Fishing for clout in South China Sea

The Asean summit of Southeast Asian nations with some principal foreign actors was notable on many counts, but the chief outcome was US President Barak Obama’s determination to plant his country’s flag in the resort of Bali as an Asia-Pacific power. Not only did he come fresh from a decision to station over 2,000 US Marines in Australia by 2016, but he left his listeners in no doubt that despite the reverses his country had faced in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States was determined to remain an Asia-Pacific power.

The elephant in the room, of course, was China, and although the China-US relationship is too important to trifle with, Washington’s determination to wave its flag in Asia, beset with the disputed South China Sea and a palpable fear among smaller nations of an aggressive China, was for many a welcome development. And it is in the context of the China factor that Mr Obama’s meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh must be partially viewed.
The United States seems to have abandoned, at least for the present, the concept sanctified in communiqués by two Presidents — Bill Clinton and Mr Obama himself — that Beijing should be something of an overseer of South Asia. Rather, the current strand of American policy is the essentially parallel themes of New Delhi and Washington to provide a measure of assurance to smaller, uneasy neighbours of China that they will remain engaged in a potentially turbulent area. For India, it is no longer a “look East” policy but “engage East” diplomacy.
There were, of course, bilateral issues to discuss between the two leaders; the first substantial meeting at the summit after the President’s visit to India about a year ago. In the US’ perspective, the Indian law on nuclear commerce does not sit easy although Washington has chosen not to make a public issue of it. Nor is it a secret that the two countries have different views on the Libya operation and on Iran and Syria, but it is a sign of maturity in relations that both sides have learnt to live with these differences. Indeed, the major trajectory of the two in Southeast and East Asia is remarkably congruous.
What was interesting in Bali was that China failed to reveal its hand. Dr Singh, at his meeting with Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, did raise the South China Sea issue and sought to give some assurance that India’s effort to explore for oil off Vietnam’s coast was a commercial proposition, rather than a political statement. The Chinese leader’s response, though unreported, could hardly have been enthusiastic. The Chinese believe that the various claimants to portions of the sea — in particular the Philippines and Vietnam among those particularly aggrieved — must talk bilaterally, not as a group in an effort to deny them strength in numbers. It was Hillary Clinton who had publicly proclaimed an American interest in the South China Sea to ruffle Chinese feathers and Mr Obama has done nothing to discourage China’s neighbours from following their policies.
On contentious Sino-Indian questions, both New Delhi and Beijing trod the cautious route. Yet another round of discussions on the border between special representatives is in the offing, with neither side expecting miracles. And a difficult relationship continues to be lifted by increasing trade volumes, lopsided as they are in China’s favour.
A significant development in Bali was the growing acceptance of Burma as a country coming in from the cold. That the reforms enacted by the nominally civilian regime are more than skin-deep is borne out by the decision of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy to register for byelections under the amended rules. It was, indeed, after talking to Ms Suu Kyi that Mr Obama authorised a visit by his secretary of state to Burma next month, the first time such a senior US official will visit the country in 50 years. Burma has also been named the chair of Asean in 2014.
If China interprets these developments as being inimical to its interests — the People’s Daily-associated Global Times could hardly contain its rage at the American military moves in Australia — it has partly itself to blame. Its newly belligerent tone in talking to neighbours and to Japan and claiming practically the whole of the South China Sea only led to a greater wariness of its interlocutors.
Although China remains a magnet for its economic boom, there is a palpable welcome mat spread out by Southeast Asian countries for Washington and a sense of relief that Mr Obama has answered their collective prayers.
Besides, the more Burma integrates with the world, the less dominant China will be in a country that had practically isolated itself from the world, in particular the West. Until now India has been the only other (junior) player in the military-dominated country. In an omen of things to come, the Burmese rulers had announced suspension of a major controversial Chinese-constructed dam, evoking suppressed fury from Beijing.
One consequence of this sequence of events will probably be a less aggressive Chinese attitude to neighbours, in words, if not in deeds. Another will be a strengthening of relations between India and the United States in engaging with the East. Washington is well aware of Indian sensitivities as not being seen as ganging up against China. Nor can New Delhi ever replicate or want to replicate the kind of relationship the US enjoys with Australia as its faithful junior strategic ally. But circumstances and Chinese behaviour have brought the two countries to their closer convergence in a part of the world that is gaining greater salience each day.
It now remains for India to do its homework and continue to pursue a policy beyond “looking East”. The motto should be: Go East. It is by no means a one-sided relationship. India’s presence is less polarising than America’s as a counterweight to China. But New Delhi will have to remain active in making the next Asean summit — to be held in India — the success that it should be.

The writer can be contacted at snihalsingh@gmail.com [2]