Disclosures made by Brigadier Devinder Singh, commander of the Batalik-based 70 Infantry Brigade during the 1999 Kargil War, have caste a cloud on the role of several Indian Army generals, including three officers who subsequently went on to become chiefs.

Defence analysts agree the recent Armed Forces Tribunal judgement expunging former 15 Corps commander Lt. Gen. Kishan Pal’s appraisal of Brig. Singh alongside key sections of the AAR (After Action Report) as well as portions of the official account of the war, calls for an indepth scrutiny of other generals who evidently chose to ignore glaring falsehoods in the corps commander’s “untrustworthy” reports.
In his interview with this correspondent, Brig. Singh said officers including the then Army Chief Gen. V.P. Malik, Northern Army Commander Lt. Gen. H.M. Khanna, successive 15 corps commanders Lt. Gen. S. Padmanabhan and Lt. Gen. Kishan Pal Yadav as well as the director general military operations Gen. N.C. Vij and additional DGMO Gen. J.J. Singh are guilty of “connivance” or the “silent acceptance” of deliberate lies.
Notably, besides Gen. Malik, three others — Gen. Padmanabhan, Gen. Vij and Gen. J.J. Singh — named by the brigadier went on to become Army Chiefs in later years. Evidently party to the initial blunder of underassessment, these officers did not take the enemy intrusions in Kargil for several crucial days though they later emerged to grab public attention and accolades from India’s first “media war”.
Gen. Malik for instance took off on a goodwill visit to Poland on May 9,1999 despite the fact that intrusions had been independently confirmed by troops on the ground as early as May 3. He remained abroad until May 20 and is said to have even stopped for a European vacation on his way back! Consequent to the colossal underestimation of the enemy by Mr Malik and other commanders, ill-equipped Indian soldiers were forced launch attacks they were easily repulsed possible resulting in avoidable casualties.
Lt. Gen. Khanna, who was decorated with the Sarvottam Yuddh Seva Medal for Kargil, took charge of the Northern Command just days before the operation commenced and in truth had little or no notion of either the terrain or tactics involved. Yet he is the one believed to have advised defence minister George Fernandes prior to the latter’s public assertion that the intruders would be thrown out in “48 hours.”
Closer to the ground as GOC 15 Corps, Lt. Gen. Kishan Pal, who was also awarded the Uttam Yudh Seva Medal and feted himself for directing a brilliant campaign during the war, also refused to see the staring face of the enemy. As late as May 19, despite contrary indicators, he advised the Unified Command at Srinagar that “the situation was local and would be defeated locally.” His underassessment was even evident at an earlier war game (April) when Brig. Devinder Singh depicted a Pakistani assault with Tololing and Tiger Hill as specific targets. Almost like the fiction, he added in his AAR to undermine Brig. Singh, Lt. Gen. Kishan Pal remained (and still is) inconsistent in his claims. Gen. Vig, then serving as director general military operations at Army HQ (and later became Army Chief) also won an Uttam Yuddh Seva Medal for what analysts say was “distinctly remote role during Kargil.” Evidently a party to the shameful Batalik cover up, as alleged by Brig. Singh, he is perhaps best remembered for the controversy he generated in agreeing to brief the BJP’s national execution on the war alongside Mr Fernandes and Air vice marshal S.K. Malik.