Post-script to Ladakh

The April 15-May 5, 2013, Indo-Chinese face-off in Ladakh has finally shaken the Indian government enough for it to get off the fence.

Some important agreements were signed during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Tokyo (May 25-27, 2013) to give muscle to their “strategic partnership”, while defence minister A.K. Antony followed with visits to Singapore, Thailand and Australia (June 3-6) to further enhance ties with these nations as the Indian Navy exercises regularly with their navies. Also, the finance ministry, which had earlier asked the Army to confirm if a Chinese threat would materialise in the next two years, has apparently moved closer to clearing the proposal for raising a new China specific Mountain Corps comprising 89,000 troops.
Chinese threats (including through its proxy, Pakistan) need to be deterred simultaneously on land and sea. And for this, India needs to bolster its sea power by collaborating with Japan and other like-minded nations.
Given the impending American withdrawal from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, India must act decisively to protect its national interests by means other than pure diplomacy. It needs to provide Afghanistan the bare minimum means to defend itself. The Taliban (and other Afghan jihadi groups) have far superior artillery than the lightly armed Afghan Army which has only AK-47 rifles and no aviation assets. Without artillery to counter the Taliban, the capital city of Kabul, and all the 15 smaller towns (Kandahar, Herat etc) will fall like ninepins after the American withdrawal, when the Taliban is expected to launch its offensive. The Afghan Army’s defeat will result in the break-up of the nation along ethnic lines (Afghanistan has 14 different ethnic groups — the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras etc), and once Afghanistan falls or disintegrates, these “holy warriors” will begin their campaign to destabilise India.
Media reports of May 26, 2013, indicate that India had agreed that with effect from July 2013, it will double the number of Afghan Army personnel undergoing training in India. But the recent, May 21, request of Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai for 105 mm guns, 81 mm mortars and M1-17 helicopters has been apparently rejected.
The $2 billion invested by India in building Afghanistan’s infrastructure — proposed iron-ore mining with a steel plant in Bamiyan province, upgradation of the Iranian port of Chabahar (located just 76 km from the Chinese controlled Pakistani port of Gwadar), and the road built from Chabahar to Afghanistan (to connect India to Afghanistan) — will be lost after the 2014 American withdrawal from Afghanistan unless India urgently supplies at least a very limited number of India-produced helicopters (Chetak or Dhruv) and artillery (105 mm guns, 120 mm and 81 mm mortars etc) — enough to fight terror, but not to threaten Pakistan.
The China-Pakistan agreement of May 22, 2013, gives China the right to connect the Chinese built and funded Gwadar port (which it now manages) by rail, road and air with China. China plans to build an international airport at Gwadar, which is likely to be used to deploy military units for operations or logistics support, since very few tourists are likely to visit that desolate region. The Gwadar Port, which connects Afghanistan to the sea for future Chinese exports of Afghan minerals, is strategically located — it’s just 380 miles from the Gulf of Oman, through which over 16 billion barrels of oil move daily on tanker ships for global export, and India is extremely dependent on West Asia for its energy needs.
Why is America pressuring India not to supply artillery, helicopters and other equipment to Afghanistan, when it knows fully well that despite its massive firepower it has not been able to “neutralise” the terrorists?
The answer is simple: the US has to withdraw (via Pakistani territory, and through Karachi port), about 100,000 troops, over 150,000 vehicles and over 180,000 containers of military equipment from Afghanistan. Despite having given Pakistan $23 billion in aid since 9/11 ($17 billion of it is military aid), the US still needs Pakistan.
In the meantime, Indian “non action” is being “rewarded” by the US “appointing” India as the “net provider of security in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)”. Though this is severely supercilious on the part of the US, India should take on this IOR task without sacrificing its interests in Afghanistan.
India must remember that China’s ultimate nightmare is India allying with the US, Japan and Australia, ostensibly to “contain China”. Modern Indian and Japanese navies, sharing real time intelligence to co-ordinate their activities in the IOR and Asia Pacific Region (APR), would have a deterrent effect on China’s ambitions at sea.
Japanese conventional submarine technology would be very useful in resurrecting India’s dwindling submarine force levels, while its US-2 seaplane (offered during Prime Minister Singh’s recent visit) would increase Indian maritime capabilities in the IOR. Also, Japan is considering shifting many of its investments from China to India, and it may agree to a nuclear deal with India for civil-nuclear power plants.
The Indian Navy must increase the frequency of exercises with the navies of the APR and IOR (to increase interoperability to combat piracy, sea-borne terror and also for disaster relief), and specifically with the navies of the US, Japan, Vietnam, Singapore and Australia (Australian coal and uranium are vital for meeting India’s energy needs).
India also needs good relations with Iran for energy security and access (via the Chahbahar port) to the energy-rich Central Asian republics. The latter will require great diplomatic skills, given American sensitivities and India’s time-tested strategic partnership with Russia.
Sometimes, nations have to use military power, directly or indirectly, to protect their sovereignty. And sometimes they need “strategic partners”. China has been making inroads into our areas of interest, and Pakistan is taking tactical nuclear weapons to sea (on submarines, ships and aircraft). It’s time for India to respond.

The writer retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam