The 46th India-Burma border liaison meeting was held at Leimakhong near Imphal, where a mountain division of the Indian Army is headquartered, on August 22. This meeting, which came reportedly in the wake of Burma’s assurance of pushing out Northeast rebel — terrorist groups from its soil and the subsequent vigilant measures being taken up along the porous India-Burma boundary by the Indian security forces in the tribal-dominated Chandel, Ukhrul and Churacha-ndpur districts. During this visit, Burmese officials also visited Kolkata and Gaya.
Of the four Indian states, Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh, which share 1,643 km of land border with Burma, the first two are plagued by insurgent-turned-terrorist groups, who have been getting shelter and support from the Burma Army.
At least eight groups of Manipur and Nagaland, including the so-called “anti-talks faction” of United Liberation Front of Asom (Ulfa) have had bases in Burma for many decades. When the pro-Pakistan Bangladesh Nationalist Party came to power in Bangladesh, Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) presence in that country was substantially increased. When the Indian Army was called to deal with the menace of United Liberation Front of Asom (Ulfa) in Assam in end November 1990, its top leadership under Paresh Baruah escaped to Bangladesh giving the ISI there the golden opportunity to enter Assam and other parts of the Northeast.
Following Awami Leagues massive electoral victory in December 2008, its government, led by Sheikh Hasina, began a crackdown on Northeast militants, many of them returned to take shelter in the jungles and hills of Burma. From these areas in Burma, Ulfa has been making trips to China, which has been providing it support and weapons for them and for supplying to Left Wing Extremists (LWEs)/Naxal-Maoists.
In 1988, India decided to stop openly supporting the Burmese democracy movement and began negotiating for bilateral cooperation with the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)/ military junta. The junta always had a long wish-list of military hardware from India with a quid pro quo of putting pressure or chasing out leaders and elements of these groups.
With a view to garnering support from the Burma Army in dealing with the menace of insurgency and to counter-balance the Chinese influence in Burma, India began engaging the military junta quite extensively since 2006.
In 2001, India’s Border Roads Organisation constructed a 160 km-long road from Tamu to Kalewa which reduced the travelling time from about 11 to 3 hours. According to a December 30, 2006 report of India Defence Premium, during a visit to Burma in November 2006, former Indian Air Force Chief, Air Chief Marshal Tyagi, offered a multi-million dollar sale of military hardware to Naypyidaw (military junta’s new name for Yangon). The package included helicopters, technical upgrades of Burma-Russian and Chinese made fighter planes, naval surveillance aircraft and radar manufactured by Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited. The visit of Gen. Shwe Mann, the junta’s joint chief of staff, in December was expected to expand the arms sales talks. Prior to ACM Tyagi’s visit, former Indian Army Chief Gen. J.J. Singh had offered to provide training in counter-insurgency campaigns for Burmese Special Forces.
President of Burma U Thein Sein, who assumed office heading the new civilian government after general elections on March 30 2011, came on a state visit to India six months later.
The President, accompanied by his spouse Daw Khin Khin Win, headed a high-level delegation of 10 ministers and the Chief of General Staff. External affairs minister (EAM) S.M. Krishna called on Mr Sein prior to the delegation-level talks with Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh, where some agreements were signed.
New Delhi felt it was time to further strengthen bilateral relations with Burma as an integral part of India’s Look East Policy. Connectivity through Burma can boost economic development for India’s north-eastern region. Work is under way in establishing the Kaladan Multi Modal Transport Corridor to connect India’s eastern ports to Mizoram through the Sittwe Port in Burma. Thereafter, the corridor moves north via rivers and the roads.
Then came the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Burma after 25 years, during which liberal financial assistance to Burma was promised and 12 agreements were signed. Further, though the Burma Army signed a ceasefire pact with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Chapping faction (NSCN-K), the government of India objected to the same and the matter was reportedly corrected.
Admitting that a deadline of June 10 was given to separatist outfits holed up in Burma by its Army, security sources said that Burmese troops came close to the camps NSCN(K) and Peoples’ Liberation Front of Manipur but no action was taken. Informing that the elusive Ulfa chief Paresh Baruah was keeping a close watch over the development, security sources said that intercepts suggested that Ulfa was mounting pressure on its senior cadres.
Frequent arrest and recovery of explosives and failure of their subversive plan is believed to have created tension in the Ulfa. While the June deadline was recently extended to September, it remains to be seen whether it will be implemented and if so, to what extent, as the Burma Army and these groups have strong old linkages related to trafficking of arms and narcotics. The youth of Manipur and Nagaland have been victims of the scourge of heroin number 4, which comes from hubs like Sagaing in Burma.
The agreements mentioned for India-Burma bilateral cooperation, whenever implemented, will be a great boon for both Burma and India’s Northeastern states, but the decision makers in New Delhi and Napyidaw/Rangoon must be very clear that these projects can only succeed if militant groups-both of Burma and India’s Northeast enjoying sanctuary there are neutralised.

Anil Bhat, a retired Army officer, is a defence and security analyst based in New Delhi