On the occasion of Army Day, former Army Chief Gen. V.P. Malik says that the current method of civilian control over the military leaves much to be desired. He also tells Sridhar Kumaraswami that grouping all strike corps under a strategic command is not a good idea.
Given the current threat perceptions, do you think we need more soldiers/officers in our 1.1-million strong Army? And which weapon systems do you think need to be inducted?
In any force, the quality of men, weapons and equipment is more important than quantity. Force levels are reviewed every five years, along with threats/challenges, strategies, weapons and equipment profiles, and the likely nature of combat.
In terms of manpower, the Indian Army is ageing and getting bloated. We must guard against that while restructuring it with greater attention to mountain warfare. Shortage of young officers must be made-up soon.
In the coming years, we need to build greater surveillance (satellite, aerial and ground- level), night fighting and rapid deployment capabilities, particularly for mountains. We need improved C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) surveillance equipment, more helicopters, ultra-light howitzers and lighter infantry weapons and equipment.
The Chinese Army gives signs of preparing to operate through PoK — do you see it as a synergy of potentially hostile neighbours, necessitating re-evaluation of our threat perceptions, even military
doctrine? Do you think that the Indian Army is capable of fighting a two-front war? And to what extent will raising a mountain corps and two independent brigades in the eastern sector deter China?
In the foreseeable future, I cannot see India becoming capable of fighting a two-front war. Such an eventuality must be avoided diplomatically. However, the scenario cannot be ruled out in Gilgit-Baltistan and we must prepare ourselves for it.
Considering the likely nature of any future conflict with China, and inadequate infrastructure for force deployment, I do not subscribe to the raising of a conventional mountain corps. Instead, we should go for division-size combat commands with rapid deployment capability which can be re-grouped when required.
Do you foresee India developing operating coalitions with any countries?
No. A nation of India’s size, stature and potential can and should play an independent role and cooperate or compete on issues with other nations depending on its national interests. India cannot afford to let go of its strategic autonomy.
As Ashley Tellis put it once, “Given its size, history and ambitions, India will always march to the beat of its own drummer.”
The posture and doctrine of the Army in independent India has been one of defending the country’s sovereignty. In the foreseeable future should the Indian Army acquire a force- projection function?
Our strategic and operational planning, and doctrines, have become “reactive”. We have conveyed an impression of being a soft state with a very high level of tolerance/threshold. The reactive strategic culture has contributed to erosion of deterrence capability. In the current strategic environment, there is a need for the armed forces to possess “reactive” as well as “pro-active” and force- projection capability, which can be implemented at short notice.
While it is a given that in democratic India, the Army should be under civilian control, is there a case in your view for bridging the civilian-military divide by incorporating the military as an integral component of national strategic planning, including determining and refining doctrinal issues?
Despite recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee — which were accepted by the government — the Services headquarters are not integrated with the ministry of defence. Instead, in what can be considered bureaucratic sophistry, the nomenclature has been changed, without much change in the functioning and the rules of business.
India is the only democratic country where civilian control over the military in almost all defence matters is exercised by the political leadership through the civilian bureaucracy. Its adverse impact on defence planning, preparedness and military morale has increased. We see this discrepancy in its worst form today when respectable and time-honoured service institutions are belittled publicly. There is inadequate synergy in national security, defence planning and operational conduct.
Encouraging a timid military may be good for the civilian ego but does not make good strategic sense.
We need to ask: Do our civilian authorities demonstrate critical understanding of larger strategic issues, constraints, effects and implications of strategic and operational employment and its institutional conduct? Are they fully conversant with military purposes, capabilities, constraints and effects? Does our military demonstrate critical and creative understanding of the strategic purposes, contributions and consequences of military operational employment and institutional conduct? Does it demonstrate a willingness to speak up and, when necessary, speak out, especially in opposition to strategically flawed policies and initiatives? Are the civilian authorities who oversee the military adequately competent in matters of military strategy?
India’s national security framework, and its antiquated civil-military relationship, have not moved in step with the needs of new security challenges. It is essential that we change attitudes and look beyond narrow boundaries defined by turf and parochialism.
How do you see questions relating to “jointness” — building capacity for the Army, Navy, Air Force to operate in an integrated fashion to secure strategic objectives?
Defence policy and planning have to be based on the collective influence and potential of the defence forces and not that of any one Service. At the politico-military level, we have to cater for incremental as well as hammer-blow responses. We have to think in terms of integrated capabilities for optimum utilisation and effect of military power.
Synergy can be ensured only when our war fighting goals, resources and techniques are harmonised by a joint-services doctrine. This requires maximum possible compatibility of equipment, particularly communications equipment. Jointmanship is not only the most efficient way to fight but will help overcome growing budget issues such as reducing overheads while preserving deployable combat-force structure.
The institution of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has been talked about for a decade. Do you think we have got along fine without the CDS, or do we,in the context of a rapidly changing security environment, need a single-point funnel for military advice to the government?
The appointment of a CDS is essential to provide single-point military advice to the government; to exercise administrative management of strategic forces; to ensure intra- and inter-service prioritisation of perspective and current defence plans; to facilitate improvement in jointness among the armed forces; to improve uniformity of training and reduce overlap and replication in the three services; and to synergise operational planning and its execution.
How do you assess the transformation process that the Army is undergoing? What do you make of the proposal to group all strike corps under one strategic command?
“Force transformation” was coined, and the process commenced, by US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld in 2003. The US military wanted to adopt the capabilities-based model of projection and re-orient its force structure to create a light and agile force for rapid deployment.
Two essential requirements of force transformation are political guidance and support and jointness that allows effective integration of combat capabilities of the three services. A service chief in India has little interaction with the political leadership, and hardly any authority on procurement matters. Jointness amongst the services exists only in name.
Grouping all strike corps under a strategic command is not a good idea. Such a centralised control of assets that requires speedy deployment is not in line with modern military thinking.
In what ways can a career in the Army be made more attractive? Does this require more cash incentives or just better parity with the civilian services?
Three requirements, in order of priority, are, (a) improved promotion prospects with a golden handshake early-retirement policy; (b) improved civil-military services parity; and (c) greater respect for soldiers and ex-servicemen from the government and society. We need to revisit terms
and conditions of service that were framed in a different socio-economic milieu many years ago.