Diplomatic games

In 2010, Operation Enduring Freedom — the American expeditionary commitment in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) — enters its ninth and seventh years respectively. The running total as on date of the “butchers bill”, as World War I British generals rather inelegantly put it, is 1,125 American soldiers dead in Afghanistan and 4,407 in Iraq, in a war that is on its way to catching up with Vietnam (1964-1975) as America’s longest conflict in history to date (though Vietnam at 58,193 remains far ahead in casualties).
The United States sees itself at war and the parable of Vietnam on the perils of war-time presidency is always a warning beacon for US President Barack Obama and the political machine of the Democratic Party. They are also aware of a Vietnam psychosis slowly gathering amongst the American public, a fretfulness about the prolonged war in Afghanistan and the slow but steady backflow of soldiers’ coffins. Afghanistan is being increasingly perceived as a tiresome commitment, now seemingly pointless with the main quarry Osama bin Laden safely ensconced in sanctuary in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Coupled with this is the US House and Senate elections in November 2010, followed by elections in November 2012 to the hallowed precincts of the White House itself. It can, therefore, be reasonably assumed that given the increasing war-weariness and a national mood swinging towards closure, the compulsions of American politics will undoubtedly be a reckonable factor in shaping the future of America’s involvement in Afghanistan.
Mr Obama’s action soon after assuming office in January 2009 seem to conform to this pattern. He ordered a thorough review of the US strategy in Afghanistan, followed within a month by announcing August 2010 as the timeline for commencing withdrawal of American troops from Iraq. Also, in December 2009, Mr Obama mandated July 2011 for a similar withdrawal from Afghanistan. While Mr Obama might have arrived at each decision after intensive reviews and consultations, both the decisions were, ultimately, as much the outcome of strategic and geopolitical factors as of the demands of political mood management. Nevertheless, there are definite straws in the wind indicating that whatever the public facade be, the Obama administration is pressing forward with a policy of gradually drawing down America’s active military commitments on painful wars in strange faraway lands.
America has to wrestle with its own demons, but its departure from Afghanistan will undoubtedly impact India’s interests in that country, where India has established itself as a substantial “soft power” — the fourth-largest foreign aid donor contributing $1.2 billion. Extensive Indian programmes of construction, social welfare and administrative training have all been remarkably successful and well received.
Nevertheless, Afghanistan is a cause for concern for India as it is the “overseas” theatre of the Pakistan-India proxy conflict, with Pakistan determined to incorporate Afghanistan into its own sphere of influence as a strategic cushion, part of which involves the elimination of any Indian presence or influence in Afghanistan.
“Military advisers” from the Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence are present in the inner councils of the Taliban shura located in sanctuaries within Pakistan, which constitute the primary instruments for furthering Pakistan’s strategic plans as quid pro quo for favours granted. The proxy offensives with car bombings and suicide attacks have systematically targeted the Indian embassy, Indian projects and workers in Afghanistan.
America’s own strategy for Afghanistan has developed around the Af-Pak concept, visualised as a tandem alliance between the US and Pakistan aiming to “defeat, destroy and dismantle” the Al Qaeda network and their Taliban support structure inside Afghanistan and Pakistan respectively. It is an intrinsically flawed perception that attempts to yoke together two countries with totally divergent policies and end interests, in an arrangement where it is Pakistan, more than the US, which holds the high cards. The US has, as its primary objective, the defeat of the Al Qaeda and the neutralisation of their Taliban supporters while the objective of Pakistan is the preservation of these very same entities as strategic resources against India, and for progressing Pakistani interests in Afghanistan after the US’ departure. It therefore comes as no surprise that the US war in Afghanistan is stumbling badly with an uncertain endgame.
Within the US itself, there are barely concealed dissensions between the military and civilian leadership which recently exploded in public with the dismissal of Gen. Stanley McChrystal, a former commander of the Joint Special Operations Command in Afghanistan. Inside Afghanistan, a beleaguered President Hamid Karzai is seriously seeking accommodation with the Taliban shuras to preserve his own position and perhaps even his life. But there are also rumblings amongst the large non-Pashtun minorities of Tajiks, Uzbegs, Hazaras and others who have suffered grievously under earlier Taliban dispensations and are uneasy at the prospect of their return. They are prepared to defend themselves if another rerun takes place, making resumption of civil war a distinct possibility.
Under the circumstances, India now needs its own Af-Pak strategy if it is indeed serious about maintaining its presence and interests in Afghanistan. Security and protection of Indian project sites, assets and workers in a hostile environment will obviously constitute a major plank, whether provided by adequate paramilitary and Central police forces, or by armed civilian contract security personnel. The substantial asset of goodwill for India across the entire spectrum of Afghan society, Pashtun and non-Pashtun, needs to be tapped and utilised to best advantage. Alternate power centres and leadership figures like Abdullah Abdullah and Yunus Qanuni are emerging particularly in the Northern Alliance community of Tajiks, Uzbegs and Hazaras with whom India’s relations have traditionally been supportive and cordial. Indian negotiators have to bring all these into play.

Gen. Shankar Roychowdhury is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former Member of Parliament