Kashmir has been a festering problem for 63 years. We have no roadmap beyond the line that Kashmir is an integral part of India and a solution will emerge through dialogue. It appears we suffer from the Panipat Syndrome — lack of strategic vision, remaining unprepared for dealing with crises and a refusal to learn from the past.
We have blundered from one folly to another and have repeatedly scored self-goals in Kashmir. All states, whether in India or Pakistan, acceded to either dominion on the basis of a common Instrument of Accession. Mountbatten, Jinnah and the Khan of Kalat signed a written agreement on August 4, 1947, at Delhi that on August 14, 1947, Baluchistan will revert to its 1876 status, that is, become independent. Yet in January 1948 the Khan, visiting Karachi, was forced to sign the Instrument of Accession. There were no special provisions for Baluchistan. The accession was repudiated by the legislature at Quetta and ever since Baluchistan has been in the throes of militancy. A desperate Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession in October 1947 but through exchange of letters, India agreed to special provisions for Kashmir not provided to any state in India or Pakistan. Then followed the cardinal folly of India taking the Kashmir issue to the UN in January 1948. Thereafter there has been a litany of follies, one after the other. On November 14, 1947, when the enemy was in full flight, the Army was stopped from advancing to Muzaffarabad. We liberated Tithwal and were tantalisingly close to Muzaffarabad in June 1948. The offensive was suspended in the wake of a UN appeal. In December 1948, after resounding success in Ladakh and Poonch, we were well poised to liberate Pakistan-occupied Kashmir but we agreed to a ceasefire. After the 1965 war, we handed over the strategic Hajipir Pass, won at great cost, on a platter to Pakistan at Tashkent. We were outwitted at Shimla in 1972 and surrendered our gains without settling Kashmir. Parliament passed a unanimous resolution demanding recovery of the area illegally occupied by Pakistan. We have done nothing to carry out that direction even when there has been widespread unrest in Gilgit- Baltal. We agreed to the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road being opened but could not get the Kargil-Skardu road opened. Our diplomats in Islamabad and our visiting dignitaries are shy of contacting leaders from that area agitating against Pakistan. On the other hand we allow free access to separatist leaders from Kashmir to the Pakistan mission in New Delhi and to meet visiting Pakistan dignitaries. We allow them to visit Pakistan and travel elsewhere on an anti-India campaign. In the name of press freedom we allow the Valley press to constantly carry anti-India false propaganda. The list of such follies is endless. In 2009, the UPA was so mesmerised by its agenda of installing youth in power that ignoring local sentiments Delhi installed Omar Abdullah as chief minister. He started with tremendous goodwill which he frittered away and has allowed the situation to spin out of control. In retrospect, it would have been much better if the experienced and locally more acceptable Farooq Abdullah had been allowed to become CM in 2009.
Pakistan has a pathological obsession with grabbing Kashmir. It tried war in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999 but could not succeed. It has been trying terrorism for 20 years but even that has not succeeded. The new strategy since 2008 is to generate a mass movement to secure secession.
The stone-pelting operations, timed with the Indo-Pak foreign minister talks, are a dress rehearsal for what is likely to happen when US President Barack Obama arrives in November. We might have a full-blown intifada on our hands. The US, desperately seeking to exit Afghanistan with honour, appears willing to go very far to promote Pakistan’s interests. The media, some deliberately and others inadvertently, is promoting sympathy for the “innocent” young boys pelting stones. It is said they have grown up in an atmosphere of violence and are angred by unemployment. The young generation in Poonch, Doda and Kargil, leave alone the non-Muslims in Jammu and Ladakh, have been through similar experiences but have not resorted to stone-throwing.
We see pictures of funeral processions. How many of us know that some 1,250 security personnel have been severely injured due to stone-pelting?
We must restore the writ of the state in the Valley. Unfortunately, Mr Omar Abdullah appears to have become a hate figure. Resigning would have been in the interests of a political comeback. The longer he stays the more his opponents will project him as the Centre’s puppet. If a replacement for him cannot be found, let there be Governor’s Rule.
Today all the deputy commisioners in the Valley are local non-IAS officers prone to local influence. IAS officers of proven ability should replace them. The police must get modern protective gear and non-lethal weapons. Firing should be the last resort and, if used, should be to disable, not kill. A worse situation, with large-scale terrorist violence, ethnic cleansing and mass upheaval, was successfully tackled by us in 1990. If other measures fail there will be no alternative but to call out the Army, as in 1990.
Talks with separatists are meaningless at this stage. The Mirwaiz refused to sit with what he called “Tom, Dick and Harry” during the round table conference and Mehbooba Mufti has repeatedly spurned the Prime Minister’s invitations for talks. If Sheikh Abdullah could be kept in detention and deported outside the state, why can’t the same treatment be meted out to the separatists?
Links:
[1] http://archive.asianage.com/sk-sinha-673