26/11: Never again

December 7, 1941, the date of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, is America’s Day of Infamy. India’s would be November 26, 2008 — “26/11” — the day of The Great Mumbai Raid, India’s Pearl Harbour in every sense. Reportedly two years in the making, 26/11 was a classic “black operation”, meticulously planned, prepared and launched by the Pakistan Army and Navy, through their covert operations arm, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and its associate, the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. Two years on, on its second remembrance day on November 26, 2010, it is quite clear that but for the happenstance capture of one of the raiders, Ajmal Amir Kasab, almost entirely through the individual gallantry and self-sacrifice of constable Tukaram Ombale, an ordinary lathi-wielding constable of the Mumbai police (posthumously awarded the Ashok Chakra, the nation’s highest peacetime award for valour, and one of its very few deserving recipients amongst the basketfuls showered on all and sundry after the incident), India would still have been groping in the dark for direct evidence of Pakistan’s complicity and the demand for its arraignment as the epicentre of jihadi terrorism would have been considerably diluted before international organisations.
Public outcry in the immediate aftermath of 26/11 forced a massive shake up in government, one result of which was the appointment of a dominating, even domineering, home minister who is influential well beyond the jurisdiction of his portfolio, and has firmly tamed the bureaucracy in his ministry. Internal security has been systemically overhauled and refurbished by a series of stringent measures, enforced with a heavy hand, where necessary. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act; the National Investigative Agency as a specialised organisation for investigating terrorism and its associated crimes like money laundering, drug smuggling and gun running; regional bases for the National Security Guard (NSG) to facilitate faster reaction to situations; counterinsurgency schools for state police; Multi-Agency Centre at the Centre and in the states for coordination of intelligence are some examples of a work still in progress. To implement a comprehensive anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy against maritime infiltration, a Coastal Security Scheme has allotted `1,100 crore to coastal states, Union Territories and islands to strengthen and reinforce their coastal and maritime policing. The battle against terrorism has been joined.
Nevertheless, concerns and uncertainties remain, principal amongst them the possibility of another 26/11 and management of its likely internal and international repercussions. Pakistan has not exorcised its jihadi demons yet and the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and its associates sponsored as its strategic force multipliers against India remain functional. Some have metamorphosed into rogue Frankensteins and are now snapping at their masters, but India remains high on their target lists. The capabilities for a rerun of 26/11 definitely exist, intentions can be formulated at any time.
A strong sense of frustration and rage still smoulders in the Indian psyche at the government’s slow and disjointed responses after 26/11 and its incapability to bring the perpetrators to justice. Misplaced attempts by government spin doctors to try and depict this weakness as some kind of philosophical Gandhian restraint has further inflamed public opinion and there is little doubt at this stage that nuclear weapons or not, if (heaven forbid!) there is ever a repeat of 26/11 public reaction will be uncontrollable. It is therefore urgently imperative to forestall or at least inhibit the possibilities of such recurrence, for which the only way is to broadcast a credible message of deterrence to terrorists and their sponsors and, more importantly, be seen to be physically prepared and psychologically willing to take even the most extreme punitive responses if such a contingency ever recurs. This requires build up of capabilities, resources and, above all, attitudes, all of which remain far from adequate.
There is undoubtedly total mistrust in India about the Pakistan Army, its proven patronage of jihad, and strong nuclear and defence linkages with China, which has its own games to play. But even against this totally unpropitious background, logic nevertheless persists in suggesting the unthinkable — Indo-Pak cooperation against the gathering jihadi menace. Easier said than done, of course, but it should be noted that several non-governmental think tanks in India and Pakistan are already interactive on the issue.
Local support for the Mumbai fidayeen is another unanswered question, a politically hyper-sensitive hot potato, around which an officially-sponsored conspiracy of silence has been imposed. It has never been seriously examined, leave alone investigated. With the passage of time, additional reports are emerging about the suspected linkages of local jihadi organisations like the Indian Mujahideen with the planners of 26/11, supported by similar revelations from interrogations of Daud Gilani aka David Headley by American and Indian investigators, and of Ajmal Amir Kasab in Indian custody. Also, reflexive remarks about possible local support were made to the media in the immediate aftermath of 26/11 by very senior police and NSG officers, hastily recanted almost immediately thereafter. All these are straws in the wind which require official investigation by an appropriately constituted Commission of Enquiry to clear the atmosphere.
Coastal security and policing along the shoreline plays the “goalkeeper” role in a three-tier maritime security layout, with the Indian Navy in a blue water outer zone, and the Coast Guard closer inshore in a brown-water inner one. The planned Coastal Security Scheme allots the coastal policing function to state governments as part of their constitutional responsibility for public order, but given the generally unsatisfactory standards of policing at that level, it is a matter of concern that coastal security will remain the weakest and most vulnerable link in the entire system unless drastic improvements are somehow forced through. Reports of Somali fishermen apprehended in the Lakshadweep Islands, but only after landing undetected add to these misgivings.
Overall, however, it is encouraging to note that the lessons of 26/11 seem to have been taken to heart and beginnings have been made. Like the United States after Pearl Harbour, India’s watchword after 26/11 must also be “Never Again”.

Gen. Shankar Roychowdhury is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former Member of Parliament