Don’t be taken in by Pak’s peace moves

At the end of May, the Pakistani government finally admitted that there was enough evidence to prosecute and probably convict Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, leader of the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), for his role in planning and executing the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008. Pakistani interior ministry officials told the Indian home secretary that Islamabad’s Federal Investigation Agency had conclusively implicated Lakhvi, and so corroborated dossiers and evidence New Delhi had provided.
While Pakistan has rejected any suggestion of the involvement of Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the extremist leader of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa — the patron organisation of the LeT — or of serving Army officers, the admission about Lakhvi is significant in itself. It has been seen as succumbing to American pressure and taking visible action in relation to 26/11, an episode in which some 150 Indians and a few citizens of other countries, including the United States, died.
By punishing Lakhvi, perhaps the Pakistani establishment has concluded it can take some of the heat off itself, and save prized assets like Saeed. In any case if Lakhvi is in a Pakistani prison, the rest of the world will have no idea as to whether he is being truly incarcerated or simply hosted by the military-intelligence establishment, but that’s another story.
Yet, does the change of heart in Islamabad — and the sudden discovery of the extent of Lakhvi’s culpability — reflect only a fear of America? It is likely that there is another, even more tactical, motivation. The Pakistani government has been keen on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visiting the country, but it realises he needs a reason to justify or sell this visit to a constituency in India. A visit without strong action on the 26/11 conspirators may not quite be possible. As such, it is entirely feasible that the “culpability of Lakhvi” has been discovered and endorsed for the narrow purpose of facilitating an Indian prime ministerial arrival in September-October.
The political content of Dr Singh’s potential trip to Pakistan has always been puzzling and problematic. A deal on Kashmir is not even on the anvil. On Siachen, the Pakistanis are presenting an Indian sacrifice as a bilateral peace gesture and that is obviously not going to happen. The Indian Army is not going to climb down from an altitudinal advantage in the glacier region. Even the Sir Creek dispute, related to a narrow, marshy strip of water that divides Gujarat/Kutch and Sindh, is not as easy as it seems.
Given this, it is entirely possible that the Prime Minister’s Office will grab the Lakhvi point, applaud it as representing a change of minds and mindsets in Pakistan and make travel plans. To complement the perception of action on terror, there will also be talk of trade.
However, on trade too, a forensic and realistic assessment of what is feasible is necessary. As in the case of Agra 2001 and several other India-Pakistan summits, it would be wise to not get carried away with euphoria and build make-believe postulates.
When he came to New Delhi in April, President Asif Ali Zardari spoke of building trade bridges in the Indian subcontinent, as has happened between India and China. These remarks came in a certain context. On April 1, India and Pakistan had announced talks on a preferential trading arrangement to lower import duties on a range of goods. A 24x7 trading post at the Attari-Wagah border (linking Indian and Pakistani Punjabs) was also proposed.
Can the India-China template be deployed in the case of India and Pakistan? Sheer numbers would be sobering. In 2011, India-China trade amounted to $74 billion, a 20 per cent jump from the previous year. In contrast, India-Pakistan trade touched just $2.7 billion in 2011 and even the most optimistic projections see it climbing to no more than $10 billion in 2015. This would incorporate all trade that is currently routed through third-party locations such as Dubai and Colombo. By 2015, it is expected India-China trade will be 15 times as valuable as India-Pakistan trade. One cannot wish away the weight of statistics.
There is no doubt India and Pakistan must and should trade. There is hope for SME-based trade in commodities (from sugar to cement) that could use the advantage of geographical proximity. The new Guru Gobind Singh refinery in Bathinda — a joint venture between Hindustan Petroleum and the L.N. Mittal Group — considers Pakistan a potential market for petro-products. To the degree possible, petrol and diesel refined in India can fill gaps in Pakistani energy supply, and allow the Bathinda refinery access to a neighbouring market.
It is for these reasons that the Akali Dal government in Punjab has been pushing for greater overland trade with Pakistan. It sees gains for not just Bathinda but for a whole series of small businessmen and traders in the state. Nevertheless, is all this likely to be enough to excite India’s big business or give a wider constituency a stake in India-Pakistan trade? Frankly, it is not — and that is why fanciful comparisons with the India-China equation are unfair.
China’s infrastructure and telecom and power equipment companies offer Indian buyers good bargains and also access to cheap credit to fund those purchases. Admittedly, there are others in the system who remain wary of putting so many eggs in Beijing’s basket, but the fact is that the commercial parameters are attractive enough for several Indian tycoons to have a stake in greater India-China economic engagement. That aside, Indian pharmaceutical and IT companies are lobbying for removal of informal and formal trade barriers and want a slice of the Chinese market. As such, India and China are contemplating a genuine give and take in trade negotiations.
That level of interest and normality has just not been reached between India and Pakistan. It would be a good idea for the future — but it does not exist in the here and now. As such, the Prime Minister may well go to Pakistan, welcome a convoy of petrol tankers from Bathinda and thank Islamabad for punishing Lakhvi. Those would be small, incremental gains. Do not interpret them as the arrival of “peace in our time”.

The writer can be contacted at malikashok@gmail.com