There seems no point in shooting off the “we told you so” line following WikiLeaks or that I am one of those who have been writing for eight years about the Pakistan Army or the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) playing a double role as America’s “frontline ally” in its war against terror in Afghanistan, at the cost of over 1,200 US Army soldiers killed so far. But will it make any difference to US President Barack Obama’s AfPak policy?
The documents, made available by WikiLeaks, suggest that Pakistan, an ostensible ally of the United States, allows representatives of its spy service to meet the Taliban directly in secret strategy sessions to organise networks of militant groups that fight against American soldiers in Afghanistan and even hatch plots to assassinate Afghan leaders. While much of the information — raw intelligence and threat assessments gathered from the field in Afghanistan— cannot be verified and likely comes from sources aligned with Afghan call into question intelligence, which considers Pakistan an enemy, and paid informants, many of the reports rely on sources that the military rated as reliable.
There are reports suggesting that the Pakistani military has acted as “both ally and enemy as its spy agency runs what American officials have long suspected is a double game — appeasing certain American demands for cooperation while angling to exert influence in Afghanistan through many of the same insurgent networks that the Americans are fighting to eliminate”.
It is believed that both former US President George W. Bush and Obama administration officials as well as top American commanders did confront top Pakistani military officers with accusations of the ISI’s complicity in attacks in Afghanistan, and even presented top Pakistani officials with lists of the ISI and military operatives believed to be working with terrorists. Senior US administration officials often expressing serious doubts about the Pakistan Army’s sincerity/efficacy and some even categorically blaming the Pakistan Army for taking the US for a ride has not stopped the US cozying up to Pakistan and frequently doling out large amounts of monetary aid and weapons, including those not required to combat terrorism. Even after WikiLeaks’ massive exposure of about 92,000 reports, the statement that is reported from Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral Mike Mullen is that the leaked documents on the war in Afghanistan “did not call into question the US strategy or Washington’s relationship with Pakistan”.
Having gone through 14 pages of WikiLeaks so far, one can say that there is almost nothing about the general trend or pattern of the ISI’s activities that Indian intelligence/security agencies and analysts may not have known. But without doubt, not only the US and other countries, whose Armies form part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, but also more nations generally allied to them should raise their guard. Because the way outfits like the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, raised and supported by the Pakistan Army and the ISI, have grown and spread to countries other than India — the initial and continued target — there may be more equivalents/counterparts of Daood Gilani, aka David Coleman Headley, hiding to strike some time in the future.
One name that frequently surfaces is that of Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, director-general of the ISI between 1987 and 1989, who is referred to in eight reports. One has him smuggling magnetic mines into Afghanistan to attack Nato troops, in another he is plotting to kidnap the United Nations staff to bargain for imprisoned Pakistani terrorists. A January 2009 report is about Gul meeting Arab militants in Pakistan’s tribal belt to send suicide vehicles into Afghanistan. “It was not known whether Hamid Gul was acting with the knowledge or consent of the ISI,” the report states. Anyway, Gul, still organising terror, has the gall to firstly accept to be interviewed by an Indian television news network and then lie through his teeth at length while fielding very hard questions.
Pakistan Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who wields most power in Pakistan and who the US has depended heavily on for “cooperation in fighting the terrorists”, headed the ISI from 2004 to 2007, a period from which many of the reports are drawn. American officials have frequently praised Gen. Kayani for what they say are his “efforts to purge the military of officers with ties to militants” and have described Pakistan’s spy service as a rigidly hierarchical organisation “that has little tolerance for ‘rogue’ activity”. But the ISI’s “S-wing” — which runs external operations against the Afghan government and India — has been given broad autonomy, which top Pakistan Army brass feels, provides it deniability.
In July 2008, CIA deputy director Stephen R. Kappes is reported to have confronted Pakistani officials with evidence that the ISI helped plan the deadly suicide bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul.
Regarding how President Obama’s AfPak policy has fared so far, it will be relevant to note the graph of the US Army’s fatal casualties in Afghanistan, which, from 2001 till 2010, are 12, 49, 48, 52, 99, 98, 117, 155, 317 in 2009 and 261 in half of 2010. And interestingly, out of these figures, the number of deaths caused by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) shoots up significantly from 2008, i.e. 152 out of 155 in 2008, 275 out of 317 in 2009 and 210 out of 261 in 2010 so far. This pattern is a major indication of an increase in numbers of terrorists, extension of their intelligence and reach and, thereby, expansion of their areas of domination. This could not have happened without substantial assistance from the ISI — be it its serving or retired operatives or both.
Yet large amounts of American taxpayers’ money is being given — that too during a period of recession — to Pakistan, whose Army is known to be the very cause of many US and other ISAF personnel dying and getting maimed. It remains to be seen how far the US will go in indulging Pakistan and for how long. The initial statements following WikiLeaks so far do not suggest any meaningful pressure on Pakistan from the US.
Unless these leaks, or more that may come, have any effect on US’ AfPak policy, India is most adversely affected by:
(a) of Pakistan’s conventional war arsenal, building up as India’s, is at an all-time low and (b) the US insisting on India talking to Pakistan to “resolve” the Kashmir issue, even as the Pakistan Army/ISI have been upping the ante there.
At the cost of being repetitive, it is reiterated that India must expedite its weapons replacements and acquisitions, neutralise terrorists who have regained control in Jammu and Kashmir and unless the US changes tack, seriously review the ongoing strategic cooperation with it.
Anil Bhat, a retired Army officer, is a defence and security analyst based in New Delhi