The idea of a unified command among states — announced by Union home minister P. Chidambaram on Wednesday — to deal with the range of issues thrown up in the fight against left-wing extremism is self-evident. The surprise is it took so long for the Centre and some states to institutionalise it. The challenge posed by
Naxalites, who typically operate in regions that are mineral rich and have strong populations of tribal forest dwellers who are extremely poor, is a complex one. Only a sophisticated response will do. The Maoist menace has become more multi-dimensional in recent years. The weapons that the Naxals use are often more advanced that those handled by the police. The organisation and deployment of Maoist cadres now speaks of careful thought and training. In the past, the Naxals were urban middle class revolutionaries who travelled to the hinterland to arouse the poor. Now it is the poor themselves who have taken up arms under the leadership of urban outsiders. The phenomenon suggests that the question of development needs to be addressed urgently. This must be the vital complement of a well thought out and carefully crafted police strategy.
The unified command, if its implementation is trouble-free, has the potential to marry development and security-related concerns on the ground. Both dimensions were adequately articulated in the speech of Prime Minister Manomohan Singh when the unified command was created. In attendance were the chief ministers of Chhattisgarh and Orissa, the Jharkhand governor (the state now being under President’s Rule), and a senior minister from West Bengal (CM Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee stayed away), besides the Union home and finance ministers. Dr Singh noted quite appropriately that the Centre needed to be with the states not only conceptually but also in operational terms. This makes perfect sense. It is a pity that Bihar, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh — where also the impact of the Maoists is felt on a regular basis — have so far chosen to stay out of the ambit of the unified command. The seven states — the four that are within the unified command structure and the three that are not — are a geographical contiguity with forest cover which allows Naxal cadres to move about with relative ease. Due to the greater effectiveness of operations in states under the unified command, the Maoists may now be expected to escape to the other three states where operations are being conducted in the old way. Indeed, this was the problem earlier. Naxal cadres simply hopped from one state to another when the heat was turned on. The Centre should continue to persuade the naysayers to join the comprehensive effort. The states will themselves benefit from resources provided to reinforce the security coordinates, including recruitment and training of more police personnel, besides targeted development activity in line with each state’s unique needs. Finally, the idea of a military man of suitable experience to be associated with the anti-Naxal operations has been accepted. A retired officer of the rank of major-general will assist the unified command. This is certain to have a positive impact on training and tactics appropriate to jungle warfare. This was an element lacking in earlier approaches to dealing with the Maoists.
It is a happy sign that states that have agreed to the unified command are run by parties as diverse as the BJP, the CPI(M)-led Left and the BJD. This gives the effort a political and ideological wholeness, not to say a shared purpose and sense of responsibility. Equally, the pooled efforts of these parties signifies a commitment from a wide swathe of the political spectrum to the uplift of the poor in tribal areas. This is an important signal to give.