Jan 27 : I am surprised at the rather scanty reaction of the public to the views expressed by Union home minister P. Chidambaram on "a new architecture for India’s security". While delivering the Intelligence Bureau Centenary Endowment Lecture in New Delhi on December 23, 2009, Mr Chidambaram made a strong plea for a thorough and radical restructuring of India’s security architecture at the top so that it acquires the capacity to effectively respond to terror threat and attacks. 

His main proposal is that issues not directly related to internal security should be dealt with by a separate ministry, or be brought under a separate department in the ministry of home affairs (MHA) and be dealt with by a minister, more or less independently, without referring every issue to the Union home minister.

Some comments on Mr Chidambaram’s speech that appeared in the media allege that Mr Chidambaram’s objective in restructuring the MHA is to cut the National Security Adviser (NSA) to size. Another allegation is that this is an attempt to take control of certain important intelligence agencies that currently report directly to the Prime Minister. I do not subscribe to these allegations and will avail the hospitality of this column only to highlight few issues raised in his speech that, in my opinion, deserve reconsideration.

The first is whether the main responsibility for internal security should be with a new ministry or department or whether restructuring of the MHA should be so designed as to strengthen the present weak role of the Central government in supporting state governments deal with threats to internal security.

An important suggestion of Mr Chidambaram is the setting up of a National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC). The centre, according to Mr Chidambaram, will counter terrorism, foil terror attacks and if ever there were one then respond swiftly and effectively, "inflicting pain upon the perpetrators". He has stated that the NCTC should have the mandate to deal with all kinds of terrorist violence, "be it insurgency groups in the Northeast or the Communist Party of India-Maoist in the heart of India or any group of religious fanatics anywhere in India, acting on their own or in consort with terrorists outside India". This makes the proposed ministry of internal security not only responsible for gathering and monitoring intelligence, and for supporting state governments in their action against terrorism, but also to be the main agency for operations against terrorists. Mr Chidambaram has said in unambiguous terms that "without operations, the NCTC and the security architecture at the Centre will be incomplete".

This raises a fundamental question: Whether the main responsibility for operations against terrorists can be, or should be, with the Central government? Whatever may be the gravity of the present threats to our internal security, we have to seriously consider whether the minister’s proposals will dilute the primary responsibility of the state governments in handling internal security.

The framers of the Constitution had taken note of India’s size and population while placing "public order" at the top of the state list of subjects in the 7th Schedule. During various debates in Parliament and discussions at the meetings of the Consultative Committee of Parliament for the MHA, most speakers have pleaded not for the direct assumption of responsibility for operations against insurgency and terrorist groups by the Centre, but for the Central government to play a much more positive and active role in strengthening state governments’ ability to take care of internal security.

It was the failure of Central government agencies to provide prompt and adequate assistance to the state governments that provoked severe criticism in Parliament against the MHA during the last few years. The restructuring exercise at the Centre, therefore, should not in any way reduce the direct responsibility of the states in dealing with threats to internal security.

My second point is about Mr Chidambaram’s suggestion of dividing MHA into two parts — one responsible for internal security and the other for the rest of the functions handled by it. If a new ministry is to become the main agency for operations against threats to internal security, and certain crucial subjects like Central-state relations are to be dealt with by the residual part of the MHA, the new ministry itself will be severely handicapped in its working.

The MHA was never intended to be an exclusive ministry for internal security. And the manner in which the MHA in India functions does not have any parallel in developed countries as many of the problems handled by this ministry — threat to national integration, communal conflicts, violence connected with agitations for reorganisation of states or for creation of new independent states — do not exist in most countries and, therefore, institutional mechanism like the NCTC (introduced in the United States in 2004), may not be suitable for India.

Mr Chidambaram himself seems to be in doubt about the need and practicability of division of MHA into two ministries. That’s why he also suggested the alternative of a separate department within the MHA to deal with all subjects not directly related to internal security.

An experienced minister like Mr Chidambaram would know that the suggestion for a separate department in the ministry, headed by a minister working "more or less independently" and dealing with subjects not related to internal security, would create more serious problems than it would solve. In our system of parliamentary democracy, the Cabinet minister is accountable to Parliament and not his minister of state. There have been instances in the MHA itself when ministers of state — supposed to be working under the home minister — have functioned in such a manner that the home minister has found his position embarrassingly undermined.

My last point arising out of Mr Chidambaram’s idea of radical restructuring of the security architecture is that there should be a simultaneous attempt to reduce the number of agencies dealing with intelligence relating to security. So, if a new NCTC were to be set up, it would be advisable to take a hard look at the need for continuing the office of NSA. The NSA may find that the role expected of him when this office was created, might not be possible in the new setup.

By P.C. Alexander

P.C. Alexander is a former governor of Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra