The perils of nuclear folly

Recently, the well known website www.foreignpolicy.com [2] examined 12 factors to determine what constituted failed states. “Postcards from hell, 2013” lists failed or “expected to fail states”. Somalia tops the list, while Afghanistan is placed at number seven.

Pakistan and North Korea, the two nuclear-armed nations that are close allies of China, are placed at number 13 and number 23 respectively. The last two should be a cause for serious worry. North Korea presently has less than four nuclear weapons, and its recent sabre rattling ended in a whimper.
It is clarified that nuclear weapons are of two types, viz fission bombs with yields of 14 to 20 kilo tonnes (KT), of the type dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (they use a conventional explosive to trigger uranium or plutonium charge), and the more powerful thermonuclear (fusion) weapons (which use a fission bomb to trigger the plutonium charge to get yields ranging from about 60 KT to over 25 mega tonnes).
These nuclear bombs (fission or fusion) achieve deterrence by their ability to destroy cities — called “counter value” (counter value is the targeting of an opponent’s assets which are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations) — but they can also be used to target enemy underground missile silos, national and military command and control centres, called “counter force”. As proved in the Cold War, counter force is very expensive. In addition, another type of bomb — typically a plutonium “fission” bomb generally below 5 KT — can be used against the enemy Army or warship formations. They are called Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs). Russia and the United States of America have removed TNWs from their arsenals by mutual agreement, as their use could initiate a nuclear war.
China and Pakistan have TNWs, but India does not. This is important, as India’s No First-Use (NFU) nuclear doctrine is based purely on counter value targeting, whilst Pakistan has an ambiguous nuclear doctrine which is based on first strike. China in its previous six defence white papers had an NFU doctrine but has created ambiguity in its seventh defence white paper for the year 2013 by not mentioning its nuclear doctrine. Both Pakistan and China have sufficient weapons to destroy all 50 Indian cities that have a population of over one million.
Taking into account only counter value targeting, if we count cities with population above one million people, then China has 160, India has 50 and Pakistan has 10. The number of bombs India needs, to simultaneously deter Pakistan and China with an NFU doctrine would be about 500.
In April 2013, SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) announced that India, Pakistan and China had each increased their stockpile of nuclear weapons by 10. Hence, as of 2013, India has about 110 nuclear weapons, Pakistan 120, and China 250.
India produces only plutonium based thermonuclear fusion weapons, and may continue to expand its arsenal at about five to 10 bombs a year, given that its deterrence is based only on counter value targeting. Pakistan has four operational weapon grade plutonium making nuclear plants in Khushab district of Punjab and produces some weapon grade plutonium already. After 2015, it will produce about 100 kilograms of plutonium annually (enough for about 25 fission type TNWs annually). While its existing highly enriched uranium (HEU) capability will continue to produce about five to seven uranium fission bombs annually, Pakistan may be capable of producing 30 nuclear weapons annually in a few years from now, based on availability of weapons grade plutonium and uranium, provided it has the requisite capacity of machinery and skilled manpower.
In 2011, a team from Georgetown University, Washington, startled the world with its findings that China had an estimated 3,000 nuclear weapons (instead of the 240 assumed earlier). This claim was contested by the International Panel on Fissile Materials, which in 2011 estimated that China could make 450 to 600 thermonuclear warheads, using its estimated stockpile of 1.8 tonnes of plutonium.
Further, China had about 20 tonnes of HEU that could be used to make 640 to 1,060 uranium bombs. This means that China may already have a nuclear arsenal of about 1,000 nuclear bombs, and is, perhaps, waiting for the US and Russia to announce a reduction of their arsenals to 1,000 each (from the present 1,550 each) before announcing its nuclear weapons holdings.
Retired Indian and Pakistani scientists, diplomats and military experts hold bilateral Track II “Nuclear Stability” talks regularly. These talks have produced sensible proposals on civil nuclear plant safety (including severe nuclear accident management) and nuclear stability (maintaining unilateral moratorium on testing, keeping nuclear weapons de-mated, prevention of inadvertent nuclear escalation, non-attacks on each other’s National Command Authority) etc. Since India’s concerns also include China, trilateral Track II talks comprising India, China and Pakistan would be logical.
China has a proven a Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) capability that has got India worried. India is building its own BMDS, which, in turn, has worried Pakistan. Pakistan is increasing its arsenal to overcome the Indian BMDS by multiple attack capability on Indian cities (possibly Delhi and Mumbai) expected to be protected by BMDS (under DRDO development presently). Hence nuclear stability in Asia is directly linked to the existing and emerging capabilities of the US, Russia and China.
Unfortunately, Asia does not appear destined for nuclear stability and a nuclear arms race has begun, with Iran likely to join the nuclear club, given its animosity to nuclear-armed Israel. A major terror attack could lead to a conventional war, which could lead to a nuclear war.
Nuclear weapons and BMDS are here to stay but nuclear stability in Asia can still be achieved if:

The US and Russia agree to further reduce their arsenals to below 1,000 weapons each, and China concurrently agrees to join India and Pakistan in Track II and Track I nuclear stability talks.
China, which supplies almost 85 per cent of North Korea’s food and energy needs, agrees to “freeze” North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programmes at the present level.
Pakistan gives up its policy of exporting terror, and eliminates terrorism on its soil.
The UK and France further reduce their weapons stocks from 180 and 300 respectively, as they have no known “enemies”.
Israel becomes an overt nuclear state, and declares its arsenal.
All nuclear powers declare an NFU doctrine.

The writer retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam