Indo-Afghan treaty: A move forward

The visit to New Delhi by Afghan President Hamid Karzai comes at a critical juncture in the decade-long conflict in his country. In recent months, Afghanistan has been subjected to a series of high-profile attacks by insurgents. Following the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani, prominent Afghan leaders have questioned the wisdom of attempting to reach out to an intransigent Taliban. Mr Karzai, too, set aside his placatory stance towards the Taliban and Pakistan. In a recent public address, he scathingly observed that “Pakistan has pursued a double game towards Afghanistan, and using terrorism as a means continues”, adding for good measure that “Seeking one-sided peace will not bring peace”.
The continuing insurgency and Pakistan’s role therein figured prominently in Mr Karzai’s discussions with the Indian Prime Minister. These discussions took place against the backdrop of considerable, not to say unprecedented, tensions between Pakistan and the United States. A fortnight ago, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, stated in congressional testimony that the Haqqani network was a “veritable arm” of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
Pakistan has responded by digging in its heels. It has rejected the Obama administration’s claims and underlined its “cooperation” in the war on terror. Both countries seem to think that they have not much to lose by forcing a stand-off at this point, as their relationship appears headed for a downward slide in any case.
Yet, unless the US is willing to adopt much stronger tactics in dealing with Pakistan, it is unlikely that the latter will act against groups such as the Haqqani network. After all, even thoughtful Pakistani officials concede that the Army and the ISI will not go after the Haqqanis. The former foreign secretary of Pakistan, Riaz Mohammed Khan, writes in his new book Afghanistan and Pakistan: “Given the culture of intelligence agencies and local traditions, the ISI cannot hound him (Jallaluddin Haqqani) out of the country.” In short neither Mr Karzai nor Mr Obama can be sure that Pakistan will help them negotiate agreements with the insurgent groups operating out of its territory. The situation in Afghanistan after 2014 is likely to remain volatile.
It is against this backdrop that Mr Karzai has inked an agreement on strategic partnership with India. Whilst he is likely to conclude similar agreements with the US and the EU among others, the significance of the agreement with India should not be overlooked. The agreement reaffirms India’s commitment to the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. But it goes beyond the existing relationship and caters for closer economic and security ties. On the economic front, the agreement aims to facilitate the economic integration of Afghanistan with other South Asian countries. This is in keeping with New Delhi’s efforts in recent years to foster better trade and connectivity in the subcontinent, and so enable its neighbours to partake of its economic growth.
The agreement acknowledges, for the first time, the need for security cooperation. Afghanistan and India will engage in a regular “strategic dialogue” led by their national security advisers. Although such exchanges have been taking place, this will provide a systematic framework for consultation and coordination of policies. More importantly, India has agreed “to assist, as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes for Afghan National Security Forces”.
This is a welcome and overdue move. To begin with India might assist in the training of the Afghan National Police. Going forward, it could play a significant role in the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) as well. India already trains Afghan officers in its military academies. New Delhi should be prepared to do more. Over the last two years, the ANA has expanded rapidly — from around 90,000 in late 2008 to nearly 1,71,000 in this month. Quantitative expansion has not, however, been accompanied by qualitative improvement. The ANA continues to be plagued by illiteracy, drug abuse and desertion. Its operational mettle is yet to be seriously tested. A large part of the problem is the lack of foreign trainers. Recent assessments show that only 58 per cent of the trainers pledged by the international coalition have actually been made available. Further, a significant proportion of those assigned have no experience of training foreign forces. Unless this situation is rectified, the ANA will find it difficult to tackle the insurgency after 2014. India could potentially play an important role here.
A key problem, of course, is Pakistan’s concerns about India’s security footprint in Afghanistan. In the past, Pakistan has urged the US not to allow India to play any role in Afghan security matters and has even offered to train Afghan forces. The US and Afghanistan have also been sensitive to Pakistani concerns, not least because of the need for Pakistan’s cooperation in dealing with the Taliban. Recent events appear to have led to a shift in this position. This does not mean that Kabul is willing entirely to disregard Pakistan’s apprehensions. India, too, recognises that Pakistan’s ability to influence developments in Afghanistan is considerable. In fact, the agreement explicitly states that it is not directed against third countries. This may not be enough to allay the Pakistan Army’s concerns. But total security for Pakistan can only mean total insecurity for Afghanistan. And as long as Rawalpindi continues to threaten the security of its neighbours, it can scarcely expect them to be solicitous of its maximalist demands.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi