drives insurgency in Afghanistan?
A: I think that, by and large, the West is funding this conflict. I think that is through a number of means. I think it’s through aid monies that go missing in corruption and that perhaps ultimately ends up in the hands of insurgents. I think it’s through the corruption in the Afghan government, I think it’s through the money that international forces pay to certain contractors who then pay certain armed groups not to attack convoys and of course there are massive supply convoys that are going through Afghanistan every single day and I am sure that some of that money ends up in the hands of the Taliban. I think it also through the money that is provided to Pakistan. I suspect that some of that makes its way to the hands of the insurgents. In addition, of course, it is the Western citizens in many cases who are purchasing the opium on the streets of their capitals which is also funding this insurgency.
Overall, yes I believe that the West is very largely funding this insurgency. Of course, primarily indirectly. It perhaps explains why so many Afghans believe that we are somehow, the West is somehow, is in collusion with the Taliban. Now that is not the case, but perhaps that and the policies of the Pakistan’s ISI explain why there is this perception among many Afghans.

Q: The US is spending over $70 billion a year in Afghanistan and the UK has had more than 300 deaths in the nine-year operations. How will the Western governments explain the rising financial and human toll of their Afghan operations without any end in sight to insurgency?
A: It is very difficult for them, so many things have gone wrong. I think one of the big mistakes was the policy of cooption led by America largely after the intervention in 2001, which was to work with whom it was politically expedient to, regardless of their record and reputation. I think it compounded by the certain way of doing politics which is predatory, which is exclusionary, which alienates certain groups and has fed into the conflict. I think that is certainly one of the major issues why we are where we are today. Also, I don’t believe that a lot of politics being implemented will bring peace. I think that the politics that is being implemented is fundamentally flawed. Why? Because insurgents have an area of sanctuary and can gain external support and there is not a legitimate credible partner government to be able to work with. I do not believe that will succeed.
I think what we have to do is to address the fundamental causes driving the conflict. Try and have a more inclusive approach to politics. Secondly, to start to try to address some of the most grevious and the most egregious cases of the abuse of power and people at the very top of the Afghan government cannot be allowed to get away with massive corruption. It also means that there is much less harm caused to Afghanistan in the course of military operation because destruction caused is really generating a lot of resistance to this foreign military presence.
Finally, the major factor is the support from Pakistan and that will really only be addressed if we take seriously the enduring and latent conflict with India. We have to see some sort of, on one hand a bilateral process between India and Pakistan, but also a regional peace process. I cannot understand why that is not happening already given that we can see that different regional conflicts going on. We need to acknowledge them, acknowledge the various security concerns and the strategic interests of the different powers in the region and then see if we can start to address them and see if we can start to manage those concerns and interests rather than watching them lead to confrontation.