The limits of the peace offensive

It may appear downright churlish to criticise the peace efforts of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Enthusiasts of his peace offensive have highlighted Pakistan’s apparent willingness to grant India the most favoured nation status, the bonhomie that was on display at recent trade fairs — in Lahore and New Delhi — Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari’s visit to Ajmer earlier this month and his invitation to Dr Singh to visit Pakistan. All of these developments, they would argue, portend that a thaw in Indo-Pakistani relations may be at hand and that New Delhi needs to seize the day.
Obviously, any improvement in the tenor of bilateral relations would be desirable. If India could actually find ways of reducing tensions along its western border, it could concentrate its forces along its increasingly restive northern frontiers with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Furthermore, it could also expand trade with Pakistan, thereby contributing to much mutual benefit.
Despite these positive straws in the wind it is far from clear that incremental steps in the realm of trade and possible reciprocal state visits will accomplish much. Several factors militate against reposing much faith in these recent developments.
Contrary to the advocates of the peace process, progress in trade and increased bilateral visits do not necessarily create conducive conditions for tackling deep-seated and fundamental differences. Since Rajiv Gandhi’s historic visit to the PRC in 1988, the two sides have engaged in seemingly endless palaver at various levels, both ministerial and bureaucratic, and yet have made glacial, if any, progress on the border dispute. Such lack of movement on the border question persists even as the PRC has emerged as India’s largest trading partner. In fact, despite this robust commercial relationship and a plethora of discussions, the PRC has actually ratcheted up its territorial claims. Given this record with the PRC why should one assume that efforts to ameliorate ties with Pakistan are likely to meet a better fate without forthrightly confronting basic issues and differences first?
This, however, is not the only possible objection to the heightened hopes of possible lessening of tensions. Mr Zardari’s own standing within Pakistan’s political order is tenuous. The military establishment views him with distrust, he faces increasing political disorder across the land and a general election looms next year. Under these conditions, is he in any position to make any credible commitments to his Indian partner? Even if he recognises the need for slowly reducing Pakistan’s intransigence towards India he may simply not be in a position to deliver.
Furthermore, despite Mr Zardari’s apparent warmth and good cheer in New Delhi, little is known about the sentiments of Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, the Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army. The dour, laconic general has mostly kept his own counsel both during and after Mr Zardari’s visit. Despite the presence of a civilian regime in Pakistan, it is more than apparent to most observers where power remains ensconced. Unless India’s policymakers have a firm sense that the overweening military establishment is prepared to give its nod to this renewed effort towards rapprochement the on-going discussions could quickly hit a cul-de-sac.
In a related vein, both the military authorities and the civilian regime seem singularly unwilling if not downright incapable of reining in the activities of the leader of the Jamaat-ud-Dawah (the latest incarnation of the notorious and vicious Lashkar-e-Tayyaba). Despite the $10 million bounty that the US has recently announced for the prosecution of its mastermind, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, his movements and rallies have not been curbed in the slightest. Worse still, Pakistani policymakers continue to mouth the legal fiction that they lack sufficient evidence to bring charges against him.
Pakistan’s apparent lack of interest in containing the activities of the JuD and its leadership should be a sure sign to India’s policymakers that the policy establishment has yet to eschew its use of terror as part and parcel of an asymmetric war strategy. If the current regime in Pakistan and its behemoth military establishment are indeed keen on signalling their bona fides, why not publicly announce that they are renouncing their support for all terrorist entities? Such a gesture would not only generate considerable trust in New Delhi but would go a long way to disarm the Prime Minister’s critics, some of whom have little or no interest in the peace process.
Such a gesture, while costly, would not involve compromising Pakistan’s stand on the Kashmir dispute, the core problem that has dogged relations with India. In the absence of such a sign, which would entail paying a domestic price, other movements and developments must be deemed to be reversible and subject to political vagaries.
Seeking peace with one’s nettlesome neighbours is, no doubt, a noble endeavour. However, the pursuit of such a goal should be undertaken with the greatest perspicacity and circumspection. Relying on a few token nods and a set of reciprocal state visits to serve as the basis of a changed milieu amounts to a triumph of hope over evidence. It is hardly the basis of sound diplomacy.

The writer holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilisations at Indiana University, Bloomington, and is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia