Dragon at Gwadar

As a reaction to the US’ “Pivot Asia” policy, the Chinese are debating a new policy, “Marching West” i.e. to focus on increasing Chinese influence and presence in South Asia, West Asia and Central Asia. The first beneficiary of this new initiative appears to be China’s all weather ally and nuclear proxy, Pakistan.
On February 1, 2013, the Pakistani government terminated its March 2007 agreement (valid for 40 years) and transferred the management-cum-development of the Gwadar port from the Port of Singapore Authority International to China’s Overseas Port Holdings. Sixty per cent of China’s oil imports transit through the Strait of Hormuz, located just 180 nautical miles (nm) from the Gwadar port. This strategic port, on the Balochistan coast, near the Iranian border, will be used by Chinese oil tanker ships to offload crude oil from West Asia. That is why, from Gwadar, there’s a proposed rail, road link and pipeline to transport oil and other goods to China, thus avoiding the Malacca and Singapore straits which can be closed during wartime or are vulnerable to piracy.
The Chinese are not just helping Pakistan build the Gwadar port, but have provided practically all the funding.
These developments, when seen along with the Chinese-built ports in Hambantotha (Sri Lanka) and new terminals at Chittagong and Sonadiya port (both in Bangladesh), and China’s move into the Maldives (where it’s reportedly providing “security assistance”), indicate troubled times ahead for India, as they complete the final links in the Chinese “string of pearls” strategy — to safeguard its sea lanes for energy imports, encircle India and dominate the Indian Ocean region.
It will take China about 20 years to convert the Gwadar port into a full-fledged naval base comprising facilities to repair warships and submarines, set up ammunition dumps for arming them, and build a suitable airfield for maritime surveillance and interdiction using drones and aircraft. And it is true that in the event of war, the Gwadar port and its installations could be destroyed by the Indian Navy and Air Force (as well as the US Navy), using land attack cruise missiles and fighter aircraft, but such an action against China and Pakistan — two nuclear powers — would have serious repercussions.
Work on Phase 1 of the Gwadar port commenced in March 2002 and was formally completed in March 2005, though ships had started using it by 2003.
The total cost of this phase was $248 million (of which the Chinese contributed $198 million). The Gwadar port has a 4.5 km approach channel of 11.5 metre depth, and three multipurpose berths. Pakistan’s former President Pervez Musharraf is reported to have stated, “In the event of war with India, Pakistan will not hesitate to invite the Chinese Navy to Gwadar”.
Phase 2 was completed in January 2006, with nine additional berths and the approach channel was deepened to 14.5 metre, thus permitting larger ships of about 50,000 DWT (deadweight tonnes) to enter and leave the port. The port was formally inaugurated in March 2007, and the Pakistan Navy is reported to have set up a base there. It may be noted that all oil tankers from the Gulf bound for India’s Vadinar Oil Terminal in the Gulf of Kutch generally pass about 40 nm south of Gwadar port and would be vulnerable to interdiction by Pakistani or Chinese units based at Gwadar. Some unconfirmed media reports indicate the possible presence of a Chinese electronic “listening post” at Gwadar.
To fully understand the implications for India, we need to note that 70 per cent of India’s oil imports come by sea, from the Gulf (with tankers exiting through the Strait of Hormuz). Seventy per cent of our imported oil arrives at ports in the Gulf of Kutch, the Gulf of Cambay and the Mumbai port. Indeed, in 2007, the Gulf of Kutch received 1,100 oil tankers (passing some 40 nm from Gwadar), and this number will grow to 2,100 by 2012 and over 4,000 tanker ships by 2025, when India’s oil imports would have quadrupled to 320 million tonnes (China’s imports would also rise to over 600 million tonnes and hence the possibility of conflict of interest between these two largest consumers of oil).
The global strategic implications are also serious since the Gulf region has 75 per cent of the world’s proven oil reserves and 50 per cent of the world’s proven gas reserves. About 16 million barrels of oil pass through the Strait of Hormuz daily on tanker ships (worth over $200 billion annually). This amounts to over 90 per cent of the oil exported by the Gulf region and over 40 per cent of the entire world’s oil trade.
The Chinese Navy’s activities in the Indian Ocean region need to be monitored as closely as we monitor Pakistani-based terrorist moves. Thanks to availability of shale oil deposits in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the US, new oil fields in Russia, and oil fields off Brazil’s EEZ, West Asia may not remain the primary source of global oil after 2030, but its proximity to India will still ensure that it’s of great strategic importance to us as an energy source. China now imports more oil from West Africa (Nigeria and Angola) than it does from West Asia, and this oil will still need to move by sea through the Malacca and other straits in Southeast Asia (Sunda and Lombok). However, in a crisis situation, China does have the option to move this West African oil to Gwadar port and then pump it to China via the proposed land-oil pipeline.
The time for fence sitting is over. We need a strong 200 ship Indian Navy, inclusive of 12 tactical nuclear submarines (SSNs) and 500 aircraft. In addition we need allies, amongst like-minded maritime nations of the Indo-Pacific Region, and we need to take bold decisions befitting a nation which will have the third largest GDP in the world by 2030.

The writer retired
as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam