Challenging the dragon at sea

Amongst the three services — Army, Navy and the Air Force — only the Indian Navy has a proud record of indigenous shipbuilding over the last 50 years. Unfortunately, its record of indigenous construction of conventional submarines (or SSKs) and strategic Arihant-class submarines (or nuclear-powered, ballistic missile-carrying submarines SSBNs) has been comparatively poor.

With the arrival of the tactical nuclear submarine (SSN), INS Chakra, on April 4, 2012, the challenge now is how to quickly build indigenous SSNs for the Navy by utilising the massive unused capacity of the private-sector Indian shipyards in a joint-venture with public sector shipyard or yards which have the necessary expertise.
Given China’s continued sabre-rattling in the South and East China Seas, it is only a matter of time before India, and its Navy, are confronted by the dragon at sea. The only viable antidote to the Chinese seaborne threat is the SSN. While a second INS Chakra-type SSN should be acquired from Russia at the earliest, there is no doubt that the Indian Navy urgently needs 6 to 12 SSNs to meet challenges in the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean, especially in the Asia Pacific region.
Building SSKs is a complex and time-consuming process, as it requires dedicated specialised manpower and infrastructure for design and construction. In the case of nuclear submarines (SSNs and SSBNs), the complexity and “degree of difficulty” increases manifold, as design of a safe, reliable miniature reactor and expensive silencing techniques are essential. Between an SSBN and an SSN, the latter is even more complex as the SSN is required to be faster, more silent at higher speeds and capable of operating at depths that are far greater than the SSBN is designed for. The UK took six years to design their latest Astute-class SSNs and then another 10 years to make the first (HMS Astute) operational in 2011. A total of seven “Astute class” submarines are being built, with a new unit being delivered every two years. The lesson here is that India should aim to build at least 6 to 12 SSNs so that the cost-cum-time benefits of series production, after initial design, are realised.
The universally accepted norm after over a century of submarine construction is to have stringent quality control at the construction stage, the harbour trials stage and the sea trials stage. In addition, building complex platforms, like the SSNs, in acceptable time frames requires joint ventures between two or more shipbuilding yards (either public or private), which can complement the strengths of each other’s infrastructure and manpower, to independently build the various “sections” of the SSN hull, which are welded together to form “blocks”, and then transfer them to a “master yard” which has suitable dry docks, where these “blocks” are welded together to form a complete submarine, which is then “floated out” of the dry dock, for final “Harbour Acceptance Trials” (Hats), followed by “Sea Acceptance Trials” (Sats).
India’s experiments with constructing conventional submarines, on a single tender basis, at Mazagon Docks Limited (MDL), Mumbai, (where two German-designed HDW units were built between 1984 and 1994) were, perhaps, necessary at that time given the paucity of shipyards and dry docks in the country. Nonetheless, this experiment showed that the total building time could have been reduced by half had a joint-venture system been followed (as against the German, which took 56 months, MDL took 96 and 108 months respectively). The same experiment was repeated in 2004, with MDL again being nominated for the construction of six French-designed Scorpene submarines, and the project is already about four years behind schedule.
The Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) advanced technology vessel (ATV) project to build a few SSBNs was apparently given to a private yard for fabrication of the hull. Once again, perhaps at that time, there were sound reasons for this single tender project, due to non availability of other suitable yards in the public or private sector. Though the project originated in the Seventies, it was in 1998 that the then defence minister, George Fernandes first publicly mentioned it. The first SSBN (Arihant) was publicly launched on July 26, 2009, in the presence of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The Arihant is yet to start sea trials, while press reports mention two more being built. Given international building norms, the Arihant is a few years behind schedule, but this should be expected in the case of the first indigenous SSBN. However, valuable time can be saved, if future SSBNs are made in a joint-venture with other shipyards which have valuable drydock space and adequate infrastructure. This would harness the full shipbuilding capacity and potential of India.
With the arrival of the third-generation Akula-class SSN at Visakhapatnam on April 4, 2012, it is but natural to expect India to commence indigenous construction of SSNs on a priority basis. Such a project may involve design and building of a new submarine type by DRDO, and a new and more powerful and silent miniature reactor (with greater exploitation life) by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre. Hence, India would need some time for design work, followed by joint-venture construction of at least 6 to 12 SSNs, to replenish the rapidly ageing conventional submarine fleet, especially given the five-year delay in even issuing Request for Proposals for the second conventional SSK production line under Project 75(I). Hopefully, the decision-makers in South Block will take the appropriate steps to make India a submarine-building nation at the earliest, and also provide the Indian Navy the wherewithal to protect our national interests at sea.