While the WikiLeaks on Pakistan has not revealed anything that Indian analysts did not suspect or know, what it has proved beyond doubt is that country’s importance as a strategic asset for the United States.
The nature of the strategic symbiosis between the two was brought out in a remarkable memo penned by former US ambassador to Islamabad, Anne Patterson. Writing in a cable to Washington on February 21, 2009, she observed that the US-Pakistan relationship “has been based on mutual mistrust... The relationship is one of co-dependency we grudgingly admit — Pakistan knows the US cannot afford to walk away; the US knows Pakistan cannot survive without our support.”
Thus, as US state department spokesman Philip J. Crowley remarked after the WikiLeaks exposure, leaks or no leaks, the partnership would endure. “We are building a strategic partnership with Pakistan, and that’s manifest in the strategic dialogue that we’ve had on multiple occasions this year in Washington and in Islamabad,” explained Crowley.” This is in our national interest. It is in Pakistan’s national interest.”
Sadly, all this is certainly not in Indian national interest. For, the US-Pakistan partnership in the ultimate analysis allows the Pakistan Army to maintain and nurture its terrorist forces, which are sometimes euphemistically referred to as non-state actors; it allows Pakistan to continue sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir and other parts of India; it provides a financial cushion with which Pakistan can continue producing nuclear weapons; and it fosters the continuance of a mindset that justifies extra-territorial ambitions such as in Afghanistan.
The WikiLeaks clearly show that Washington was more worried about containing the fallout from the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack than getting at the perpetrators. It was all about protecting Pakistan. The details of the cables exchanged during that time make for sorry reading.
In one of the cables, a US embassy official reported that the UK is pressing urgent action but that this should be ignored: “British high commission officials in Islamabad told Polcouns on November 28 that HMG has evidence the attacks in Mumbai were carried out by Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), which was planning more attacks... The UK mission is suggesting to London that the UK call for credible actions, perhaps to include arresting senior LeT leaders and permanently closing down the infrastructure of the militancy.” Instead of supporting the British view, the Americans reported that “the UK embassy here is overreacting.”
Three days later, British foreign minister Arthur Miliband called up Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari and told him to take action against the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. But Zardari now prevaricated just as his Army chief General Kayani was doing. A cable from the US Mission in Islamabad reported: “Miliband said that LeT needed to ‘feel the full force of the law’. Zardari responded by saying he was setting up special courts, was contacting all political parties, and would take action immediately... Miliband pressed for Pasha to go to India. Zardari gave Brinkley a long answer about various levels of directors in the ISI but finally confirmed that the Army had vetoed the decision to send Pasha.” Zardari went on to talk about Muslim-Hindu differences and attempts to split India without making any commitment.
No real action was forthcoming. The Pakistani establishment stonewalled every Indian attempt to shut down the LeT. Yet, the US ambassador in Islamabad continued to champion the Pakistan Army’s cause, although by January 2010 it was clear that LeT was involved. In a cable marked to the New Delhi mission, ambassador Patterson wrote: “ISI director-general Pasha has just approved the sharing of tearline information on Pakistan’s investigation with Indian intelligence, after assurances from the CIA that information would be tightly held in intelligence channels only... If Pasha is embarrassed by what is essentially public dissemination without the Indians providing the results of their own investigation to Pakistan, it will undercut Pakistan’s ability to pursue its investigation, generate a public backlash in Pakistan, and could undermine Pasha personally.”
Within days of the Mumbai outrage it was clear that the Pakistani establishment, especially the military, was not going to cooperate with India or address its concerns over the LeT and other terrorist groups. A great opportunity for mending ties with India was deliberately lost. The US officials were monitoring Pakistani reactions and knew what was going on. Yet, top US officials kept assuring their Indian counterparts that they would help bring the perpetrators to justice. Indian restraint went unrewarded.
In Islamabad, Patterson kept insisting the ball was in the Indian court. The US, she wrote, “should not allow Mumbai to derail rapprochement. Both sides should resume Composite Dialogue negotiations, re-establish back-channel negotiations, and increase trade across both the Wagah border and the Kashmir Line of Control.”
That pressure continues and even President Barack Obama on his India visit last month privately told Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh to resume talks with Pakistan. Only this time, Prime Minister Singh politely refused. At the joint press conference, he made it a point to publicly declare that the desire for talks and support for terrorism could not go hand in hand. “Once Pakistan moves away from this terror-induced coercion, we’ll be very happy to enga-ge productively with Pakistan to resolve all outstanding issues,” he declared.
With the WikiLeaks revelations it is abundantly clear that despite the highfalutin talk about Washington’s relations with Islamabad and New Delhi not being a zero sum game, in practical terms India should not expect US even-handedness as long as Pakistan continues to be a cherished strategic asset.
Indranil Banerjie
is a defence and security analyst based in New Delhi