The scene in Egypt is changing and there is now a possibility of a transition to a new form of state-power, though its character is far from pre-ordained.
Much would depend on power struggle or compromise between the two most organised and effective forces in the country — the Army and the Islamist radicals (the Muslim Brotherhood) — the barracks and the mosque.

Currently, the Army is right on top, but the MB has gained ground by belatedly aligning itself with the street protesters. The two are in conversation about the future. We have to wait and see where the negotiations lead. It was clear from day one that President Hosni Mubarak would not relinquish power so long as, in his estimation, he continued to have the support of the Egyptian Armed forces.
But the US didn’t get it, not even when Mr Mubarak announced that neither he nor his son Gamal will be a candidate for President in the September election. To that extent he had heard the voice of the Arab street. But he also made it plain that he had no mind to surrender office before the election although the protests had taken on the form of an uprising that stunned West Asia and the world, and pressure from Washington in its favour was mounting on a daily basis. The US backed the Egyptian dictator for 34 years, and before that kept Mr Mubarak’s predecessor President Anwar Sadat (also a former serving officer) afloat, but US President Obama was aggressive in backing what appeared to be “pro-democracy” protests, and strongly hinted that Mr Mubarak should leave office forthwith.
Evidently, after being the lifeline for dictatorships in West Asia’s most influential country, the US was keen to curry favour with the street armies, which looked like they might seize power.
In the event, the Egyptian leader defied the neophyte American chief and demonstrated that it is not easy in our times for foreigners to dictate terms. He calculated that the US could not withdraw its annual $1.5-billion aid to his country as $1.3 billion of this were credits to buy US weapons.
In contrast with the US, Indian diplomacy played its hand more professionally. It did well to disregard the advice of well-intentioned pro-democracy do-gooders to demand Mr Mubarak’s scalp. First it called the tumultuous goings-on an “internal matter” of Egypt — although this sounded tepid at the time — and later urged Cairo to pay attention to the popular mood.
What is that mood exactly? The protesters — the MB and the others — certainly want Mr Mubarak out. The more important question is: Is the Army quitting? Also, is it preparing to usher in democracy even if it is not quitting right away? We don’t know for sure yet, but these seem unlikely. For that matter, we also don’t know whether the Army would compromise with MB — the other protesters don’t count for so much as they are not organised, have no identifiable leader or tradition of the culture of democracy, and the educated professionals in Tehir Square were probably MB masquerading as democrats — or take it on while appearing to hold conversations and political negotiations with it.
In the past, the Egyptian Army has shown suppleness. When in 1948 the secular and socialist Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser seized power from King Farooq, a puppet of British colonial authority, in the name of all Egyptians, he had the backing of Sayyid Qutub, MB’s ideologue, organiser, icon and arguably the most influential 20th century political philosopher of the Islamic world to whom Al Qaeda leaders pays intellectual allegiance.
Yet, MB was first banned under Nasser in 1948, permitted to revive at different times, but subsequently banned. In 1966, Qutub was hanged. But MB has survived and grown. On what terms the Army would deal with it is the main point of interest now.