The first anniversary of United Progressive Alliance-2 is occasioning a frenzied review of its performance.
Here is a brief look at its diplomatic report card. Indian foreign policy has been undergoing subtle transmutation since 1991, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Narasimha Rao began the repositioning of India; the National Democratic Alliance government led by Atal Behari Vajpayee consolidated it. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s task was complicated as UPA-I was dependent on the Communist Party of India-Marxist, for whom United States was anathema. There was also the legacy aspect, as the Nehru-Gandhi family had traditionally been votaries of non-alignment and against excessive cosiness with the US. Dr Singh decided to restrict himself to a few big ticket issues; he also chose stealth over debate.
Essentially there has been single-theme domination. During UPA-I it was the Indo-US nuclear deal and now Pakistan. Other important subjects have been taken up i.e. the financial crisis and Dr Singh’s attendance of the Group of Eight and now the Group of Twenty summits, the Copenhagen Climate Summit and the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington on April 13, 2010. These, however, have been meetings convened by others which India participated in. The nuclear deal and Pakistan were subjects specially chosen with tremendous diplomatic energy expended on them. There has been success with Bangladesh; stalemate in Nepal; and new policy dilemmas over post-Prabhakaran Sri Lanka (as elections loom in Tamil Nadu). With China, trade expanded, rhetoric fluctuated and distrust was concealed. The public perception, however, of the success or failure of Indian diplomacy hinges on the two dominant themes.
Take the nuclear deal. On July 18, 2005, it was proudly announced that India would have the “same benefits and advantages” as other nations possessing advanced nuclear technology. With the Obama presidency an uphill battle ensued to ensure that the spirit of the deal was retained despite the non-proliferation pundits amidst the Democrats. The reprocessing agreement with the US precludes technology transfer. The US has moved an amendment at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to forbid even others from doing so. China is now giving two more reactors to Pakistan, clearly in breach of its obligations as a member of the NSG since 2004. The US reaction so far has been mild. It needs Chinese help with the United Nations Security Council’s resolution on Iran and Pakistan’s ongoing relevance to their Af-Pak strategy. US meanwhile lobbies India to pass the Civil Nuclear Liability Bill, despite political turbulence and public apprehension.
For George W. Bush, the nuclear deal was primarily about strategic convergence and not energy, i.e. India as a counterfoil to a rising China. The Indian vote against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2005 sealed the shift. US President Barack Obama is India-friendly but does not share Mr Bush’s world view. He also confronts a China critical to post-financial crisis global stability. The realisation now that Mr Obama’s Af-Pak endgame may increase Pakistan’s strategic space and diminish that of India has led external affairs minister S.M. Krishna to loiter around Tehran, waiting for his turn, while Turkey and Brazil played deal brokers. Space lost in Iran would have to be slowly earned back.
Septuagenarian Indian prime ministers have a fatal attraction to Pakistan. Despite experience since 1998 that the Pakistani military will not allow the India-specific terror network to be dismantled, viewed as a force equaliser and vital for negotiating blackmail, India keeps returning to play the same game, hoping that a Kashmir settlement can outrace the next big terrorist attack. Pakistani public avowals notwithstanding, the rising ferocity of attacks in India, the spread of radical Islam in Pakistan’s veins (Mr Obama called it cancer), today even the civil society, the mainstream politicians and the Army brass in Pakistan are probably reluctant to try exorcising the evil as they fear failure. Thus the issue no longer is Kashmir. Already water is being chanted as the new big issue. It is the rise of India, the non-radicalisation of Indian Muslims and India’s growing clout at the international level which the Pakistani ruling elite has not reconciled to. Pakistan can either piggy-back by dove-tailing into Indian economic success or be consumed by a Wahabi-Pashtun monster. For the West to propound and India to accept that the resolution of the Kashmir dispute will de-radicalise Pakistan is a fallacy. A fair settlement will be unacceptable to the fringes in both countries and thus an irritant, not a balm.
Douglas Hurd, British diplomat-politician, describes a visionary as one who selectively studies history to obtain endorsement for his vision. A strategist, on the contrary, studies history and develops a wider perspective which guides his decisions. A tactician understands chronology but not the wider themes. Prime Minister is a visionary guided by tacticians. India must remain rooted in its wider developing world constituency, albeit while shedding the anti-West rhetoric of the Non-Aligned Movement. Prime Minister has not attended the last three UN General Assembly meetings.
India is a bridge between the two worlds. Let us not demolish the bridge before crossing the river.