These things are never foolproof. But it is hard to dismiss the case that Mumbai would have been spared the trauma of 26/11 if David Coleman Headley, the American national of Pakistan origin who did the crucial reconnaissance work for the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba to mount the Mumbai terrorist attack in November 2008, had been arrested and duly investigated by the US authorities following tip-offs from his two former wives a whole year before the assault on Mumbai by Pakistani gunmen aided by the ISI. There can be a counter-argument that an ISI-inspired hit could have been undertaken even if Headley had been picked up, that quite simply the ISI and the LeT could have found a suitable replacement for Dawood Gilani (Headley’s original name). This is, however, extremely unlikely. If Headley had begun to sing in the lock-up and reveal details of the nature that he has, disclosing the close involvement of serving and retired military officers as part of the ISI team that trained the LeT commandos, ISI would be busy concocting alibis to firewall itself, not mounting alternative plans for an attack in India. At any rate, the recent American media disclosures revealing the disdain with which the information offered by the two women was officially treated by the US is likely to strengthen the perception in this country that when it comes to Pakistan-based terrorism, India cannot truly bank on timely American cooperation.
It is possible that Headley’s wives didn’t give the American authorities concrete, actionable, intelligence. This is the defence the US system has taken. However, since two women, not just one, in an intimate relationship with the man who so closely assisted with organising the Mumbai attack, came forward with details that Headley was a LeT man planning something horrible against India, the American agencies may have been expected to take a less cavalier attitude toward this country, considering they are meant to be hyper-active in the international war on terrorism, and they profess a relationship of partnership with India. In the event, they did wake up but only when it became clear that the Pakistani-American — after the success of his Mumbai enterprise — might be in the process of launching a major terrorist attack in Western Europe on behalf of Al Qaeda. It is hard to get away from the feeling that in a matter such as this the US system looked at India and Europe very differently; in short, it was not even-handed. True, before Mumbai was hit, the Americans did pass on some intelligence to India that a strike was possibly being planned. But in the intelligence business such general warnings are routine and numerous. Subsequently, the Americans also provided considerable assistance with their forensic expertise in investigating the Mumbai attack that helped us ascertain the role of the ISI in the 26/11 context. These instances of cooperation cannot, however, compensate for the lackadaisical US attitude earlier that came in the way of arresting Headley before the Mumbai carnage could materialise.
The fresh details in the Headley affair have emerged weeks before President Barack Obama is due to arrive in India on a bilateral visit. This is a pity. Nevertheless, using the Headley case as a peg, India and the US do need to have a thorough-going conversation on the effectiveness of cooperation in dealing with international terrorism, especially in the light of Pakistan’s profile in nurturing world jihadism. We cannot be over-solicitous about the presumed US need to deal with Pakistan with kid gloves on account of the Afghan factor. It should be made plain that India has its own priorities in Afghanistan which are at variance with Pakistan’s and not coterminous with those of the US when it comes to the fine print.