Foreign assignment

India’s election to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a non-permanent member is rightly seen as an opportunity to stake claim for permanent membership. The question of UNSC reforms has been on the cards for some time now. And the government will look to provide much needed impetus to the debate. But it also recognises that India’s performance at the high table over the next two years will be an important factor in determining the outcome. The external affairs minister, S.M. Krishna, has noted that the tenure would enable India to establish its credential in handling major international issues with responsibility.
What exactly this entails is a matter of some debate. It is easy to frame this question as a discussion of what stance India should adopt on a range of problems: Iran, Palestine, North Korea, Sudan and so on. It is equally tempting to consider whether India’s position would be strengthened by convincing the United States that it can play ball or by signalling to the wider international community that it can stake out an independent stance. These issues are undoubtedly important and are bound to be considered when specific problems come to the fore. But the window of strategic opportunity now open to India is a larger one.
The nub of the matter is how we understand the markers of power. Great powers do have the capacity to impose (by whatever means) their wishes on other states; but they also have the ability to control which issues actually come up for discussion in international institutions. As anyone who has chaired a meeting knows, setting the agenda is as important as prevailing in the discussion itself. The use of “hard” and “soft” power certainly enables a great power to influence the behaviour of other states. But much of its influence also flows from its ability to create or reinforce political norms and practices that shape other states’ choices and conduct.
Our own history of involvement in the UN suggests ways in which we can leverage this dimension of power. Indeed, Jawaharlal Nehru’s approach to the organisation drew on this insight into the multi-dimensional character of power. The “Kashmir question” casts a long shadow on any discussion of Nehru’s India and the UN. But there were significant, and now forgotten, successes as well.
As vice-president of the interim government constituted in September 1946, Nehru paid considerable attention to the UN. His views on the UN were quite pragmatic. He recognised that the structure of the UN accorded a privileged position to the great powers of the day. Yet he thought that the veto was an essential concession for the viability of the UNSC. At the same time, Nehru believed that the UN afforded an opportunity for India both to position itself as a major actor and to transform key aspects of the existing international system.
From the outset, he felt that India should be elected a non-permanent member of the UNSC: India should put forward its case for election “even if we fail in getting elected, the very fact that we have put out a strong case will influence world opinion and raise India in the eyes of the world”. The major issue where he wished India to frame a new agenda was on the position of the colonised territories. Nehru was well aware that the UN Charter was biased in favour of preserving the position of the major imperial powers. Two issues gave Nehru the opportunity he was looking for to change the agenda.
The first was the enactment by South Africa of a law that virtually segregated the Indians living in that country. India claimed that the treatment of Indians in South Africa was incompatible with the latter’s obligations under the UN Charter. But Article 2(7) of the UN Charter proscribed interference in matters falling under a state’s “domestic jurisdiction”.
When the issue came up for discussion, the US, Britain, South Africa and other Commonwealth states wanted to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice. On Nehru’s instructions, the Indian delegation insisted that the matter was a political not legal one. This stance resonated with several members of the General Assembly. Eventually, when India’s motion was put to vote, it was upheld by a comfortable majority.
The second issue in which India played an important role concerned the future status of south-west Africa. South Africa sought to annex this erstwhile League of Nations “mandate”. Significant opposition, however, came from other African states. India was forthcoming in its support for the cause. The Indian delegation energetically opposed the annexation of any “mandate”. Instead it demanded UN trusteeship based on the principle of the sovereignty of the people. These efforts paid off. When the issue came up for discussion in the General Assembly, the great powers backed off and South Africa was asked to come up with trusteeship arrangements.
India’s stance on the Korean War was another case in point. Immediately after the outbreak of the war, India went along with the UN resolutions blaming North Korea for the attack, demanding the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of status quo ante. But Nehru declined to send troops to fight as part of the UN Command. His efforts to convince the international community to take into account the role and interests of China in the conflict met with considerable disdain in Western capitals. But once the US and its allies were bogged down in the armistice negotiations, India’s ideas for breaking the deadlock were welcomed. What’s more, India was asked to chair the international commission on repatriation of prisoners.
Sixty years on, India’s is a much stronger player on the international stage. Yet in its quest for major power status it can learn a thing or two from its past. The key point is that the power of argument is as important as the argument of power. Two years at the UNSC will hopefully provide ample opportunity to hone our skill in setting the agenda of world politics.

n Srinath Raghavan is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi